I suggest that even if observation in the sense of perception were theory-neutral that does not make any difference in testing scientific theories, because the kind of testability that scientific theories must pass is based upon not personal or subjective beliefs but intersubjectively shared ones
📌 3 Key Takeaways
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Objective & Hypothesis:This paper critically examines the central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that the epistemological significance between observable and unobservabie entities plays a putative role for our attitudes toward scientific theories.
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Key Findings & Data:More specifically, I shall try to show whether the distinction Van Fraassen draws between observable and unobservable entities is epistemicaliy significant or an arbitrary criterion.
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Conclusion & Impact:I suggest that even if observation in the sense of perception were theory-neutral that does not make any difference in testing scientific theories, because the kind of testability that scientific theories must pass is based upon not personal or subjective beliefs but intersubjectively shared ones
This paper critically examines the central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that the epistemological significance between observable and unobservabie entities plays a putative role for our attitudes toward scientific theories. More specifically, I shall try to show whether the distinction Van Fraassen draws between observable and unobservable entities is epistemicaliy significant or an arbitrary criterion. I suggest that even if observation in the sense of perception were theory-neutral that does not make any difference in testing scientific theories, because the kind of testability that scientific theories must pass is based upon not personal or subjective beliefs but intersubjectively shared ones
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