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Journals / Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi / 2017 / Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 3

MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF TAX PAYMENT TYPES FOR CORPORATE TAXPAYER

Ersin Kıral
Can Mavruk
Pages
214–229
Publication Date
2017-10-21
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The results demonstrate that: (1) after implementation of new draft law, 17% more tax return can be generated compared to honest tax return from settlement; (2) tax administration needs to raise audit rates to a mean of 41% to force corporate taxpayer to point of indifference; (3) the agent of the corporation will prefer payment types of remorse exemption, settlement, after statutory period and reduction in order; (4) the government should implement new policies to prevent corporate taxpayer from paying two times the amount of fine per tax item.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Öz This article analyzes corporate tax returns from tax evasion based on corporate taxpayers’ payment types.
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Key Findings & Data:A tax payment function is generated for tax evasion and four payment types of the tax evader are included.
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Conclusion & Impact:The results demonstrate that: (1) after implementation of new draft law, 17% more tax return can be generated compared to honest tax return from settlement; (2) tax administration needs to raise audit rates to a mean of 41% to force corporate taxpayer to point of indifference; (3) the agent of the corporation will prefer payment types of remorse exemption, settlement, after statutory period and reduction in order; (4) the government should implement new policies to prevent corporate taxpayer from paying two times the amount of fine per tax item.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Anahtar Kelimeler Tax Evasion · Taxation and Revenue · Business Taxes

Özet

Öz This article analyzes corporate tax returns from tax evasion based on corporate taxpayers’ payment types. A tax payment function is generated for tax evasion and four payment types of the tax evader are included. An application is provided to compare tax returns under new draft tax procedural law and existing law. The results demonstrate that: (1) after implementation of new draft law, 17% more tax return can be generated compared to honest tax return from settlement; (2) tax administration needs to raise audit rates to a mean of 41% to force corporate taxpayer to point of indifference; (3) the agent of the corporation will prefer payment types of remorse exemption, settlement, after statutory period and reduction in order; (4) the government should implement new policies to prevent corporate taxpayer from paying two times the amount of fine per tax item.

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Cite This Article

Kıral, E., Mavruk, C. (2017). MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF TAX PAYMENT TYPES FOR CORPORATE TAXPAYER. Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 3, 214–229. https://ajindex.com/articles/73324

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