Dergiler / Bilig / 2026 / Sayı: 118

Ekonomik ve Mali İlişkilerin Diplomatik Etkisi: Türkistan Devletleri ile Çin Üzerine Bir Analiz

Diplomatic Impact of Economic and Financial Relations: An Analysis of the Turkestan States and China

Dergi
Bilig
Sayfa
177–212
Yayın Tarihi
2026-07-31
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Çalışma, ekonomik teşviklerin siyasi uyumu artırma potansiyelinin ancak iç siyasal yapı, kurumsal kapasite ve dış politika yönelimleriyle birleştiğinde etkili olabileceğini göstermektedir.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:Bu çalışma, Çin’in Türkistan Devletleri – Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Tacikistan, Türkmenistan ve Özbekistan – ile geliştirdiği iktisadi ve mali ilişkilerin, bu ülkelerin Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu’nda (BMGK) Çin ile olan oy uyumu üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmektedir. 2000–2021 dönemine ilişkin veriler ithalat, ihracat, dış borç, proje sayısı, taahhüt miktarı ve ekonomik özgürlük endeksi gibi değişkenleri kapsamaktadır.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Bağımlı değişken olarak oy uyumu oranı kullanılmıştır.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Çalışma, ekonomik teşviklerin siyasi uyumu artırma potansiyelinin ancak iç siyasal yapı, kurumsal kapasite ve dış politika yönelimleriyle birleştiğinde etkili olabileceğini göstermektedir.
🔬Tür:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Kapsam:2000–2021 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Oy Uyumu · ekonomi · Çin

Özet

Bu çalışma, Çin’in Türkistan Devletleri – Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Tacikistan, Türkmenistan ve Özbekistan – ile geliştirdiği iktisadi ve mali ilişkilerin, bu ülkelerin Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu’nda (BMGK) Çin ile olan oy uyumu üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmektedir. 2000–2021 dönemine ilişkin veriler ithalat, ihracat, dış borç, proje sayısı, taahhüt miktarı ve ekonomik özgürlük endeksi gibi değişkenleri kapsamaktadır. Bağımlı değişken olarak oy uyumu oranı kullanılmıştır. Verilerin parametrik varsayımları sağlamaması ve panel sonuçlarının anlamlı olmaması nedeniyle Theil-Sen regresyon yöntemi tercih edilmiştir. Sonuçlar, ekonomik ve mali ilişkilerin siyasi uyum üzerinde ülkelere göre değişen etkiler yarattığını ortaya koymaktadır. Kırgızistan ve Özbekistan’da ekonomik değişkenler anlamlı etki gösterirken; Kazakistan, Tacikistan ve Türkmenistan örneklerinde açıklayıcılık oldukça sınırlıdır. Çalışma, ekonomik teşviklerin siyasi uyumu artırma potansiyelinin ancak iç siyasal yapı, kurumsal kapasite ve dış politika yönelimleriyle birleştiğinde etkili olabileceğini göstermektedir.

Abstract

This study analyses the impact of China’s economic and financial relations with the Turkestan States – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – on voting alignment of these five states with China in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Data from the 2000–2021 period covers variables such as imports, exports, external debt, number of projects, commitment amounts and economic freedom index. The voting alignment ratio was used as the dependent variable. Due to the failure to meet parametric assumptions and the lack of significant results from panel models, the Theil-Sen regression method was preferred. The results reveal that economic and financial relations have varying effects on political alignment depending on the country. Economic variables show a significant effect in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, while explanatory power is quite limited in the cases of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The study demonstrates that the potential of economic incentives to increase political alignment can only be effective when combined with internal political structure, institutional capacity and foreign policy orientations.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Ceylan, F. A., Uruş, A. F. (2026). Ekonomik ve Mali İlişkilerin Diplomatik Etkisi: Türkistan Devletleri ile Çin Üzerine Bir Analiz. Bilig, Sayı: 118, 177–212. https://doi.org/10.12995/bilig.8957

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