Dergiler / All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace / 2026 / Volume: 15 Issue: 2

The Role of Status in Military Interventions of Russia, Iran, and Türkiye in Syria

Musa Akgül(NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY)0000-0002-1893-7067
Hüseyin Faruk Şimşek(MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY)0000-0002-8485-0445
Muhammet Koçak(National Intelligence Academy)0000-0002-6448-9250
Sayfa
—
Yayın Tarihi
2026-06-08
🏛️Bu makalenin bibliyografik verileri ve tam metin bağlantısı DergiPark üzerinden sağlanmıştır.
DergiPark Kaydı ↗
✨

Yapay Zeka Hızlı Bakış & Çıkarımlar

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Furthermore, this research challenges state-centric views on status by showing that dissatisfied states may confront non-state actors to elevate their status without engaging in traditional interstate warfare.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

🎯
Amaç & Hipotez:The Syrian civil war provides a novel contemporary case for examining how different status-seeking powers engage in military interventions simultaneously.
📊
Temel Bulgular & Veri:In contrast, for Türkiye and Iran, any status acquired was largely a byproduct of their broader strategic goals and security concerns.
💡
Sonuç & Katkı:Furthermore, this research challenges state-centric views on status by showing that dissatisfied states may confront non-state actors to elevate their status without engaging in traditional interstate warfare.
🔬Tür:Research Article
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Status-Seeking · Status Deficit · Military Conflict

Abstract

The Syrian civil war provides a novel contemporary case for examining how different status-seeking powers engage in military interventions simultaneously. This study evaluates the actions of Russia, Iran, and Türkiye in Syria to assess the extent to which their interventions serve to enhance their international status. Through a comparative analysis of primary and secondary sources, the research reveals the complex dynamics between status deficits and military conflicts. The findings indicate that while status gains through military intervention were evident for all three nations before the downfall of the Assad regime, only Russia explicitly pursued status enhancement. In contrast, for Türkiye and Iran, any status acquired was largely a byproduct of their broader strategic goals and security concerns. After the regime’s collapse, Russia and Iran struggled to retain their status, whereas Türkiye managed to maintain, or even enhance, its standing. This empirical study also contributes to the status literature by demonstrating that not only major powers but also middle powers may resort to violence and gain international status. Furthermore, this research challenges state-centric views on status by showing that dissatisfied states may confront non-state actors to elevate their status without engaging in traditional interstate warfare.

🔖

Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Akgül, M., Şimşek, H. F., Koçak, M. (2026). The Role of Status in Military Interventions of Russia, Iran, and Türkiye in Syria. All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Volume: 15 Issue: 2. https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1956464

📄 Tam Metin PDF Okuyucu

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

Kaynakça (103)

