Journals / İktisat Politikası Araştırmaları Dergisi / 2019 / Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 1

Tariff Disadvantages of SMEs in International Trade

KOBİ’lerin Uluslararası Ticarette Karşılaştığı Tarife Dezavantajları

Pages
1–30
Publication Date
2019-01-22
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this regard, instead of governments’ initiatives, a multilateral initiation under the WTO umbrella could be considered.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Although SMEs working both in developed and developing countries contribute a lot to employment and GDP of the countries they operate, their participations in international trading activities remain modest.
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Key Findings & Data:SMEs most of whom operate in import substitution industries in their home country receive tariff protection support from their governments, thanks to their high lobbying power.
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Conclusion & Impact:In this regard, instead of governments’ initiatives, a multilateral initiation under the WTO umbrella could be considered.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:KOBİ · Tarifeler · Tarife dışı önlemler

Abstract

Although SMEs working both in developed and developing countries contribute a lot to employment and GDP of the countries they operate, their participations in international trading activities remain modest. Great importance are attached to bringing them international play field from the viewpoint of macroeconomic stability of the world economy. In the process of internalization, SMEs encounter a lot of obstacles such as high level customs tariff and quasi tariff financial burdens, as well as other non- tariff barriers. But who creates these obstacles are SMEs themselves. SMEs most of whom operate in import substitution industries in their home country receive tariff protection support from their governments, thanks to their high lobbying power. In order for SMEs to be able escape from this vicious cycle, it is impossible for countries to fight with the protectionism in their own initiatives. In this regard, instead of governments’ initiatives, a multilateral initiation under the WTO umbrella could be considered.

Özet

Hem gelişmiş hem de gelişmekte olan ülkelerde faaliyet gösteren KOBİ’ler, faaliyet gösterdikleri ülkelerin istihdam ve GSYİH’larına önemli katkılar yaptıkları halde, dünya ticaretine katılım düzeyleri oldukça sınırlı kalmaktadır. KOBİ’lerin uluslararası ticaret sahnesine çekilmesine ülkelerin makroekonomik istikrarı açısından büyük bir önem atfedilmektedir. Bunların uluslararası ticarete açılmasının önünde, birçok engel yanında, yüksek düzeyde gümrük tarifeleri ve tarife benzeri mali yüklerler mevcuttur. Fakat önlerine yüksek gümrük duvarları örenler, KOBİ’lerin kendilerdir. Çoğunlukla kendi ülkelerinde ithal ikamesi endüstrilerinde faaliyet gösteren KOBİ’ler, yüksek lobi güçleri sayesinde, hükümetlerinden tarifeler ve tarife dışı yollarla koruma desteği almaktadırlar. KOBİ’lerin bu kısır döngüden çıkarılabilmesi için ülkelerin kendi inisiyatifleri ile korumacılıkla mücadele etmesi mümkün değildir. Bu bağlamda hükümet inisiyatifleri yerine DTÖ şemsiyesi altında çok taraflı bir girişim göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır.

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Cite This Article

PARILTI, H. (2019). Tariff Disadvantages of SMEs in International Trade. İktisat Politikası Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 1, 1–30. https://ajindex.com/articles/8342

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