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Journals / Muhasebe Bilim Dünyası Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 28 Sayı: 3

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR SELECTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON BIST 100 COMPANIES

KURUMSAL YÖNETİM SKORU İLE BAĞIMSIZ DENETÇİ SEÇİMİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: BIST 100 ŞİRKETLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA

Ahmet Akbaş(Recep Tayyip Erdogan University)0000-0002-1947-8181
Pages
390–417
Publication Date
2026-09-27
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Using a panel logistic regression model, the findings reveal a positive and statistically significant association between corporate governance scores and preference for Big Four audit firms.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This study examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and the selection of audit firms among companies listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) 100 Index during 2018–2024.
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Key Findings & Data:Using a panel logistic regression model, the findings reveal a positive and statistically significant association between corporate governance scores and preference for Big Four audit firms.
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Conclusion & Impact:Overall, auditor selection appears to be driven more by corporate structure and risk profile than performance.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2018–2024 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Kurumsal Yönetim · Bağımsız Denetim Firmaları · Panel Veri Analizi

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and the selection of audit firms among companies listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) 100 Index during 2018–2024. Using a panel logistic regression model, the findings reveal a positive and statistically significant association between corporate governance scores and preference for Big Four audit firms. Among the control variables, firm size and financial leverage increase the likelihood of selecting a Big Four auditor, while return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q have no significant effect. Overall, auditor selection appears to be driven more by corporate structure and risk profile than performance.

Özet

Bu çalışma, Borsa İstanbul (BIST) 100 Endeksi’nde yer alan firmalarda kurumsal yönetim kalitesi ile bağımsız denetim firması seçimi arasındaki ilişkiyi 2018–2024 dönemi için incelemektedir. Analizlerde panel logit regresyon modeli kullanılmıştır. Bulgular, kurumsal yönetim skoru ile Dört Büyük denetim firması tercihi arasında pozitif ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir ilişki bulunduğunu göstermektedir. Kontrol değişkenleri açısından firma büyüklüğü ve finansal kaldıraçın Dört Büyük denetçi seçimi olasılığını artırdığı; aktif kârlılık (ROA) ve Tobin Q Oranı (Tobin’s Q) değişkenlerinin bağımsız denetim firması seçiminde anlamlı bir etki yaratmadığı belirlenmiştir. Sonuçlar, denetçi seçiminin firma performansından ziyade kurumsal yapı ve risk profiliyle daha yakından ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir.

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Cite This Article

Akbaş, A. (2026). THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR SELECTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON BIST 100 COMPANIES. Muhasebe Bilim Dünyası Dergisi, Cilt: 28 Sayı: 3, 390–417. https://doi.org/10.31460/mbdd.1884696

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