  1. 20 Year National Vision Document. (2005). Iran Data Portal. https://irandataportal.syr.edu/20-year-national-vision
  2. Advisor To Iranian President Rohani: Iran Is An Empire, Iraq Is Our Capital; We Will Defend All The Peoples Of The Region; Iranian Islam Is Pure Islam – Devoid Of Arabism, Racism, Nationalism. (2015). MEMRI. https://www.memri.org/reports/advisor-iranian-president-rohani-iran-empire-iraq-our-capital-we-will-defend-all-peoples
  3. Ahmadian, H., & Mohseni, P. (2019). Iran’s Syria strategy: The evolution of deterrence. International Affairs, 95(2), 341–364.
  4. Ahmed, N. (2013, August 30). Syria intervention plan fueled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concern. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines
  5. Akbarzadeh, S., Gourlay, W., & Ehteshami, A. (2022). Iranian proxies in the Syrian conflict: Tehran’s ‘forward-defence’ in action. Journal of Strategic Studies, 46(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.2023014
  6. Akraminia, M. (2013). [Foreign policy strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in achieving the vision goals of 1404]راهبردهاي سیاست خارجی جمهوري اسلامی ایران در دستیابی به اهداف چشمانداز1404. [Strategic Studies Quarterly]فصلنامه مطالعات راهبردي, 16(60), 33–60.
  7. Al-Hilu, K. (2021). The Turkish intervention in Northern Syria: One strategy, discrepant policies (No. 2021/01; Middle East Directions Programme (MED), Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria). European University Institute. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/69657
  8. Arı, T., & Munassar, O. (2020). Two Stages of Turkey’s Quest for a Regional Power Status in the Middle East: An Integrated Role- Status-seeking Approach. Gazi Akademik Bakış, 14(27), 1–29.
  9. Ataman, M., & Özdemir, Ç. (2018). Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives Shifting Priorities. Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, 5(2), 13–36. https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.466046
  10. Bucala, P. (2017). Iran’s New Way of War in Syria (Critical Threats Project). Institute for the Study of War.
  11. Cengiz, S. (2020). Assessing the Astana Peace Process for Syria: Actors, Approaches, and Differences. Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 7(2), 200–214. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798920901876
  12. Davutoğlu, A. (2012, April 20). Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring. TEPAV. https://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/2827
  13. Diab, T. (2019). Peace Spring: Reading agreements and implications [Analytical Paper]. Egyptian Institute for Studies.
  14. Duque, M. G. (2018). Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach. International Studies Quarterly, 62(3), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001
  15. Erdoğan: Batı Türkiye’yi yalnız bıraktı. (2016a, March 31). NTV. https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bati-turkiyeyi-yalniz-birakti,AbwNjUeH7kuxoLhPlQLARw
  16. Erdoğan, R. T. (2015, June 26). Tüm dünyaya sesleniyorum: Bedeli ne olursa olsun, Suriye’nin kuzeyinde, Türkiye’nin güneyinde devlet kurulmasına asla müsaade etmeyeceğiz. X (formerly Twitter). https://x.com/RTErdogan/status/614536973529804800
  17. Erdoğan: Suriye’de uçuşa yasaklı bölge ilan edilmeli. (2014, September 27). Hürriyet. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-suriyede-ucusa-yasakli-bolge-ilan-edilmeli-27281800
  18. Erdoğan: Türkiye yanlış güvenlik anlayışını terk etmiştir. (2016b, October 19). NTV. https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/turkiye-yanlis-guvenlik-anlayisini-terk-etmistir,XQuseHLt2UW5dtuvV6m5oA
  19. Fawcett, L. (2015). Iran and the regionalization of (in)security. International Politics, 52(5), 646–656. https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2015.21
  20. Gilpin, R. (1981). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664267
  21. Goff-Taylor, M. (2017). Why Turkey Needs Russia (Viewpoints No. 113). Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-turkey-needs-russia
  22. Goodarzi, J. M. (2013). Syria and Iran: Alliance politics in a changing regional environment. Ortadoğu Etütleri, 4(2), 31–54.
  23. Götz, E. (2019). Strategic imperatives, status aspirations, or domestic interests? Explaining Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. International Politics, 56(6), 810=827. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0168-7
  24. Hernandez, M. G. (2024, December 16). Trump says Türkiye will hold 'key to Syria,’ hails relationship with Turkish president [AA]. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/trump-says-turkiye-will-hold-key-to-syria-hails-relationship-with-turkish-president/3426162
  25. Hinnebusch, R. (2015). Back to enmity: Turkey-Syria relations since the Syrian Uprising. Orient, 56(1), 14–22.
  26. Hoffmann, C. (2019). Neo-Ottomanism, Eurasianism or securing the region? A longer view on Turkey’s interventionism. Conflict, Security and Development, 19(3), 301–307. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1608016
