Journals / Muhasebe Bilim Dünyası Dergisi / 2015 / Cilt: 17 - Sayı: 1

OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION EFFECT ON FIRM PERFORMANCE IN TURKEY

TÜRKİYE’DE ORTAKLIK YOĞUNLAŞMASININ ŞİRKET PERFORMANSINA ETKİSİ

Pages
33–56
Publication Date
2015-03-31
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Interestingly, effects of family and foreign ownership concentration on firm performance diminish, and even disappear, when performance is measured by using accounting data.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Effect of corporate ownership concentration on firm performance has been researched in various fields.
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Key Findings & Data:We investigate the effect of family and foreign ownership on firm performance – both market and accounting- for companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange-Turkey- from 2005 to 2009.
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Conclusion & Impact:Interestingly, effects of family and foreign ownership concentration on firm performance diminish, and even disappear, when performance is measured by using accounting data.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2005 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Aile ortaklık yapısı · yabancı ortaklık · şirket performansı

Abstract

Effect of corporate ownership concentration on firm performance has been researched in various fields. We investigate the effect of family and foreign ownership on firm performance – both market and accounting- for companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange-Turkey- from 2005 to 2009. We find a positive relationship between family and foreign ownership and market performance during the period. Our results also show that foreign ownership concentration loses its effect on market performance during 2008-2009 – a period marked by the economic crisis, which might be attributed to the global source of the crisis. Interestingly, effects of family and foreign ownership concentration on firm performance diminish, and even disappear, when performance is measured by using accounting data.

Özet

Ortaklık yapısının şirket performansı üzerindeki etkisine ilişkin çeşitli alanlarda araştırmalar yapılmıştır. Bu araştırmada aile ve yabancı ortaklık paylarının şirket performansı üzerindeki etkileri, 2005-2009 yılları arasında İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsasında işlem gören şirketler için incelenmiştir. Araştırma döneminde piyasa performansı ile aile ve yabancı ortaklık payı arasında pozitif ilişki saptanmıştır. Ayrıca sonuçlar, ekonomik kriz dönemi olan 2008-2009 yıllarında yabancı ortaklık yoğunlaşmasının piyasa performansı üzerindeki etkisinin azaldığını da göstermektedir ki bu da krizin küresel nitelikte olmasına bağlanabilir. Araştırmanın dikkate değer bir başka sonucu ise, aile ve yabancı ortaklık yoğunlaşması etkilerinin, performans muhasebe verileri kullanılarak ölçüldüğünde azalması ve hatta etkilerin ortadan kalkmasıdır.

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Cite This Article

AKMAN, N. H., MUGAN, C. S., AKIŞIK, O. (2015). OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION EFFECT ON FIRM PERFORMANCE IN TURKEY. Muhasebe Bilim Dünyası Dergisi, Cilt: 17 - Sayı: 1, 33–56. https://ajindex.com/articles/692407

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