Journals / Felsefe Dünyası / 2014 / Cilt: 0 - Sayı: 59

Descartes-based discussions on the definition of knowledge in Post-Gettierian epistemology

Gettier sonrası Epistemolojide Descartes odaklı bilgi tanımı tartışmaları

Pages
41–59
Publication Date
2022-10-18
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this paper, I tried to show, on the one hand, that the tripartite knowledge definition is not compatible with Descartes definition and, on the other hand, that the traditional epistemology is strong enough and epistemologically or morally superior to its competitor(s).

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Gettier s a short paper titled Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? , not only is one of the most influential writings in the history of philosophy, but also constitutes a turning point in epistemology that is one from its unique areas.
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Key Findings & Data:Gettier s critique to the tripartite definition of knowledge that he formulated in his paper, has leaded to a serious discussion for the last fifty years, and enabled claims that the main source of this problem was Cartesian thought.
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Conclusion & Impact:In this paper, I tried to show, on the one hand, that the tripartite knowledge definition is not compatible with Descartes definition and, on the other hand, that the traditional epistemology is strong enough and epistemologically or morally superior to its competitor(s).
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

E. Gettier s a short paper titled Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? , not only is one of the most influential writings in the history of philosophy, but also constitutes a turning point in epistemology that is one from its unique areas. Gettier s critique to the tripartite definition of knowledge that he formulated in his paper, has leaded to a serious discussion for the last fifty years, and enabled claims that the main source of this problem was Cartesian thought. In this paper, I tried to show, on the one hand, that the tripartite knowledge definition is not compatible with Descartes definition and, on the other hand, that the traditional epistemology is strong enough and epistemologically or morally superior to its competitor(s).

Özet

E. Gettierin Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (Gerekçelendirilmiş Doğru İnanç Bilgi midir?) adlı küçük makalesi, felsefe tarihinin en etkili yazılarından birisi olmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda felsefenin özgün alanlarının başında gelen epistemolojide de bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilmektedir. Gettier ilgili yazısında formüle ettiği bilgi tanımına yönelik eleştirileri, son elli yılda ciddi bir tartışmaya ve geleneksel ya da üçlü bilgi tanımı olarak kabul edilen bu tanımın önemli ölçüde Kartezyen düşüncenin bir ürünü olduğu iddialarına yol açmıştır. Bu yazıda, bir taraftan söz konusu bilgi tanımının Descartesın bilgi tanımıyla uyumlu olmadığını, diğer taraftan ise geleneksel epistemolojinin hâlâ güçlü olduğunu ve gerek epistemik gerekse de ahlakî açıdan karşıt(lar)ını öncelediğini göstermeye çalıştım.

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Cite This Article

MEHDİYEV, N. (2022). Descartes-based discussions on the definition of knowledge in Post-Gettierian epistemology. Felsefe Dünyası, Cilt: 0 - Sayı: 59, 41–59. https://ajindex.com/articles/512929

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References (7)

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