Journals / Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 73

Understanding the Usa’s extended nuclear deterrence policy towards South Korea: Nuclear umbrella or nuclear straitjacket?

ABD’nin Güney Kore’ye yönelik izlediği yaygınlaştırılmış nükleer caydırıcılık politikasını anlamak: Nükleer şemsiye mi, nükleer deli gömleği mi?

Kahraman Süvari(MANİSA CELÂL BAYAR ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0002-8137-9010
Pages
159–167
Publication Date
2026-04-30
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The study concluded that the extended nuclear deterrence policy, presented by the US as a nuclear umbrella for South Korea, can be considered a nuclear straitjacket that limits not only South Korea but also the US.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Why would a state use its nuclear capabilities to protect another state, potentially drawing it into a conflict and putting its own territory at risk?
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Key Findings & Data:In seeking an answer to this question, this study examined the restrictive effect of the extended nuclear deterrence strategy, which involves a nuclear actor protecting its non-nuclear ally using its own capabilities, through the US-South Korea alliance relationship.
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Conclusion & Impact:The study concluded that the extended nuclear deterrence policy, presented by the US as a nuclear umbrella for South Korea, can be considered a nuclear straitjacket that limits not only South Korea but also the US.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Güney Kore · nükleer deli gömleği · nükleer şemsiye

Abstract

Why would a state use its nuclear capabilities to protect another state, potentially drawing it into a conflict and putting its own territory at risk? In seeking an answer to this question, this study examined the restrictive effect of the extended nuclear deterrence strategy, which involves a nuclear actor protecting its non-nuclear ally using its own capabilities, through the US-South Korea alliance relationship. This study examined the concept of “nuclear umbrella,” used to describe extended nuclear deterrence, and proposes an approach based on the concept of “nuclear straitjacket,” highlights the restrictive impact of this strategic practice. The question of “Is the US’s extended nuclear deterrence policy towards South Korea a nuclear umbrella held by the US, or a nuclear straitjacket placed on both actors?” constitutes the fundamental problem of the study. A case study, a qualitative research method, was employed to reach findings related to the problem, data were collected using primary as well as secondary sources including studies on the subject. The study first examined the definition of the concept of extended nuclear deterrence strategy. After exploring the historical development and general structure of the extended nuclear deterrence policy adopted by the US towards South Korea, the implementation of this strategy was evaluated in the context of two historical cases. The study concluded that the extended nuclear deterrence policy, presented by the US as a nuclear umbrella for South Korea, can be considered a nuclear straitjacket that limits not only South Korea but also the US.

Özet

Bir devlet neden olası bir çatışmanın içine çekilerek kendi topraklarını riske edebilecek şekilde sahip olduğu nükleer imkanlarını başka bir devleti korumak için kullanır? Bu çalışma bu soruya yanıt ararken nükleer bir aktörün nükleer olmayan müttefiki olan başka bir aktörü tehdit unsurlarına karşı kendi kabiliyetlerini kullanarak koruma durumunu içeren yaygınlaştırılmış nükleer caydırıcılık stratejisinin sınırlayıcı etkisini ABD-Güney Kore ittifak ilişkisi üzerinden incelemiştir. Çalışmada yaygınlaştırılmış nükleer caydırıcılık uygulamasını kısaca tanımlamak için kullanılan “nükleer şemsiye” kavramı sorgulanarak bu stratejik uygulamanın kısıtlayıcı etkisini ön plana çıkartan “nükleer deli gömleği” kavramı üzerinden bir yaklaşım ortaya konulmuştur. “ABD’nin Güney Kore’ye yönelik uyguladığı yaygınlaştırılmış nükleer caydırıcılık politikası ABD tarafından tutulan bir nükleer şemsiye mi yoksa iki aktöre de giydirilmiş bir nükleer deli gömleği mi?” sorusu çalışmanın temel sorunsalını oluşturmaktadır. Çalışmada sorunsala dair bulgulara ulaşma konusunda nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden vaka analizi uygulanmış olup verilerin toplanması için birincil kaynaklardan ve konuya dair çalışmaları içeren ikincil kaynaklardan yararlanılmıştır. Çalışmada ilk olarak yaygınlaştırılmış nükleer caydırıcılık stratejisi kavramı ele alınmıştır. ABD’nin Güney Kore’ye uyguladığı yaygınlaştırılmış nükleer caydırıcılık politikasının tarihsel gelişim süreci ve genel yapısı incelendikten sonra da söz konusu stratejinin uygulanışı iki tarihsel vaka bağlamında değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışmada, ABD’nin Güney Kore için nükleer şemsiye olarak sunduğu yaygınlaştırılmış nükleer caydırıcılık politikasının sadece müttefiki Güney Kore’yi değil aynı zamanda ABD’yi de sınırlandıran nitelikte bir nükleer deli gömleği olarak değerlendirilebileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

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Cite This Article

Süvari, K. (2026). Understanding the Usa’s extended nuclear deterrence policy towards South Korea: Nuclear umbrella or nuclear straitjacket?. Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Sayı: 73, 159–167. https://doi.org/10.18070/erciyesiibd.1830153

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