Journals / İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2022 / Cilt: 21 - Sayı: 45

Bank market power and risk during crises

Kriz zamanlarında banka piyasa gücü ve riski

Pages
1405–1422
Publication Date
2022-12-30
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Policymaking in banking may specifically focus on improving bank market power but not maximizing competition between banks during crises.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Purpose: This paper investigates the influence of bank market power on risk during the Global Financial Crisis 2007/2009 (GFC).
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Key Findings & Data:Methodology: We use a sample of 6,090 private and listed US banks for 2007-2016 and perform our estimations using panel data techniques, together with bank-fixed effects.
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Conclusion & Impact:Policymaking in banking may specifically focus on improving bank market power but not maximizing competition between banks during crises.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2007 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Banka riski · 2007-2009 Küresel Finansal Kriz · Lerner indeksi

Abstract

Purpose: This paper investigates the influence of bank market power on risk during the Global Financial Crisis 2007/2009 (GFC). Methodology: We use a sample of 6,090 private and listed US banks for 2007-2016 and perform our estimations using panel data techniques, together with bank-fixed effects. Findings: The findings suggest that the crisis increases banks’ default risk for banks with lower market power. Meanwhile, higher market power helps banks to remain stable during turbulent times and have lower default risk. Banks with more market power achieve this stability mainly because of lower leverage risk and lower portfolio risk. They managed to maintain a portfolio with higher and more stable earnings during the crisis. This paper supports the view that market power in banking is very vital, and competition is more harmful to stability during crisis periods. Originality: This paper provides important implications for the banking industry during crisis times. Policymaking in banking may specifically focus on improving bank market power but not maximizing competition between banks during crises.

Özet

Amaç: Bu makale, Küresel Finansal Kriz 2007/2009 (GFC) döneminde banka piyasa gücünün risk üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. Metodoloji: 2007-2016 yılları için 6090 özel ve borsada işlem gören ABD bankasından oluşan bir örneklem kullanılmaktadır ve ampirik analiz banka sabit etkileri içeren panel veri teknikleri kullanarak gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bulgular: Bulgular, krizin piyasa gücü düşük bankaların temerrüt riskini artırdığını göstermektedir. Ancak, yüksek piyasa gücüne sahip bankalar kriz sırasında istikrarlı kalır ve temerrüt riskleri daha düşüktür. Daha fazla piyasa gücüne sahip bankalar, kriz sırasında, esas olarak daha düşük kaldıraç riski ve ve daha düşük portföy riski yoluyla istikrarı sağlamaktadırlar. Bu bankalar kriz sırasında daha yüksek ve daha istikrarlı kazançlara sahip bir portföy sürdürmeyi başarmışlardır. Bu çalışma, bankacılıkta piyasa gücünün çok hayati olduğu ve kriz dönemlerinde rekabetin istikrar için daha zararlı olduğu görüşünü desteklemektedir. Özgünlük: Bu makale, kriz zamanlarında bankacılık sektörü için önemli çıkarımlar sunmaktadır. Bankacılıkta politika yapıcılar, kriz zamanları sırasında bankalar arasındaki rekabeti maksimize etmeye değil, banka pazar gücünü geliştirmeye odaklanabilir

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Cite This Article

DANIŞMAN, G. Ö. (2022). Bank market power and risk during crises. İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 21 - Sayı: 45, 1405–1422. https://ajindex.com/articles/868971

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