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Propaganda War: A Comparative Analysis of Western Think Tanks and Kremlin Narratives in the Russia-Ukraine War

Propaganda Savaşı: Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşında Batılı Düşünce Kuruluşları ve Kremlin Anlatılarının Karşılaştırmalı Analizi

Yusuf Fidan(Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli Üniversitesi)0000-0003-4975-5845
Pages
109–127
Publication Date
2025-12-31
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

On the other hand, Western think tanks aim to strengthen the West's collective action capacity through a more “normative reaction” strategy.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Russia's occupation of Ukraine in 2022 went beyond conventional military clashes, leading to a global information and narrative war.
📊
Key Findings & Data:In this context, this paper analyzes the Russia-Ukraine war within the framework of propaganda, comparing the discursive strategies of Western think tanks with those of the Kremlin and Kremlin-aligned actors.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:On the other hand, Western think tanks aim to strengthen the West's collective action capacity through a more “normative reaction” strategy.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2022 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Propaganda · dezenformasyon · Düşünce Kuruluşları

Abstract

Russia's occupation of Ukraine in 2022 went beyond conventional military clashes, leading to a global information and narrative war. In this context, this paper analyzes the Russia-Ukraine war within the framework of propaganda, comparing the discursive strategies of Western think tanks with those of the Kremlin and Kremlin-aligned actors. The research argues that the war has gained importance as a “narrative front” beyond the physical front. Using a qualitative research design, a broad range of textual content (reports, policy briefings, official statements, and media content) covering the period 2022-2024 was examined. This study examined the policy discourse and texts produced by Western think tanks (such as the Brookings Institution, Chatham House, Atlantic Council, and Carnegie Endowment) and the discourse of Kremlin-aligned actors such as the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RT, and Sputnik using qualitative content analysis methods. The findings show that the two sides operate within fundamentally different strategic objectives. It reveals that they aim for epistemic destruction and chaos through the “Firehose of Falsehood” and 4D (Deny, Distort, Divert, Deter) models. On the other hand, Western think tanks aim to strengthen the West's collective action capacity through a more “normative reaction” strategy.

Özet

Rusya'nın 2022 yılında Ukrayna'yı işgali, konvansiyonel askeri çatışmaların ötesine geçerek, küresel bir enformasyon ve anlatı savaşını da beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu kapsamda bu çalışma, Rusya-Ukrayna savaşını, propaganda çerçevesinde ele alarak Batılı düşünce kuruluşları ile Kremlin ve Kremlin-yanlısı aktörlerin söylemsel stratejilerini karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz etmektedir. Araştırma, savaşın fiziksel cephenin ötesinde bir "anlatısal cephe" olarak da önem kazandığını savunmaktadır. Nitel bir araştırma tasarımıyla, 2022-2024 yılları arasını kapsayan geniş bir metin içeriği (raporlar, politika brifingleri, resmi açıklamalar ve medya içerikleri) incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Batılı düşünce kuruluşlarının (Brookings Institution, Chatham House, Atlantic Council, Carnegie Endowment gibi) ürettiği politika söylem ve metinleri ile Rusya Dışişleri Bakanlığı, RT ve Sputnik gibi Kremlin-yanlısı aktörlerin söylemleri nitel içerik analizi yöntemiyle incelenmiştir. Bulgular, iki tarafın temelden farklı stratejik hedefleri dahilinde hareket ettiğini göstermiştir. "Yalan Hortumu" (Firehose of Falsehood) ve 4D (Reddet, Çarpıt, Saptır, Yıldır) modelleriyle epistemik bir yıkım ve kaos hedeflediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Diğer bir taraftan, Batılı düşünce kuruluşları daha "normatif reaksiyon" stratejisiyle Batı’nın kolektif eylem kapasitesini güçlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

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Cite This Article

Fidan, Y. (2025). Propaganda War: A Comparative Analysis of Western Think Tanks and Kremlin Narratives in the Russia-Ukraine War. Avrasya Dosyası, Cilt: 16 Sayı: 2, 109–127. https://ajindex.com/articles/1368542

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