Journals / Ortadoğu Etütleri / 2013 / Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 2

The Limits to Cooperation Between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations Since 2002

Rakipler Arasında İşbirliğinin Sınırları: 2002’den Bu Yana Türk-İran İlişkileri

Pages
111–144
Publication Date
2013-07-15
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Furthermore, the Arab Spring and Iran’s continual interest in acquiring nuclear weapons drive a wedge between the security interests of Turkey and Iran

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The rapprochement between Turkey and Iran over the last decade has been based on a constellation of short-term economic and security interests rather than a robust alignment of long-term objectives.
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Key Findings & Data:The initial strategic rationale behind the Turkey’s security partnership with Iran, i.e. that the expected benefits of cooperating with Iran to counter separationist movements in the region would outweigh the potential threats that Iran could pose against Turkey’s security, is no longer valid.
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Conclusion & Impact:Furthermore, the Arab Spring and Iran’s continual interest in acquiring nuclear weapons drive a wedge between the security interests of Turkey and Iran
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Türkiye · İran · Dengeleme

Abstract

The rapprochement between Turkey and Iran over the last decade has been based on a constellation of short-term economic and security interests rather than a robust alignment of long-term objectives. There are two reasons as to why the cooperative relations between Turkey and Iran are bound to collapse. First, even though growing economic ties between Turkey and Iran have facilitated the political cooperation between the two countries, beneath the growing trade volume lies an extremely asymmetric distribution of relative gains, primarily due to the predominance of energy. This imbalanced economic exchange is more likely to foster conflict than cooperation in the long run. Second, the security leg of the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement is also on shaky ground. The initial strategic rationale behind the Turkey’s security partnership with Iran, i.e. that the expected benefits of cooperating with Iran to counter separationist movements in the region would outweigh the potential threats that Iran could pose against Turkey’s security, is no longer valid. Iran appears unwilling to act in harmony with Turkey against the PKK. Furthermore, the Arab Spring and Iran’s continual interest in acquiring nuclear weapons drive a wedge between the security interests of Turkey and Iran

Özet

Son on yıldır Türkiye ve İran arasında süregelen uzlaşma ortamı uzun vadeli amaçların sağlam bir uyumundan ziyade kısa vadeli ekonomik ve güvenlik çıkarlarının geçici olarak örtüşmesine dayanmaktadır. Türkiye ve İran arasındaki işbirliğine dayalı ilişkilerin devamına engel teşkil eden iki temel neden vardır. Öncelikle, Türkiye ve İran arasındaki yoğun ticaret bu iki ülke arasındaki siyasi işbirliğini kolaylaştırmış görünse de artan ticaret hacminin ardında göreceli ekonomik kazanımların asimetrik dağılımı yatmaktadır ki bu eşitsizliğin temel unsuru da Türkiye’nin İran’a enerji alanında bağımlı oluşudur. Bu dengesiz ekonomik ilişki uzun vadede iki ülke arasında işbirliğinden çok çatışmayı arttıracaktır. İkinci olarak, Türkiye-İran uzlaşmasının güvenlik ayağı da zayıf bir temel üzerine kuruludur. Türkiye’nin İran ile güvenlik konusunda ilk planda işbirliği yapmasının ardında yatan temel stratejik nedenler −özellikle de İran’ın bölgedeki ayrılıkçı güçlere karşı Türkiye’nin iç güvenliğine katkıda bulunacağı düşüncesi− artık geçerliliğini yitirmiştir. İran, son dönemde PKK’ya karşı Türkiye ile ortak hareket etme konusunda isteksiz görünmektedir. Ayrıca Arap Baharı ve İran’ın nükleer güç elde etme konusundaki ısrarı, Türkiye ve İran arasındaki güvenlik ilişkisini daha da gergin bir hale getirmektedir.

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Cite This Article

DEMİRYOL, T. (2013). The Limits to Cooperation Between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations Since 2002. Ortadoğu Etütleri, Cilt: 4 - Sayı: 2, 111–144. https://ajindex.com/articles/720419

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