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Journals / Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi Uygulamalı Bilimler Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 10 Sayı: 2

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis of the US Manufacturing Sector

Kurumsal Yönetimin Temettü Politikasına Etkisi: ABD İmalat Sektörü Üzerine Ampirik Bir İnceleme

Allah Mohammad Nazari(Ministry of Higher Education, paktika university, Afghanistan)0009-0005-7708-8287
Emin Hüseyin Çetenak(NEVŞEHİR HACI BEKTAŞ VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0003-2900-4948
Pages
1–14
Publication Date
2026-09-30
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Empirical findings reveal that GOV scores exert a statistically significant and positive effect on dividend yield, supporting the "Outcome Model" proposed by La Porta et al. (2000).

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This study empirically examines the impact of corporate governance practices on firms' dividend policies within the framework of Agency Theory.
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Key Findings & Data:An unbalanced panel dataset comprising manufacturing firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between 2010 and 2021 is estimated using a Random Effects Panel Tobit model, accounting for the censored nature of the dependent variable.
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Conclusion & Impact:Empirical findings reveal that GOV scores exert a statistically significant and positive effect on dividend yield, supporting the "Outcome Model" proposed by La Porta et al. (2000).
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2010 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Kurumsal Yönetim · Kâr Dağıtım Politikası · Panel Tobit

Abstract

This study empirically examines the impact of corporate governance practices on firms' dividend policies within the framework of Agency Theory. An unbalanced panel dataset comprising manufacturing firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between 2010 and 2021 is estimated using a Random Effects Panel Tobit model, accounting for the censored nature of the dependent variable. The Corporate Governance Index (GOV) score obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database is employed as the primary explanatory variable. Empirical findings reveal that GOV scores exert a statistically significant and positive effect on dividend yield, supporting the "Outcome Model" proposed by La Porta et al. (2000). While firm size and return on assets positively influence dividend yield, financial leverage exerts a negative effect. The strong positive impact of Tobin's Q, representing growth opportunities, suggests that growth-oriented firms utilise dividend payments as a signalling device.

Özet

Bu çalışma, kurumsal yönetim uygulamalarının firmaların kâr dağıtım politikaları üzerindeki etkisini Vekalet Teorisi (agency theory) çerçevesinde ampirik olarak incelemektedir. 2010–2021 döneminde New York Menkul Kıymetler Borsası'nda (NYSE) işlem gören imalat sektörü firmalarından oluşturulan dengesiz panel veri seti, sansürlü bağımlı değişken yapısı gözetilerek Rassal Etkili Panel Tobit modeli ile tahmin edilmiştir. Çalışmada Thomson Reuters Eikon veri tabanından elde edilen Kurumsal Yönetim Endeksi (GOV) skoru temel açıklayıcı değişken olarak kullanılmıştır. Analiz bulguları, GOV skorunun temettü verimi üzerinde istatistiksel açıdan anlamlı ve pozitif bir etkiye sahip olduğunu ortaya koymakta ve bu sonuç La Porta ve diğerleri (2000) tarafından önerilen "Sonuç Modeli"ni desteklemektedir. Firma büyüklüğü ve aktif kârlılığı temettü verimini pozitif yönde etkilerken, finansal kaldıraç negatif etki göstermektedir. Piyasa değeri ve büyüme fırsatları hakkında ipuçları veren Tobin Q'nun pozitif etkisi, bu firmaların temettü ödemesini bir sinyal aracı olarak kullandıklarını işaret etmektedir.

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Cite This Article

Nazari, A. M., Çetenak, E. H. (2026). The Impact of Corporate Governance on Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis of the US Manufacturing Sector. Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi Uygulamalı Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 2, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.31200/makuubd.1931809

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