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A Game-Theoretic Perspective on the U.S.–China Trade War: A Sequential Chicken Game Framework

ABD-Çin Ticaret Savaşına Oyun Teorik Bir Yaklaşım: Sıralı Tavuk Oyunu Çerçevesi

Müslüm Basılgan(Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi)0000-0001-8307-6315
Pages
59–85
Publication Date
2026-10-17
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

These findings highlight the role of strategic asymmetry, sequential decision-making, and payoff structures in shaping trade-conflict outcomes and illustrate the analytical value of the Chicken Game framework for understanding contemporary international trade conflicts.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:One of the most significant sources of tension in the contemporary global trading system is the trade war between the United States and China.
📊
Key Findings & Data:This study analyzes the U.S.–China trade war within a game-theoretic framework to examine strategic decision-making under conflict.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:These findings highlight the role of strategic asymmetry, sequential decision-making, and payoff structures in shaping trade-conflict outcomes and illustrate the analytical value of the Chicken Game framework for understanding contemporary international trade conflicts.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Ticaret savaşı · oyun teorisi · tavuk oyunu

Abstract

One of the most significant sources of tension in the contemporary global trading system is the trade war between the United States and China. This study analyzes the U.S.–China trade war within a game-theoretic framework to examine strategic decision-making under conflict. The Chicken Game is employed to model the strategic interaction underlying mutual confrontation, where both parties face strong incentives to avoid unilateral concession. Given the sequential and asymmetric structure of the trade conflict, the analysis is conducted in an extensive-form framework and applies the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Backward induction yields a unique SPNE in which the United States chooses a tariff strategy and China responds by avoiding further tariff escalation. The equilibrium reflects the first-mover advantage of the United States and China’s incentive to minimize the larger losses associated with mutual escalation under the assumed asymmetric payoff structure. A sensitivity analysis further shows that the equilibrium is preserved under alternative payoff magnitudes as long as the underlying ordinal preference relationships remain unchanged, while also demonstrating that the result remains conditional on these preference orderings. These findings highlight the role of strategic asymmetry, sequential decision-making, and payoff structures in shaping trade-conflict outcomes and illustrate the analytical value of the Chicken Game framework for understanding contemporary international trade conflicts.

Özet

Günümüz küresel ticaret sistemindeki en önemli gerilim kaynaklarından biri, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Çin arasındaki ticaret savaşıdır. Bu çalışma, çatışma koşullarında stratejik karar alma süreçlerini incelemek amacıyla ABD-Çin ticaret savaşını oyun teorik bir çerçevede analiz etmektedir. Karşılıklı çatışmanın temelinde yatan stratejik etkileşimi modellemek için, her iki tarafın da tek taraflı taviz vermekten kaçınmaya yönelik güçlü teşviklere sahip olduğu Tavuk Oyunu (Chicken Game) kullanılmaktadır. Ticaret çatışmasının sıralı ve asimetrik yapısı dikkate alınarak analiz, genişletilmiş biçimli oyun (extensive-form) çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilmekte ve alt oyun mükemmel Nash dengesi (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium – SPNE) kavramı uygulanmaktadır. Geriye doğru çözümleme (backward induction), Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin tarife stratejisini seçtiği ve Çin’in daha fazla tarife artışından kaçınarak karşılık verdiği tek bir SPNE ortaya koymaktadır. Bu denge, varsayılan asimetrik getiri yapısı altında ABD’nin ilk hareket eden oyuncu avantajını ve Çin’in karşılıklı tırmanmanın yol açacağı daha büyük kayıpları en aza indirme teşvikini yansıtmaktadır. Duyarlılık analizi ayrıca, temel sıralı tercih ilişkileri değişmediği sürece alternatif getiri büyüklükleri altında dengenin korunduğunu; bununla birlikte, sonucun söz konusu tercih sıralamalarına bağlı olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu bulgular, ticaret çatışmalarının sonuçlarının şekillenmesinde stratejik asimetrinin, sıralı karar almanın ve getiri yapılarının rolünü ortaya koymakta ve çağdaş uluslararası ticaret çatışmalarının anlaşılmasında Tavuk Oyunu çerçevesinin analitik değerini göstermektedir.

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Cite This Article

Basılgan, M. (2026). A Game-Theoretic Perspective on the U.S.–China Trade War: A Sequential Chicken Game Framework. Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 45 Sayı: 1, 59–85. https://ajindex.com/articles/1378147

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