In this study it has been dwelt on the factors which interrupt the efficient transmission of individiual preferences to collective ones As the theory of the public choice put forwards some specific subjects such as the voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy and the problems arise from the election systems constitute important problems during collective decision process Keywords : The voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy
📌 3 Key Takeaways
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Objective & Hypothesis:In this study it has been dwelt on the factors which interrupt the efficient transmission of individiual preferences to collective ones As the theory of the public choice put forwards some specific subjects such as the voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy and the problems arise from the election systems constitute important problems during collective decision process Keywords : The voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy
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Key Findings & Data:In this study it has been dwelt on the factors which interrupt the efficient transmission of individiual preferences to collective ones As the theory of the public choice put forwards some specific subjects such as the voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy and the problems arise from the election systems constitute important problems during collective decision process Keywords : The voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy
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Conclusion & Impact:In this study it has been dwelt on the factors which interrupt the efficient transmission of individiual preferences to collective ones As the theory of the public choice put forwards some specific subjects such as the voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy and the problems arise from the election systems constitute important problems during collective decision process Keywords : The voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters
Abstract
In this study it has been dwelt on the factors which interrupt the efficient transmission of individiual preferences to collective ones As the theory of the public choice put forwards some specific subjects such as the voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy and the problems arise from the election systems constitute important problems during collective decision process Keywords : The voters’ apathetic and ignorant motives logrolling pressure and interest groups bureucracy
Özet
Bu çalışmada bireysel tercihlerden kolektif tercihe geçişi sağlayan oylama mekanizmalarının etkin çalışmasını sekteye uğratan etmenler üzerinde durulmuştur Kamu tercihi teorisi seçmenlerin ilgisizliği ve bilgisizliği oy ticareti baskı ve çıkar grupları bürokrasi ve seçim sisteminden kaynaklanan sorunlar gibi etmenlerin kolektif karar alma sürecinde önemli sorunlar teşkil ettiğini kabul etmektedir Anahtar sözcükler : Seçmenlerin ilgisizliği ve bilgisizliği oy ticareti baskı ve çıkar grupları bürokrasi
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Cite This Article
ÜNLÜKAPLAN, A. İ. (2003). Kolektif Karar Alma Sürecinde Temel Sorunlar. Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt: 11 - Sayı: 11. https://ajindex.com/articles/74231
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