Journals / Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 73

The role of institutional factors and public economics in combating corruption: An empirical analysis

Yolsuzlukla mücadelede kurumsal faktörlerin ve kamu ekonomisinin rolü: Ampirik bir analiz

Yüksel Çağdaş(BOLU ABANT İZZET BAYSAL ÜNİVERSİTESİ İKTİSADİ VE İDARİ BİLİMLER FAKÜLTESİ)0000-0002-0112-2427
Pages
131–140
Publication Date
2026-04-30
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The findings indicate that improvements in regulatory quality and the rule of law significantly reduce corruption, while accountability mechanisms reinforce this effect.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This study empirically examines how anti-corruption efforts are shaped by institutional factors and public finance indicators.
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Key Findings & Data:Using a panel dataset covering 51 countries from different income groups over the period 2000–2023, the analysis jointly evaluates institutional factors— accountability and transparency, regulatory quality, and the rule of law—and public finance indicators, including tax burden, tax effort, and public expenditures.
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Conclusion & Impact:The findings indicate that improvements in regulatory quality and the rule of law significantly reduce corruption, while accountability mechanisms reinforce this effect.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2000–2023 Verileri
⚙️Variables:yolsuzluk · kurumsal faktörler · vergi yükü ve gayreti

Abstract

This study empirically examines how anti-corruption efforts are shaped by institutional factors and public finance indicators. Corruption distorts resource allocation through the misuse of public power for private gain, weakens economic efficiency, and undermines the quality of public services; in this respect, it constitutes a structural problem rooted in institutional and fiscal frameworks. Focusing on the concept of “combating corruption,” the study analyzes the institutional and fiscal conditions under which anti-corruption capacity is strengthened. Using a panel dataset covering 51 countries from different income groups over the period 2000–2023, the analysis jointly evaluates institutional factors— accountability and transparency, regulatory quality, and the rule of law—and public finance indicators, including tax burden, tax effort, and public expenditures. In addition, macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, unemployment, and inflation are controlled for to isolate cross-country differences. The findings indicate that improvements in regulatory quality and the rule of law significantly reduce corruption, while accountability mechanisms reinforce this effect. In contrast, a heavy tax burden and high tax effort increase corruption risk by intensifying fiscal and administrative pressure on taxpayers. The absence of a statistically significant effect of total public expenditure suggests that, in combating corruption, the decisive factor is not the size of public spending but rather expenditure allocation and implementation quality. By integrating institutional quality and public finance indicators, the study demonstrates that coordinated institutional reforms, fiscal transparency, and sound tax administration policies can generate sustainable policy gains in the fight against corruption.

Özet

Bu çalışma, yolsuzlukla mücadelenin kurumsal faktörler ve kamu ekonomisi göstergeleri çerçevesinde nasıl şekillendiğini ampirik olarak incelemektedir. Yolsuzluk, kamu gücünün özel çıkarlar doğrultusunda kullanılması yoluyla kaynak tahsisini bozmakta, ekonomik verimliliği ve kamu hizmetlerinin kalitesini zayıflatmakta; bu yönüyle kurumsal ve mali yapılardan beslenen yapısal bir sorun alanı oluşturmaktadır. Çalışma, “yolsuzlukla mücadele” kavramını merkeze alarak bu sürecin hangi kurumsal ve mali koşullar altında güçlendiğini analiz etmektedir. 2000–2023 dönemini kapsayan ve farklı gelir gruplarından 51 ülkeye ait panel veri seti kullanılarak yapılan analizde, kurumsal faktörler (hesap verebilirlik ve şeffaflık, düzenleyici kurum kalitesi ve hukukun üstünlüğü) ile kamu ekonomisi göstergeleri (vergi yükü, vergi gayreti ve kamu harcamaları) aynı model içinde değerlendirilmiştir. Ayrıca kişi başına düşen gelir, işsizlik oranı ve enflasyon gibi makroekonomik değişkenler kontrol edilerek ülkeler arasındaki farklılıkların etkisi ayrıştırılmıştır. Bulgular, düzenleyici kurum kalitesi ve hukukun üstünlüğündeki iyileşmenin yolsuzluğu anlamlı biçimde azalttığını; hesap verebilirlik mekanizmalarının bu etkiyi tamamlayıcı nitelikte güçlendirdiğini göstermektedir. Buna karşılık ağır vergi yükü ve yüksek vergi gayreti, mükellefler üzerindeki mali ve idari baskıyı artırarak yolsuzluk riskini yükseltmektedir. Kamu harcamalarının toplam düzeyinin istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bulunmaması, yolsuzlukla mücadelede belirleyici olan unsurun harcamaların büyüklüğünden ziyade hangi alanlara yönlendirildiği ve ne ölçüde şeffaf ve etkin biçimde uygulandığı olduğunu göstermektedir. Çalışma, kurumsal kalite ile kamu ekonomisi göstergelerini bütünleştiren yaklaşımıyla, kurumsal reformlar ile mali şeffaflık ve vergi yönetimi politikalarının eşgüdüm içinde tasarlanmasının kalıcı politika kazanımları sağlayabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır.

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Cite This Article

Çağdaş, Y. (2026). The role of institutional factors and public economics in combating corruption: An empirical analysis. Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Sayı: 73, 131–140. https://doi.org/10.18070/erciyesiibd.1802741

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