Dergiler / Law and Justice Review / 2019 / Sayı: 18

DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?

İngiliz Şirketler Hukukunda Pay Sahiplerinin Yönetime Katilma Yetkisi Yönetim Kurulunun Otoritesini Zayıflatır Mı?

Sayfa
27–27
DOI
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

However,inparticular, director primacy theoryfiercely advocates limiting shareholderpower because shareholder participationundermines the board authority to managecompany freely and forces the board to actin the interests of shareholders rather thanin the long-term interes ts of the company.The UK perspective has not enjoyed anysustained examination of the relationshipbetween shareholder power and the boardauthority.This paper examines the amendment ofarticles of association, shareholders’ reservepower, the appointment and removal ofdirectors, executive remuneration andtakeover regulations in the UK and theboard authority under UK case law, andargues that shareholder power does notundermine the authority of the board andthese two concepts are compatible witheach other.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:The financial crisis of 2007-8 has focusedincreasing attention on the accountabilityof directors.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Demands of greateraccountability has given further impetuson shareholder empowerment.
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Sonuç & Katkı:However,inparticular, director primacy theoryfiercely advocates limiting shareholderpower because shareholder participationundermines the board authority to managecompany freely and forces the board to actin the interests of shareholders rather thanin the long-term interes ts of the company.The UK perspective has not enjoyed anysustained examination of the relationshipbetween shareholder power and the boardauthority.This paper examines the amendment ofarticles of association, shareholders’ reservepower, the appointment and removal ofdirectors, executive remuneration andtakeover regulations in the UK and theboard authority under UK case law, andargues that shareholder power does notundermine the authority of the board andthese two concepts are compatible witheach other.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:2007 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Alan Parametreleri

Özet

The financial crisis of 2007-8 has focusedincreasing attention on the accountabilityof directors. Demands of greateraccountability has given further impetuson shareholder empowerment. However,inparticular, director primacy theoryfiercely advocates limiting shareholderpower because shareholder participationundermines the board authority to managecompany freely and forces the board to actin the interests of shareholders rather thanin the long-term interes ts of the company.The UK perspective has not enjoyed anysustained examination of the relationshipbetween shareholder power and the boardauthority.This paper examines the amendment ofarticles of association, shareholders’ reservepower, the appointment and removal ofdirectors, executive remuneration andtakeover regulations in the UK and theboard authority under UK case law, andargues that shareholder power does notundermine the authority of the board andthese two concepts are compatible witheach other.

Abstract

2007-8 Finansal Krizi şirket yönetim kurulu üyelerinin hesap verebilirliği kavramını gündeme getirmiştir. Şirket yönetim kurulu üyelerinin daha fazla hesap verebilirliğini sağlamak için pay sahiplerinin yetkilerinin artırılması gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Fakat, özellikle yönetim kurulu üyelerinin üstünlüğünü savunan görüşe göre pay sahiplerinin yönetime katılması yönetim kurulunu etkisiz hale getireceğinden ve yönetim kurulunu sadece pay sahiplerinin kısa dönemli menfaatlerine odaklanmasını sağlayacağından pay sahiplerinin gücünün kısıtlanması gerekmektedir. İngiliz şirketler hukukunda pay sahiplerinin yetkileri ile yönetim kurulunun otoritesi (yetkileri) arasındaki ilişki yeterince incelenmemiştir. Bu çalışmada pay sahiplerinin ana sözleşme değişikliği, pay sahiplerinin saklı yetkisi, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin atanması ve görevden alınması, yöneticilerin ücret düzenlemesi, şirket devralma düzenlemesi ve yönetim kurulunun otoritesine ilişkin İngiliz Mahkeme Kararları incelenecektir. Bu makale, pay sahiplerinin yönetime katılma haklarının yönetim kurulunun otoritesini zayıflatmadığını ve bu iki kavramın birbiriyle uyumlu olduğunu ileri sürmektedir.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

SOLAK, E. (2019). DOES SHAREHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATORY POWER UNDERMINE THE BOARD AUTHORITY IN THE UK COMPANY LAW?. Law and Justice Review, Sayı: 18, 27–27. https://ajindex.com/articles/345286

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Kaynakça (2)

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