Journals / Habitus Toplumbilim Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 7

The Limits of Hybrid Peace Theory: Reassessing Initial Findings as the Russia-Ukraine War Enters Its Fifth Year

Hibrit Barış Teorisinin Sınırları: Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşının Beşinci Yılına Girerken İlk Bulguların Yeniden Değerlendirilmesi

Pages
169–208
Publication Date
2026-03-31
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Empirical findings indicate that hybrid warfare has evolved not merely into a military strategy but into a permanent mode of governance.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:This study constitutes a reflexive response to the article “An Axiological and Strategic Evaluation Regarding Russian Invasion of Ukraine” published in 2023.
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Key Findings & Data:This study reassesses the theoretical validity and practical relevance of the concept of “hybrid peace,” introduced in 2023, as the Russia–Ukraine war, which began in 2022, enters its fifth year.
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Conclusion & Impact:Empirical findings indicate that hybrid warfare has evolved not merely into a military strategy but into a permanent mode of governance.
🔬Design:İnceleme Makalesi
📍Scope:2023 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Hibrit Savaş · Hibrit Barış · Hibrit Bloklaşma

Abstract

This study constitutes a reflexive response to the article “An Axiological and Strategic Evaluation Regarding Russian Invasion of Ukraine” published in 2023. This study reassesses the theoretical validity and practical relevance of the concept of “hybrid peace,” introduced in 2023, as the Russia–Ukraine war, which began in 2022, enters its fifth year. The original article argued that, in response to the multidimensional nature of hybrid warfare, peace could likewise be established through a combination of conventional and non-conventional instruments. However, by 2025 the course of the war had significantly transformed this assumption. Empirical findings indicate that hybrid warfare has evolved not merely into a military strategy but into a permanent mode of governance. While Russia has suffered economic exhaustion and yet preserved its regime, Ukraine, despite strong international support, has failed to achieve a decisive strategic advantage. At the systemic level, instead of “hybrid peace,” a pattern of “hybrid bloc formation” has emerged. The multilayered rivalry between the NATO–EU axis and the BRICS–Shanghai axis has institutionalized the conflict at the global scale. In this context, the study argues that hybrid peace has given way to a notion of hybrid equilibrium or hybrid stability. Peace no longer signifies the absence of conflict but rather the sustainable management of controlled competition. Consequently, the axiological idealism of 2023 has evolved into the strategic realism of 2025. This transformation compels a rethinking of the very meaning of peace: in the hybrid era, peace is no longer a lasting reconciliation but the art of living with asymmetry. In this context, the main conclusion of the study is that the “hybrid peace” concept proposed in 2023 has increasingly proven insufficient to explain developments on the ground, and that peace has evolved from a normative goal to a hybrid balance in which the continuity of hybrid warfare and the inter-state competition structured by hybrid bloc formation are maintained within manageable limits.

Özet

Bu çalışma, 2023 yılında yayımlanan “Rusya’nın Ukrayna’yı İşgal Girişimi Bağlamında Stratejik ve Aksiyolojik Bir Değerlendirme” başlıklı makaleye refleksif bir yanıt niteliğindedir. Çalışma, 2022’de başlayan Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının beşinci yılına girerken, 2023’te ileri sürülen “hibrit barış” kavramının teorik geçerliliğini ve pratik karşılığını yeniden değerlendirmektedir. İlk makalede, hibrit savaşın çok boyutlu doğasına karşılık olarak barışın da konvansiyonel ve konvansiyonel olmayan araçların birleşimiyle tesis edilebileceği savunulmuştu. Ancak 2025 itibarıyla, savaşın seyri bu yaklaşımı önemli ölçüde dönüştürmüştür. Ampirik bulgular, hibrit savaşın yalnızca bir askeri strateji değil, kalıcı bir yönetişim biçimi hâline geldiğini göstermektedir. Rusya ekonomik olarak yıpransa da rejimini korumuş; Ukrayna uluslararası destekle dirense de kalıcı bir üstünlük elde edememiştir. Uluslararası sistem düzeyinde ise “hibrit barış” değil, “hibrit bloklaşma” ortaya çıkmıştır. NATO–Avrupa Birliği ekseni ile BRICS ve Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü ekseni arasındaki çok katmanlı rekabet, savaşın küresel ölçekte kurumsallaşmasına yol açmıştır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, hibrit barışın yerini hibrit denge veya hibrit istikrar anlayışına bıraktığını öne sürmektedir. Barış artık çatışmasızlık değil, kontrollü rekabetin sürdürülebilir yönetimi anlamına gelmektedir. Sonuç olarak, 2023’teki aksiyolojik idealizm, 2025’te stratejik realizme evrilmiştir. Bu dönüşüm, barış kavramının yeniden düşünülmesini zorunlu kılmaktadır: hibrit çağda barış, artık kalıcı uzlaşma değil, asimetriyle yaşama sanatıdır. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın vardığı temel sonuç, 2023’te öne sürülen “hibrit barış” kavramının sahadaki gelişmeleri açıklamakta giderek yetersiz kaldığı ve barışın normatif bir hedeften ziyade, hibrit savaşın sürekliliği ve hibrit bloklaşmanın yapılandırdığı güçler arası rekabetin yönetilebilir sınırlar içinde tutulduğu bir hibrit denge durumuna evrildiğidir.

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Cite This Article

Şengöz, M. (2026). The Limits of Hybrid Peace Theory: Reassessing Initial Findings as the Russia-Ukraine War Enters Its Fifth Year. Habitus Toplumbilim Dergisi, Sayı: 7, 169–208. https://doi.org/10.62156/habitus.1813439

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