  27. Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 233–309. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584
  28. Horowitz, M., McDermott, R., & Stam, A. C. (2005). Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(5), 661–685.
  29. Hunter, S. T. (2010). Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Praeger.
  30. International Crisis Group. (2018). Iran’s Priorities in a Turbulent Middle East (Middle East Report No:184). International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/184-irans-priorities-turbulent-middle-east
  31. Iran and Syria: Alliance of shared enemies and goals. (2012, June 8). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18369380
  32. Iran Has Won the War in Syria, Former IRGC Commander Declares. (2019, January 18). KAYHAN LIFE. https://kayhanlife.com/news/middle-east/iran-has-won-the-war-in-syria-former-irgc-commander-declares/
  33. Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey on agreed steps to revitalize the political process to end the Syrian conflict. (2016, December 20). Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran_-the-russian-federation-and-the-republic-of-turkey-on-agreed-steps-to-revitalize-the-political-process-to-end-the-syrian-conflict_-20-december-2016_-moscow.en.mfa
  34. Kagan, F. W., & Bucala, P. (2016). Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria. Critical Threats Project of The American Enterprise Institute. https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/middle-east/irans-evolving-way-of-war-how-the-irgc-fights-in-syria/
  35. Kalın, İ. (2013, August 1). “Türkiye Ortadoğu’da yalnız kaldı” iddiası doğru değil ama eğer bu bir eleştiri ise o zaman söylemek gerekir: Bu, değerli bir yalnızlıktır.". X (formerly Twitter). https://x.com/ikalin1/status/362746057513385984
  36. Kalın: Rusya ve ABD’ye Suriye’ye girme hakkı tanındıysa Türkiye’nin de aynı hakka sahip oldu. (2021, October 1). Habertürk. https://www.haberturk.com/kalin-rusya-ve-abdye-suriyeye-girme-hakki-tanindiysa-turkiye-nin-de-ayni-hakka-sahip-oldu-3208804
  37. Kardaş, Ş. (2013). Turkey: A Regional Power Facing a Changing International System. Turkish Studies, 14(4), 637–660. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861111
  38. Karim, M. F. (2018). Middle power, status-seeking and role conceptions: The cases of Indonesia and South Korea. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72(4), 343–363. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2018.1443428
  39. Kasapoğlu, C., & Ülgen, S. (2018). Operation Olive Branch: A Political ? Military Assessment. Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14059
  40. Koçak, M., & Akgül, M. (2022). Quest for regional power status: Explaining Turkey’s assertive foreign policy. International Journal, 77(2), 292–312. https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020221130310
  41. Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [The concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation]. (2023, March 31). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/
  42. Köstem, S. (2021). Russian-Turkish cooperation in Syria: Geopolitical alignment with limits. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 34(6), 795–817. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1719040
  43. Kozhanov, N. (2024, December 13). Russia has lost prestige after the fall of Assad. It has also been freed of a difficult partner. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/russia-has-lost-prestige-after-fall-assad-it-has-also-been-freed-difficult-partner
  44. Lake, D. A. (2013). Great Power Hierarchies and Strategies in Twenty-First Century World Politics. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (pp. 555–578). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587
  45. Larson, D. W. (2017). Social Identity Theory: Status and Identity in International Relations. In W. R. Thompson (Ed.), Empirical International Relations Theory (pp. 396–408). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.290
  46. Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2003). Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy. International Organization, 57(1), 77–109. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303571028
  47. Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy. International Security, 34, 63–95. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.63
  48. Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2014a). Managing Rising Powers: The Role of Status Concerns. In D. Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, & W. C. Wohlforth (Eds.), Status in World Politics (pp. 33–57). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107444409.004
  49. Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2014b). Russia says no: Power, status, and emotions in foreign policy. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3), 269–279. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.09.003
  50. Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2019). Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy. Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvbnm3jd
