Dergiler / All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace / 2019 / Cilt: 8 - Sayı: 2

Mobilization Follies in International Relations: A Multimethod Exploration of Why Some Decision Makers Fail to Avoid War When Public Mobilization as a Bargaining Tool Fails

Sayfa
359–385
Yayın Tarihi
2022-10-11
DOI
—
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A large-n evaluation of 68 cases of “public” mobilization,and an evaluation of six Balkan state mobilizations in the 1878-1909 era, donot support the idea that the size of the winning coalition, a part of the factorsdetermining overhaul, has an association with war onset or its avoidance.

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Amaç & Hipotez:This paper is intended to serve as a show and tell model for graduate students.Sections in parentheses and italics provide a running commentary by the authoron the decisions taken throughout the paper.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:The goal is to permit studentsto follow the thinking of the researcher and see how it guided the theoretical,methodological and other decisions on content that finally made it into the paper.The paper in question explores how “public” military mobilization can be anattempt by weak actors to trigger intervention by third parties in a dispute with astronger actor, in the hopes that the third parties will force the stronger actor toaccommodate the weaker actor.
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Sonuç & Katkı:A large-n evaluation of 68 cases of “public” mobilization,and an evaluation of six Balkan state mobilizations in the 1878-1909 era, donot support the idea that the size of the winning coalition, a part of the factorsdetermining overhaul, has an association with war onset or its avoidance.
🔬Tür:Modelleme & Sayısal Simülasyon
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Alan Parametreleri

Abstract

This paper is intended to serve as a show and tell model for graduate students.Sections in parentheses and italics provide a running commentary by the authoron the decisions taken throughout the paper. The goal is to permit studentsto follow the thinking of the researcher and see how it guided the theoretical,methodological and other decisions on content that finally made it into the paper.The paper in question explores how “public” military mobilization can be anattempt by weak actors to trigger intervention by third parties in a dispute with astronger actor, in the hopes that the third parties will force the stronger actor toaccommodate the weaker actor. This attempt is called “compellence via proxy”.In this research I explore why in reaction to failure, some weak actors are ableto avoid escalation to war, while others are not. I posit that the flexibility of thedecision makers of the weak actors is influenced by their ability to overhaul theirwinning coalition. A large-n evaluation of 68 cases of “public” mobilization,and an evaluation of six Balkan state mobilizations in the 1878-1909 era, donot support the idea that the size of the winning coalition, a part of the factorsdetermining overhaul, has an association with war onset or its avoidance.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

TRAVLOS, K. (2022). Mobilization Follies in International Relations: A Multimethod Exploration of Why Some Decision Makers Fail to Avoid War When Public Mobilization as a Bargaining Tool Fails. All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Cilt: 8 - Sayı: 2, 359–385. https://ajindex.com/articles/434993

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Kaynakça (17)

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