Dergiler / Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 26 Sayı: 3

Ticaret Politikası ve İç Siyasetin Kesişimi: Popülizmin Yükselişi ve Küresel Düzenin Parçalanması

The Nexus of Trade Policy and Domestic Politics: The Rise of Populism and the Fragmentation of the Global Order

Gökhan Katıtaş(MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0003-0041-7669
Sayfa
1383–1414
Yayın Tarihi
2026-09-30
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Bulgular, korumacılığın motivasyonlarının küresel hiyerarşiye göre farklılaştığını ortaya koymaktadır.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası kurulan liberal uluslararası ticaret düzeninin, 2008 Küresel Finans Krizi ve ardından yükselen popülist hareketlerle birlikte yaşadığı yapısal dönüşümü ve yeni korumacılık dalgasını analiz etmektedir.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Araştırma, uluslararası arenada ticaret politikalarının salt ekonomik verimlilik arayışıyla değil, iç siyasetteki dağıtımcı mücadeleler ve jeopolitik güvenlik kaygılarıyla şekillendiğini savunmaktadır.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Bulgular, korumacılığın motivasyonlarının küresel hiyerarşiye göre farklılaştığını ortaya koymaktadır.
🔬Tür:Modelleme & Sayısal Simülasyon
📍Kapsam:2008 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Popülizm · politik ekonomi · ticaret stratejileri

Özet

Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası kurulan liberal uluslararası ticaret düzeninin, 2008 Küresel Finans Krizi ve ardından yükselen popülist hareketlerle birlikte yaşadığı yapısal dönüşümü ve yeni korumacılık dalgasını analiz etmektedir. Araştırma, uluslararası arenada ticaret politikalarının salt ekonomik verimlilik arayışıyla değil, iç siyasetteki dağıtımcı mücadeleler ve jeopolitik güvenlik kaygılarıyla şekillendiğini savunmaktadır. Stolper-Samuelson, Ricardo-Viner, Satılık Korumacılık ve Veto Oyuncuları teorilerini içeren çok katmanlı bir teorik çerçeve kullanan çalışma; ABD, AB, Latin Amerika, Asya ve Afrika’dan seçilmiş vakaları karşılaştırmalı bir perspektifle incelemektedir. Bulgular, korumacılığın motivasyonlarının küresel hiyerarşiye göre farklılaştığını ortaya koymaktadır. Küresel Kuzey’deki korumacılık, statü kaybına karşı savunmacı bir ‘gerileme kaygısı’ ile şekillenirken Küresel Güney’deki korumacılık, kalkınma hedeflerine dayalı saldırgan bir ‘yükselme arzusu’ taşımaktadır. Çalışma, Ricardo-Viner ve lobi odaklı modellerin, sınıf temelli modellere kıyasla güncel ticaret tercihlerini daha iyi açıkladığını göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, ‘Hiper-Küreselleşme’ çağının sona ermek üzere olduğunu, DTÖ merkezli kuralların aşındığını ve ticaretin güvenlikleştirildiği parçalı bir ‘Jeoekonomik Çağ’ın şekillenerek başlamakta olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Abstract

This study analyzes the structural transformation of liberal international trade order and the surging wave of new protectionism triggered by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and subsequent rise of populist movements. The research argues that trade policies in the international arena are shaped not merely by the pursuit of economic efficiency but fundamentally by distributive struggles in domestic politics and geopolitical security concerns. Employing a multi-layered theoretical framework that integrates Stolper-Samuelson, Ricardo-Viner, Protection for Sale, and Veto Players theories, the paper conducts a comparative analysis of selected cases from the US, EU, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The findings reveal a divergence in protectionist motivations based on global hierarchy: while protectionism in the Global North is driven by a defensive ‘anxiety of decline’ regarding status loss, protectionism in the Global South is motivated by an offensive ‘aspiration of ascent’ tied to developmental goals. The study demonstrates that Ricardo-Viner and lobby-based models possess greater explanatory power for current trade preferences than class-based models. Consequently, the paper posits that the era of ‘hyper-globalization’ is drawing to a close, as WTO-centered rules erode and a fragmented ‘geo-economic age’ -defined by the securitization of trade- begins to take shape.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Katıtaş, G. (2026). Ticaret Politikası ve İç Siyasetin Kesişimi: Popülizmin Yükselişi ve Küresel Düzenin Parçalanması. Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 26 Sayı: 3, 1383–1414. https://doi.org/10.18037/ausbd.1843077

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