Journals / Felsefe Dünyası / 2015 / Sayı: 61

Fact-Value Distinction Problem in Ethics and its Interpretation with regards to Moral Realism.

AHLAK FELSEFESİNDE OLGU DEĞER AYRIMI VE NESNELCİ AHLAKİ REALİZM AÇISINDAN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Pages
241–268
Publication Date
2015-07-15
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

At the same time I will state remarks on how to interpret Hume`s Law and Moore`s open question argument with regards to moral realism.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:In this article, I will discuss fact-value distinction problem in ethics and its interpretation with regards to moral realism.
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Key Findings & Data:Firstly, I will define Moral Realism and types of it and summarize how to be understood it with some philosophical criteria.
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Conclusion & Impact:At the same time I will state remarks on how to interpret Hume`s Law and Moore`s open question argument with regards to moral realism.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Olgu-değer ayrımı · Ahlaki Realizm · Nesnelcilik

Abstract

In this article, I will discuss fact-value distinction problem in ethics and its interpretation with regards to moral realism. Firstly, I will define Moral Realism and types of it and summarize how to be understood it with some philosophical criteria. After that respectively I will discuss Hume`s Law and Moore`s open question argument and validity of them in the light of objections to them. At the same time I will state remarks on how to interpret Hume`s Law and Moore`s open question argument with regards to moral realism.

Özet

Bu makalede ahlak felsefesindeki olgu-değer ayrımı problemini ve bu problemin ahlaki realizm açısından değerlendirmesini yapacağım. Öncelikle ahlaki realizmi tanımlayıp, türlerini kısaca ifade edecek ve ahlaki realizmin nasıl anlaşılması gerektiğini bazı felsefi kriterler ile özetleyeceğim. Sonrasında sırasıyla Hume Yasası ve Moore’un açık soru argümanı, bu argümana getirilen itirazlar ışığında Hume Yasası ve açık sor argümanının geçerliliklerini ele alacağım. Bununla beraber Hume Yasası ve Moore’un açık soru argümanının ahlaki realizm açısından nasıl değerlendirilmesi gerektiğine ilişkin görüşlerimi ifade edeceğim.

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Cite This Article

YÖNEY, F. (2015). Fact-Value Distinction Problem in Ethics and its Interpretation with regards to Moral Realism.. Felsefe Dünyası, Sayı: 61, 241–268. https://ajindex.com/articles/665476

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References (1)

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