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Journals / Erciyes Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 21 Sayı: 2

Defending Human Rights Against Private Military Companies in the International Sphere

ULUSLARARASI ALANDA ÖZEL ASKERİ ŞİRKETLERE KARŞI İNSAN HAKLARINI SAVUNMAK

Buğra Pakbeşe(GAZİANTEP ÜNİVERSİTESİ, HUKUK FAKÜLTESİ)0000-0003-1962-8001
Pages
1259–1303
Publication Date
2026-10-21
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The final section discusses why existing norms of international humanitarian law and human rights law fall short in regulating PMCs and evaluates the issue of accountability.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This study examines the human rights violations caused by Private Military Companies (PMCs), which are becoming increasingly visible within the international security architecture, as well as the ambiguous legal status of these companies under international law.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Rather, this rise is a deliberate consequence of neoliberal state logic and governance paradigms extending into the security sphere.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The final section discusses why existing norms of international humanitarian law and human rights law fall short in regulating PMCs and evaluates the issue of accountability.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Paralı asker · Özel Askeri Şirketler · İnsan Hakları İhlalleri

Abstract

This study examines the human rights violations caused by Private Military Companies (PMCs), which are becoming increasingly visible within the international security architecture, as well as the ambiguous legal status of these companies under international law. The study proceeds on the premise that the rise of PMCs is not simply the result of a coincidental legal vacuum. Rather, this rise is a deliberate consequence of neoliberal state logic and governance paradigms extending into the security sphere. By relaxing the Weberian monopoly on violence, states transfer costs and domestic political risks to the private sector; thereby evade international accountability to a certain extent. The study first examines the historical development and legal nature of PMCs. It then focuses on how these actors’ profit-driven activities lead to human rights violations, both against their own employees and civilian victims. The final section discusses why existing norms of international humanitarian law and human rights law fall short in regulating PMCs and evaluates the issue of accountability.

Özet

Bu çalışma, uluslararası güvenlik mimarisi içinde giderek daha görünür hale gelen Özel Askeri Şirketler’in (ÖAŞ) yol açtığı insan hakları ihlallerini ve bu şirketlerin uluslararası hukuktaki muğlak statüsünü ele almaktadır. Çalışma, ÖAŞ’lerin yükselişinin tesadüfi bir hukuki boşluğun ürünü olmadığı üzerinden hareket etmektedir. Aksine, bu yükseliş, neoliberal devlet aklının ve yönetişim anlayışının güvenlik alanına yansıyan bilinçli bir sonucudur. Devletler, Weberci anlamda şiddet tekelini esneterek maliyetleri ve politik riskleri özel sektöre devretmekte; böylece uluslararası sorumluluktan da belirli ölçülerde kaçabilmektedir. Çalışma, önce ÖAŞ’lerin tarihsel gelişimini ve hukuki niteliğini incelemektedir. Ardından, bu aktörlerin kâr odaklı faaliyetlerinin hem kendi çalışanları hem de sivil mağdurlar bakımından nasıl insan hakları ihlallerine yol açtığına odaklanmaktadır. Son bölümde ise mevcut uluslararası insancıl hukuk ve insan hakları hukuku normlarının ÖAŞ’leri denetleme konusunda neden yetersiz kaldığı tartışılmakta ve hesap verebilirlik sorunu değerlendirilmektedir.

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Cite This Article

Pakbeşe, B. (2026). Defending Human Rights Against Private Military Companies in the International Sphere. Erciyes Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 21 Sayı: 2, 1259–1303. https://doi.org/10.58820/eruhfd.1981031

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