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Dergiler / Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 22 Sayı: 53

Uzayın Askerîleştirilmesi ve Silahlandırılması: Bir Tehdit Değerlendirmesi

Militarization and Weaponization of Space: A Threat Assessment

Ali Bilgin Varlık0000-0002-5265-2321
Sayfa
127–153
Yayın Tarihi
2026-04-27
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Bulgular, halihazırda askerîleştirmenin operasyonel bir gerçeklik olduğunu, silahlandırmanın ise stratejik irade, teknolojik uygunluk ve jeopolitik rekabetle şekillenen bir gelişim süreci içerisinde olduğunu göstermektedir.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:Bu makale, uzay güvenliğinin güncel dinamiklerini, özellikle uzayın askerîleştirilmesi ve silahlandırılması bağlamında incelemektedir.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Amacı, uzay sistemlerini şekillendiren stratejik, teknolojik ve operasyonel tehditleri değerlendirmektir.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Bulgular, halihazırda askerîleştirmenin operasyonel bir gerçeklik olduğunu, silahlandırmanın ise stratejik irade, teknolojik uygunluk ve jeopolitik rekabetle şekillenen bir gelişim süreci içerisinde olduğunu göstermektedir.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Uzayın Askerîleştirilmesi · Uzayın Silahlandırılması · Karşı-uzay Teknolojileri

Özet

Bu makale, uzay güvenliğinin güncel dinamiklerini, özellikle uzayın askerîleştirilmesi ve silahlandırılması bağlamında incelemektedir. Amacı, uzay sistemlerini şekillendiren stratejik, teknolojik ve operasyonel tehditleri değerlendirmektir. Küresel düzeydeki uzay komutanlıklarının yaygınlaşması, askerî uydu konuşlandırmaları ve karşı-uzay yetenekleri analiz edilerek, askerîleştirmenin mevcut durumu ve silahlandırmanın potansiyel seyri ortaya konulmaktadır. Makalenin özgün katkısı, ikili kullanım sistemleri, doğrudan-fırlatılan karşı-uydu (Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite – DA ASAT) kabiliyetleri ve elektronik harp uygulamaları—GPS karıştırma ve aldatma dahil—gibi teknolojilerin askerî ve sivil uzay altyapılarına etkilerini kurumsal, teknolojik ve taktik perspektifleri birleştirerek değerlendirmesidir. Temel tez, uzayın modern savaşın vazgeçilmez bir unsuru haline geldiğini vurgularken, gelinen aşamada uzayda silahlanmanın görece kısıtlı olduğunu, esas tehditlerin yer tabanlı ve ikili kullanım karşı-uzay önlemlerinde yoğunlaştığını savunmaktadır. Yöntem olarak, çalışma açık kaynak istihbaratı, uydu veritabanları ve güncel akademi ve politika literatürünü sentezleyerek, askerî uydulara ilişkin nicel veriler ile kurumsal ve teknolojik gelişmelerin nitel analizini bir araya getirmiştir. Bulgular, halihazırda askerîleştirmenin operasyonel bir gerçeklik olduğunu, silahlandırmanın ise stratejik irade, teknolojik uygunluk ve jeopolitik rekabetle şekillenen bir gelişim süreci içerisinde olduğunu göstermektedir.

Abstract

This article examines the contemporary dynamics of space security with a focus on the militarization and weaponization of outer space. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the strategic, technological, and operational factors shaping the current and emerging threats to space systems. By analyzing the global proliferation of space commands, military satellite deployments, and counterspace capabilities, the study highlights the operational reality of militarization and the prospective nature of weaponization. The article’s original contribution lies in integrating organizational, technological, and tactical perspectives to evaluate how dual-use systems, directascent anti-satellite (DA ASAT) capabilities, and electronic warfare—including GPS jamming and spoofing—affect both military and civilian space infrastructure. The central thesis posits that while space has become an indispensable enabler of modern warfare, weaponization remains largely demonstrative, with ground-based and dual-use counterspace measures constituting the principal threats. Methodologically, the study employs a synthesis of open-source intelligence, satellite databases, and contemporary academic and policy literature, combining quantitative data on military satellites with qualitative analysis of institutional developments and technological demonstrations. The findings point out that militarization is an operational reality, whereas weaponization is an evolving trajectory influenced by strategic intent, technological feasibility, and geopolitical competition. The study emphasizes the need for comprehensive policies and norms to mitigate risks in the increasingly contested space domain.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Varlık, A. B., *, A. B. V. (2026). Uzayın Askerîleştirilmesi ve Silahlandırılması: Bir Tehdit Değerlendirmesi. Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, Cilt: 22 Sayı: 53, 127–153. https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.1825383

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