Journals / Yeditepe Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi / 2019 / Cilt: 16 - Sayı: 2

THE STEWARDSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES OF SHAREHOLDERS IN UK AND EU COMPANY LAW

HBİRLEŞİK KRALLIK VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ HUKUKLARI KAPSAMINDA PAY SAHİBİ AKTİVİZMİ DÜZENLEMELERİ

Pages
127–162
Publication Date
2019-12-01
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This article examines the shareholder duties imposed by the Stewardship Code and the Shareholder Rights Directive, and argues that while these regulations are worthwhile initiatives, their impact on shareholder activism is likely to be modest due to their structural limitations

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, corporate governance discussions have focussed on shareholders’ duties regarding shareholder activism.
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Key Findings & Data:These discussions have also affected the UK, 46 other countries, and the EU.
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Conclusion & Impact:This article examines the shareholder duties imposed by the Stewardship Code and the Shareholder Rights Directive, and argues that while these regulations are worthwhile initiatives, their impact on shareholder activism is likely to be modest due to their structural limitations
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2008 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Gözetim İlkeleri · Pay Sahibi Hakları Direktifi · Pay Sahibi Aktivizmi

Abstract

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, corporate governance discussions have focussed on shareholders’ duties regarding shareholder activism. These discussions have also affected the UK, 46 other countries, and the EU. The UK adopted the Stewardship Code in 2010 and the EU adopted the Shareholder Rights Directive in 2017. While there are differences between these regulations, they share similar overarching goals. Both seek to improve the quality of institutional shareholder activism in order to ensure the accountability of management in public companies, to protect the long-term interests of companies, and to address the shorttermism problem in corporate governance. This article examines the shareholder duties imposed by the Stewardship Code and the Shareholder Rights Directive, and argues that while these regulations are worthwhile initiatives, their impact on shareholder activism is likely to be modest due to their structural limitations

Özet

2008 küresel ekonomik krizi sonrasında, kurumsal yönetim tartışmaları pay sahiplerinin yükümlülükleri üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. Bu tartışmalar başta Birleşik Krallık olmak üzere Avrupa Birliğini de etkilemiştir. Birleşik Krallık’ta Gözetim İlkeleri the “Stewardship Code” 2010 yılında, Avrupa Birliği’nde ise Pay Sahibi Hakları Direktifi-II the “Shareholder Rights Directive” 2017 yılında yürürlüğe girmiştir. Bu iki düzenleme arasında farklılıklar bulunsa da ulaşmaya çalıştıkları amaçlar benzerdir. Bu düzenlemeler kurumsal pay sahiplerini şirket yönetiminde daha aktif söz sahibi olmasını teşvik ederek çok ortaklı şirketlerdeki güç boşluğunu doldurmayı, bu şirketlerin uzun vadeli menfaatlerini korumayı ve kısa vadecilik sorununu çözmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu makalede, Birleşik Krallık ve Avrupa Birliği’ndeki pay sahibi aktivizmi düzenlemeleri ve bu düzenlemelere ilişkin tartışmalar inceleme konusu yapılmıştır

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Cite This Article

SOLAK, E. (2019). THE STEWARDSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES OF SHAREHOLDERS IN UK AND EU COMPANY LAW. Yeditepe Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 16 - Sayı: 2, 127–162. https://ajindex.com/articles/405809

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References (1)

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