Journals / Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Elektronik Dergisi / 2020 / Cilt: 11 - Sayı: 3

Do Political Budget Cycles Exist in Advanced Democracies?

İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?

Pages
728–743
Publication Date
2020-10-25
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In other words, political budget cycles are observed in the election periods and it is confirmed that for the reelection purpose politicians make benefit of manipulation.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In this study, it has been explored whether there have been any manipulation attempts on fiscal instruments in order to the reelection of politicians during the electoral periods dominated by advanced democracy for 42 countries selected by various criteria.
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Key Findings & Data:For this aim, a balanced panel data set covering the period 2001-2018 was used in the study.
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Conclusion & Impact:In other words, political budget cycles are observed in the election periods and it is confirmed that for the reelection purpose politicians make benefit of manipulation.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2001-2018 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Political Budget Cycles · Fiscal Policy · Panel Econometrics

Abstract

In this study, it has been explored whether there have been any manipulation attempts on fiscal instruments in order to the reelection of politicians during the electoral periods dominated by advanced democracy for 42 countries selected by various criteria. For this aim, a balanced panel data set covering the period 2001-2018 was used in the study. The methods applied in econometric methodology have been the difference between dynamic, and generalized moments models. Fiscal balance, fiscal revenue and government expenditure are considered as fiscal indicators. According to econometric results, it has been shown that the election variable has a positive and statistically significant effect only on the government expenditure variable both in the difference between dynamic and generalized moments models. In other words, political budget cycles are observed in the election periods and it is confirmed that for the reelection purpose politicians make benefit of manipulation.

Özet

Bu çalışmada çeşitli kriterlere göre seçilmiş 42 adet ülke için ileri demokrasinin hakim olduğu seçim dönemlerinde politikacıların yeniden seçilebilmek amacı ile mali araçlar üzerinde herhangi bir manipülasyon girişiminin olup olmadığı araştırılmıştır. Bu amaçla çalışmada 2001-2018 yılları arasını kapsayan dengeli panel veri seti kullanılmıştır. Ekonometrik metodolojide başvurulan yöntem farklarda dinamik ve genelleştirilmiş momentler modelleri olmuştur. Mali gösterge olarak ise mali denge, mali gelir ve kamu harcamaları kalemleri göz önüne alınmıştır. Seçim odaklı dalgalanmaların varlığının araştırıldığı bu çalışmadan elde edilen sonuçlara göre, seçim değişkeninin hem farklarda dinamik model hem de genelleştirilmiş momentler modeli için sadece kamu harcaması değişkeni üzerinde pozitif ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir etkisi olduğu gösterilmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle seçim zamanlarında kamu harcamaları üzerinde politik bütçe dalgalanmalarının görülmekte olduğu ve ileri demokrasiye sahip ülkelerde politikacıların seçimi kazanabilmek amacı ile manipülasyona başvurduğu tespit edilmiştir.

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Cite This Article

ŞEN, S. (2020). Do Political Budget Cycles Exist in Advanced Democracies?. Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Elektronik Dergisi, Cilt: 11 - Sayı: 3, 728–743. https://ajindex.com/articles/78713

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