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Journals / Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi / 2012 / Cilt: 8 - Sayı: 16

Examination of the firms ownership structure: Deductions for ownership and control divergence

İşletmelerin sahiplik yapısının incelenmesi: Sahiplik ve kontrol ayrımı konusunda çıkarımlar

Emel YÜCEL
Ayşe Gül YILGÖR
Pages
41–57
Publication Date
2022-11-05
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

It is also found that the ultimate owners cash flow and control rights significantly differed and this mentioned divergence was high when the ultimate owner was a firm.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:In this study, it is aimed to evaluate characteristics of ultimate owners and the pyramid structures formed by ultimate owners through examining firm ownership structures and to indicate whether there is a separation between ownership and control rights or not.
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Key Findings & Data:In this respect, the evaluations were made by using the data belonging to publicly listed firms on the ISE from 2006 to 2008.
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Conclusion & Impact:It is also found that the ultimate owners cash flow and control rights significantly differed and this mentioned divergence was high when the ultimate owner was a firm.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2006 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

In this study, it is aimed to evaluate characteristics of ultimate owners and the pyramid structures formed by ultimate owners through examining firm ownership structures and to indicate whether there is a separation between ownership and control rights or not. In this respect, the evaluations were made by using the data belonging to publicly listed firms on the ISE from 2006 to 2008. As a result of the examinations, it has been specified that the level of availability of ultimate owners was high in firm pyramid structures were prevalent although they did not form complex structures. It is also found that the ultimate owners cash flow and control rights significantly differed and this mentioned divergence was high when the ultimate owner was a firm.

Özet

Bu çalışmada, firma sahiplik yapıları incelenerek, hakim ortakların özellikleri ve hakim ortakların oluşturdukları piramit yapılar hakkında değerlendirmeler yapılması ve sahiplik hakkı ile kontrol hakkı ayrımının olup-olmadığının belirlenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, İMKBde işlem gören firmaların 2006-2008 dönemine ilişkin verileri kullanılarak incelemeler yapılmıştır. İncelemeler sonucunda, firmalarda hakim ortak bulunma düzeyinin yüksek olduğu, piramit yapıların yaygın şekilde yer aldığı ancak karmaşık yapılar oluşturmadıkları saptanmıştır. Hakim ortağın sahiplik hakları ile kontrol haklarının önemli ölçüde farklılaştığı, söz konusu ayrımın hakim ortağın şirket olması durumunda yüksek olduğu bulunmuştur.

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Cite This Article

YÜCEL, E., YILGÖR, A. G. (2022). Examination of the firms ownership structure: Deductions for ownership and control divergence. Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, Cilt: 8 - Sayı: 16, 41–57. https://ajindex.com/articles/645482

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