  51. Lavrov hopes West won’t embark on ‘reckless’ adventurism in Syria. (2018, April 13). TASS. https://tass.com/politics/999581
  52. Lavrov, S. (2019, October 16). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the 18th meeting of heads of special services, security agencies and law-enforcement organisations of foreign states, Sochi, October 16, 2019. Collective Security Treaty Organization. https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/vystuplenie-ministra-inostrannykh-del-rossiyskoy-federatsii-s-v-lavrova-na-xviii-soveshchanii-rukovo/#loaded
  53. Lebow, R. N. (2010). Why Nations Fight: Past And Future Motives For War. Cambridge University Press.
  54. MacDonald, P. K., & Parent, J. M. (2021). The Status of Status in World Politics. World Politics, 73(2), 358–391. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000301
  55. Marson, J., & Forrest, B. (2021, June 3). Armed Low-Cost Drones, Made by Turkey, Reshape Battlefields and Geopolitics. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/armed-low-cost-drones-made-by-turkey-reshape-battlefields-and-geopolitics-11622727370
  56. Melkonian, S. (2024, December 24). The Syria Fiasco As Seen From Moscow. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/12/the-syria-fiasco-as-seen-from-moscow?lang=en
  57. Melvin, D., Cullinane, S., & Tawfeeq, M. (2015, October 1). Russia’s Lavrov on Syria targets: ‘If it looks like a terrorist, walks like a terrorist ….’ CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/01/middleeast/russia-syria/index.html
  58. Mercer, J. (2017). The Illusion of International Prestige. International Security, 41(4), 133–168. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00276
  59. Milani, M. (2013). Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism). The Washington Quarterly, 36(4), 79–93.
  60. Molodykh, L. L. (2017). Uchastiye Rossii v voyne v Sirii v kontekste vneshney politiki Rossii: Motivy i predvaritel’nyye itogi. The Newman in Foreign Policy, 38, 25–40.
  61. Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. A.A. Knoph.
  62. Murray, M. K. (2019). The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers. Oxford University Press.
  63. Nakhoul, S., & Azhari, T. (2025, March 2). Russia gambles to keep military bases in post-Assad Syria. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-gambles-keep-military-bases-post-assad-syria-2025-03-02/
  64. Neumann, I. B. (2014). Status Is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians Seek Great-Power Status. In T. V. Paul, D. W. Larson, & W. C. Wohlforth (Eds.), Status in World Politics (pp. 85–112). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107444409.006
  65. Nitoiu, C. (2017). Aspirations to Great Power Status:Russia’s Path to Assertiveness in the International Arena under Putin. Political Studies Review, 15(1), Article 1.
  66. Noori, V. (2012). Status-Seeking and Iranian Foreign Policy: The Speeches of the President at the United Nations. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 3(9), 127–152.
  67. Nouri, V. (2013). Status-seeking as a foreign policy: An analytic framework for I.R.I Foreign policy (منزلت طلبی به مثابه سیاست خارجی؛ چهارچوبی براي تحلیل سیاست خارجی جمهوري اسلامی ایران). Strategic Studies Quarterly, 16(60), 7–32.
  68. Oktav, Ö. Z. (2015). The Syrian Civil War and Turkey-Syria-Iran relations. Syria Studies, 7(2), 1–19.
  69. Onea, T. A. (2014). Between dominance and decline: Status anxiety and great power rivalry. Review of International Studies, 40(1), 125–152. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000563
  70. Parlar Dal, E. (2016). Conceptualising and testing the ‘emerging regional power’ of Turkey in the shifting ınternational order. Third World Quarterly, 37(8), 1425–1453. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1142367
  71. Parlar Dal, E. (2019). Status-seeking policies of middle powers in status clubs: The case of Turkey in the G20. Contemporary Politics, 25(5), 586–602. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2019.1627766
  72. Paul, T. V., Larson, D. W., & Wohlforth, W. C. (Eds.). (2014). Status in World Politics. Cambridge University Press.
  73. Petkova, M. (2020, October 1). What has Russia gained from five years of fighting in Syria? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria
  74. Putin, V. (2000). Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii [The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation]. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf
  75. Putin, V. (2007, March 7). Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034
  76. Renshon, J. (2015). Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders. International Organization, 69(3), 659–695. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000107
  77. Renshon, J. (2016). Status Deficits and War. International Organization, 70(3), 513–550. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000163
  78. Renshon, J. (2017). Fighting for Status – Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics. Princeton University Press.
