Journals / Ortadoğu Etütleri / 2026 / Cilt: 18 Sayı: 1

THE END OF THE "NO MORE WARS" RHETORIC: AN ANATOMY OF THE IRAN WAR DECISION IN TRUMP'S POPULIST FOREIGN POLICY

SAVAŞLARA SON SÖYLEMİNİN SONU: TRUMP'IN POPÜLİST DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA İRAN SAVAŞI KARARININ ANATOMİSİ

Selin M. Bölme(MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0002-8266-4323
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Publication Date
2026-06-18
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this process, the restrainers, represented by only a few figures at the upper levels, were excluded.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The war launched by the United States alongside Israel against Iran in February 2026 sparked considerable debate, as it stood in stark contradiction to Trump's campaign rhetoric of "no more wars." This study analyzes this contradiction through the lens of populist foreign policy.
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Key Findings & Data:The existing literature accounts for the discourse–practice gap by reference to the instrumental use of rhetoric, institutional constraints, or the leader's cost calculations.
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Conclusion & Impact:In this process, the restrainers, represented by only a few figures at the upper levels, were excluded.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2026 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Trump · İran Savaşı · İsrail Lobisi

Abstract

The war launched by the United States alongside Israel against Iran in February 2026 sparked considerable debate, as it stood in stark contradiction to Trump's campaign rhetoric of "no more wars." This study analyzes this contradiction through the lens of populist foreign policy. The existing literature accounts for the discourse–practice gap by reference to the instrumental use of rhetoric, institutional constraints, or the leader's cost calculations. Building on this framework, the study explains the gap through the conflict between the foreign policy visions of the political groups supporting the leader. Although Trump's campaign brought together various groups under the MAGA coalition, these groups did not share a common foreign policy vision and were divided into restrainers and interventionists. The study claims that the discourse–practice gap stems from a structural asymmetry within the coalition. While the restrainer discourse mobilized the electoral base, the administrative level was dominated by interventionists. Although Trump was the ultimate decision-maker, his team's composition shaped the process by generating policy options and managing implementation. Finally, the study argues that the Heritage Foundation's institutional influence in staffing, together with structural factors such as the Israel lobby and the entrenched interventionist consensus cutting across both parties in Congress, was decisive both in forming Trump's core team, predominantly composed of interventionist, pro-Israel figures inclined toward military action against Iran, and in the rise of the military intervention decision within the administration. In this process, the restrainers, represented by only a few figures at the upper levels, were excluded.

Özet

Şubat 2026'da ABD'nin İsrail'in yanında İran'a karşı başlattığı savaş, Trump'ın seçimlerde öne çıkardığı “savaşlara son” söylemiyle açık bir çelişki taşıdığı için beraberinde tartışmaları getirmiştir. Bu çalışma, söz konusu çelişkiyi popülist dış politika yaklaşımını temel alarak analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Literatür, popülist dış politikada tutarsızlığı söylemin araçsallığı, yerleşik kurumsal kısıtlamalar veya liderin maliyet hesabı üzerinden açıklamaktadır. Çalışmada bu çerçeve temel alınmakla birlikte popülist dış politikadaki tutarsızlık, lideri destekleyen siyasi grupların dış politika vizyonlarındaki çatışma üzerinden açıklanmaktadır. Çalışmada Trump'ın seçim sürecinde farklı siyasi grupları MAGA koalisyonu altında bir araya getirdiği, ancak bu grupların hepsinin ortak bir dış politika vizyonu paylaşmadıkları ve kısıtlamacılar ile müdahaleciler olarak iki grup oluşturdukları gösterilmektedir. Çalışmanın temel iddiası MAGA tabanını mobilize eden kısıtlamacı söylemin dış politikada ön plana çıkmasına karşın, yönetim düzeyinde müdahaleciler lehine bir asimetri olduğu ve bunun söylem–eylem tutarsızlığı yarattığıdır. Trump’ın gerek Amerikan siyasal sisteminin yapısı gerekse yönetiminde dış politika bürokrasisini dışlaması nedeniyle nihai karar mercii olduğu kabul edilmekle birlikte dış politika seçeneklerini üretmeleri ve sürecin yürütülmesinde rol almaları nedeniyle ekip kompozisyonunun da karar sürecinde etkisi olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Son olarak çalışmada Heritage Vakfı'nın kadrolaşmadaki kurumsal etkisi ile yapısal faktörler olarak İsrail lobisi ve Kongre'de her iki partiyi kesen yerleşik müdahaleci konsensüsün varlığının, hem Trump'ın çekirdek ekibinin ağırlıklı olarak müdahaleci, İsrail destekçisi ve İran'a askeri müdahaleye yakın isimlerden oluşmasında hem de İran'a askeri müdahale kararının yönetim içinde ağırlık kazanmasında belirleyici olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu süreçte yönetimin üst kademelerinde az sayıda temsil edilen kısıtlamacılar ise dışlanmışlardır.

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Cite This Article

Bölme, S. M. (2026). THE END OF THE "NO MORE WARS" RHETORIC: AN ANATOMY OF THE IRAN WAR DECISION IN TRUMP'S POPULIST FOREIGN POLICY. Ortadoğu Etütleri, Cilt: 18 Sayı: 1. https://doi.org/10.47932/ortetut.1944266

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