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Materyalitenin Jeopolitiği: ABD'nin Kritik Maden Stratejileri ve İttifak Mimarisi

The Geopolitics of Materiality: U.S. Critical Mineral Strategies and Alliance Architecture

Gökhan Katıtaş(MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0003-0041-7669
Sayfa
292–318
Yayın Tarihi
2026-06-30
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Sonuç olarak çalışma, ABD’nin piyasa etkinliği önceliğini terk ederek güvenlik ve dayanıklılık odaklı yeni bir jeoekonomik bloklaşma modeline geçtiğini ortaya koymakta ve kritik maden tedarik zincirlerinin stratejik kontrolünün, çağdaş küresel güç rekabetinin temel belirleyicisi haline geldiğini savunmaktadır.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:Bu çalışma, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin 1939–2025 yılları arasındaki kritik maden stratejilerini ve ittifak mimarisini ‘materyalitenin jeopolitiği’ perspektifinden derinlemesine incelemektedir.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:Özellikle 1990–2016 arası ‘Neoliberal Rehavet’ dönemi, üretim kapasitelerinin dışsallaştırılması ve Çin’in tedarik zincirindeki ‘düğüm noktası etkisini’ güçlendirmesiyle sonuçlanan bir stratejik fetret devri olarak tanımlanmaktadır.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Sonuç olarak çalışma, ABD’nin piyasa etkinliği önceliğini terk ederek güvenlik ve dayanıklılık odaklı yeni bir jeoekonomik bloklaşma modeline geçtiğini ortaya koymakta ve kritik maden tedarik zincirlerinin stratejik kontrolünün, çağdaş küresel güç rekabetinin temel belirleyicisi haline geldiğini savunmaktadır.
🔬Tür:Modelleme & Sayısal Simülasyon
📍Kapsam:2025 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Jeoekonomi · kritik madenler · tedarik zinciri güvenliği

Özet

Bu çalışma, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin 1939–2025 yılları arasındaki kritik maden stratejilerini ve ittifak mimarisini ‘materyalitenin jeopolitiği’ perspektifinden derinlemesine incelemektedir. Tarihsel Kurumsalcılık ve Süreç Takibi yöntemlerini kullanan makale, ABD’nin maden politikasını dört ana tarihsel dönemde analiz etmektedir. Özellikle 1990–2016 arası ‘Neoliberal Rehavet’ dönemi, üretim kapasitelerinin dışsallaştırılması ve Çin’in tedarik zincirindeki ‘düğüm noktası etkisini’ güçlendirmesiyle sonuçlanan bir stratejik fetret devri olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Çalışma, 2017 sonrası yaşanan ‘Jeo-ekonomik Uyanış’ sürecinde ABD’nin, Enflasyon Azaltma Yasası (IRA) ve Savunma Üretim Yasası (DPA) gibi araçlarla piyasaya doğrudan müdahale ettiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Janet Yellen tarafından kavramsallaştırılan ‘friend-shoring’ (dost ülkelerden tedarik) doktrini çerçevesinde şekillenen yeni ittifak mimarisi; Kuzey Amerika, Hint-Pasifik, Afrika ve Latin Amerika’daki bölgesel vaka analizleri üzerinden test edilmektedir. Sonuç olarak çalışma, ABD’nin piyasa etkinliği önceliğini terk ederek güvenlik ve dayanıklılık odaklı yeni bir jeoekonomik bloklaşma modeline geçtiğini ortaya koymakta ve kritik maden tedarik zincirlerinin stratejik kontrolünün, çağdaş küresel güç rekabetinin temel belirleyicisi haline geldiğini savunmaktadır.

Abstract

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of United States critical mineral strategies and alliance architecture between 1939 and 2025 through the lens of the ‘geopolitics of materiality’. Utilizing Historical Institutionalism and Process Tracing, the article evaluates U.S. mineral policy across four distinct historical eras. It specifically identifies the 1990–2016 period as ‘Neoliberal Complacency,’ a strategic interval characterized by offshoring and market-driven inertia that allowed China to establish a formidable "chokepoint effect" within global supply chains. The paper demonstrates how the post-2017 ‘Geo-economic Awakening’ prompted a return to state interventionism through legislative tools such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Defense Production Act (DPA). The research examines the newly emerging alliance architecture—driven by the ‘friend-shoring’ doctrine—through detailed regional case studies in North America, the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. By integrating Securitization Theory and Weaponized Interdependence, the study concludes that the U.S. has pivoted from market efficiency to a security-oriented model of geo-economic bloc formation. Ultimately, the work argues that the strategic control of critical mineral supply chains has become a primary determinant of contemporary global power competition.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Katıtaş, G. (2026). Materyalitenin Jeopolitiği: ABD'nin Kritik Maden Stratejileri ve İttifak Mimarisi. Siirt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 1, 292–318. https://doi.org/10.53586/susbid.1899374

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