  79. Rüma, İ., & Çelikpala, M. (2019). Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Activism in the Syrian Theater. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, 16(62), 65–84. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.588930
  80. Russia, Turkey agree to create buffer zone in Syria’s Idlib. (2018, September 17). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/russia-turkey-agree-to-create-buffer-zone-in-syrias-idlib-idUSKCN1LX205/
  81. Sarı Karademir, B. (2019). A Dance of Entanglement: The US-Turkish Relations in the Context of the Syrian Conflict. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, 16(62), 27–43. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.588897
  82. Seddon, M. (2025, February 28). Vladimir Putin denies Russia was defeated in Syria. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/21ef79ab-e546-4968-85dd-b4c668afb467
  83. Seliktar, O., & Rezaei, F. (2020). Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29418-2
  84. Seren, M., Yeşiltaş, M., & Özçelik, N. (2017). Operation Euphrates Shield Implementation and Lessons learned [Policy Report]. SETA. https://www.setav.org/en/operation-euphrates-shield-implementation-and-lessons-learned
  85. Siccardi, F. (2021). How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/09/how-syria-changed-turkeys-foreign-policy?lang=en
  86. Smagin, N. (2023, February 7). Moscow’s Original “Special Operation”: Why Russia Is Staying in Syria. Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/01/moscows-original-special-operation-why-russia-is-staying-in-syria?lang=en
  87. Speech by President E. Macron for a global french diplomacy. (2017, August 29). France ONU. https://onu.delegfrance.org/Speech-by-President-E-Macron-for-a-global-french-diplomacy
  88. Spencer, R. (2017, May 10). Turkey humiliated by US decision to arm Kurds. The Times. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turkey-humiliated- by-us-decision-to-arm-kurds-scfnjmbf7
  89. Syria war: Alarm after 33 Turkish soldiers killed in attack in Idlib. (2020, February 28). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717
  90. Tabatabai, A. M., Chandler, N., Frederick, B., & Kavanagh, J. (2021). Iran’s Military Interventions: Patterns, Drivers, and Signposts. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA444-2.html
  91. Trenin, D. (2016, April 5). Russia in the Middle East: Moscow’s Objectives, Priorities, and Policy Drivers. Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2016/04/russia-in-the-middle-east-moscows-objectives-priorities-and-policy-drivers?lang=en&center=russia-eurasia
  92. Velayati: Syria is golden ring in chain of resistance in face of the Zionists and their protectors. (2016, December 27). SANA. https://www.sana.sy/en/?p=97120
  93. Volgy, T. J., Corbetta, R., Grant, K. A., & Baird, R. G. (2011). Major Power Status in International Politics. In T. J. Volgy, R. Corbetta, K. A. Grant, & R. G. Baird (Eds.), Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives (pp. 1–26). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119314_1
  94. Volgy, T. J., & Gordell, K. M. (2019). Rising powers, status competition, and global governance: A closer look at three contested concepts for analyzing status dynamics in international politics. Contemporary Politics, 25(5), 512–531. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2019.1621719
  95. Volgy, T. J., & Mayhall, S. (1995). Status Inconsistency and International War: Exploring the Effects of Systemic Change. International Studies Quarterly, 39(1), 67–84. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600724
  96. Ward, S. (2017). Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316856444
  97. Wastnidge, E. (2020). Iran’s Own ‘War on Terror’: Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Syria and Iraq During the Rouhani Era. In L. Zaccara (Ed.), Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani’s First Term (2013–2017) (pp. 107–129). Palgrave Macmillan. https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9789811539237
  98. What happened in Syria? How did al-Assad fall? (2024, December 8). Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/8/what-happened-in-syria-has-al-assad-really-fallen
  99. Why the Assad regime collapsed in Syria – and why so fast. (2024, December 8). France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241208-why-the-assad-regime-collapsed-in-syria-and-why-so-fast
  100. Wohlforth, W. C. (2009). Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. World Politics, 61(1), 28–57. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000021
  101. Yackley. (2020, October 15). How Turkey militarized its foreign policy. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/how-turkey-militarized-foreign-policy-azerbaijan-diplomacy/
  102. Yacoubian, M. (2021, February 16). What is Russia’s Endgame in Syria? United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/what-russias-endgame-syria
  103. Ziadeh, R. (2024, December 17). Deciphering the Quick Collapse of the Assad Regime. Arab Center Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/deciphering-the-quick-collapse-of-the-assad-regime/