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Dergiler / Sosyoekonomi / 2009 / Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 10

Matching with Restricted Preferences

Mustafa DOĞAN
Sayfa
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Yayın Tarihi
2009-12-01
DOI
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

🎯
Amaç & Hipotez:This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey.
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Sonuç & Katkı:We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.
🔬Tür:Modelleme & Sayısal Simülasyon
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Alan Parametreleri

Özet

This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

DOĞAN, M. (2009). Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi, Cilt: 10 - Sayı: 10. https://ajindex.com/articles/139838

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Kaynakça (4)

  1. Balinski, M. and T. Sonmez (1999), “A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement”, Journal of Economic Theory, 84: 73–94.
  2. Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9–15.
  3. Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayar (1990), Two–Sided Matching: A Study in Game–Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
  4. Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor (1992), “Two Sided Matching,” in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, (eds.) Aumann R. and S. Hart, North Holland: Elsevier, 485–541.