Journals / Black Sea Journal of Engineering and Science / 2026 / Cilt: 8 Sayı: 1

The Axiomatic Characterization of a Value for Audit Purpose in Game Theory

Oyun Teorisinde Denetim Amaçlı Bir Değerin Aksiyomatik Karakterizasyonu

Mahmut Sami Öztürk(Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi İşletme Bölümü)0000-0002-7657-3150
Pages
128–131
Publication Date
2025-01-15
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Various propositions are used to axiomatically characterize the Shapley value, and the axiomatic characterization is concluded by proving the main theorem.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The aim of this study is to obtain a new characterization of the Shapley value, one of the effective solutions in cooperative game theory, using the fairness axiom.
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Key Findings & Data:The axiom of fairness requires that the payoffs of two players change at the same rate.
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Conclusion & Impact:Various propositions are used to axiomatically characterize the Shapley value, and the axiomatic characterization is concluded by proving the main theorem.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Shapley değeri · İşbirlikçi oyunlar · Aksiyomatik karakterizasyon

Abstract

The aim of this study is to obtain a new characterization of the Shapley value, one of the effective solutions in cooperative game theory, using the fairness axiom. The axiom of fairness requires that the payoffs of two players change at the same rate. The axiom of justice is important in terms of auditing as it considers the principles of equality, fairness and justice in the distribution of resources and decision-making stages. Audit within game theory constitutes the control mechanism of game theory and plays an important role in increasing the effectiveness of systems. In the study, in addition to the justice axioms, the gain-loss axiom and the Shapley value with the null player property are redefined. Various propositions are used to axiomatically characterize the Shapley value, and the axiomatic characterization is concluded by proving the main theorem.

Özet

Bu çalışmanın amacı adalet aksiyomunun kullanılması neticesinde işbirlikçi oyun teorisindeki etkili çözümlerden biri olan Shapley değerinin yeni bir karakterizasyonun elde edilmesidir. Adalet aksiyomu, iki oyuncunun kazançlarının aynı oranda değişmesini gerektirmektedir. Adalet aksiyomu kaynakların dağıtılması konusunda ve karar alma aşamalarında eşitlik, hakkaniyet ve adalet prensiplerini dikkate aldığı için denetim açısından önem taşımaktadır. Oyun teorisi bünyesinde denetim ise oyun teorisinin kontrol mekanizmasını oluşturmakta ve sistemlerin etkinliğini artırılmasında önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Çalışmada adalet aksiyomlarının yanı sıra kazanç-kayıp aksiyomu ve null oyuncu özelliği ile Shapley değeri yeniden tanımlanmaktadır. Shapley değerini aksiyomatik karakterize etmek için çeşitli önermeler kullanılmakta ve ana teorem ispatları yapılarak aksiyomatik karakterizasyon neticelendirilmektedir.

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Cite This Article

Öztürk, M. S. (2025). The Axiomatic Characterization of a Value for Audit Purpose in Game Theory. Black Sea Journal of Engineering and Science, Cilt: 8 Sayı: 1, 128–131. https://doi.org/10.34248/bsengineering.1569433

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