Journals / İ M K B Dergisi / 2010 / Cilt: 12 - Sayı: 47

Finansal piyasaları modellemek için oyun teorik bir yaklaşım: Tahmin oyunları

Pages
47–64
Publication Date
2022-10-18
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

We also offer some extensions that may further contribute to produce better and more realistic models of financial markets.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:How deep our reasoning and strategic thinking is and how strategic we think are crucial in making financial investment decisions because we need to guess how other people will behave.
📊
Key Findings & Data:This paper studies Guessing Game (Beauty contest game) that helps us understand how people make decisions in environments where depth of reasoning plays a key role.
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Conclusion & Impact:We also offer some extensions that may further contribute to produce better and more realistic models of financial markets.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

How deep our reasoning and strategic thinking is and how strategic we think are crucial in making financial investment decisions because we need to guess how other people will behave. This paper studies Guessing Game (Beauty contest game) that helps us understand how people make decisions in environments where depth of reasoning plays a key role. We mainly summarize the findings of experimental studies focusing on this game and then link these findings to financial markets, especially to stock market players’ behavior. We also offer some extensions that may further contribute to produce better and more realistic models of financial markets.

Özet

Özellikle finansal yatırım kararı alırken nedenselliğin derinliği ve düşünce yapısının stratejikliği fazlasıyla önemlidir çünkü bu tarz bir karar alırken diğer oyuncuların nasıl davranacaklarının tahmin edilmesi gerekir. Bu makale insanların nedensel derinliğin çok önemli olduğu durumlarda nasıl karar verdiğini anlamamıza yardımcı olabilecek tahmin oyunu konusunu irdelemektedir. Makalede temel olarak mevcut deneysel yazının bulguları özetlenmiş ve bu bulgular ile finansal piyasalar arasındaki bağlantı incelenmiştir. Ayrıca daha gerçekçi ve kullanışlı modellerin meydana getirilebilmesine destek olmak amacıyla potansiyel çalışma önerileri de verilmiştir.

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Cite This Article

AKIN, Z., URHAN, Ü. B. (2022). Finansal piyasaları modellemek için oyun teorik bir yaklaşım: Tahmin oyunları. İ M K B Dergisi, Cilt: 12 - Sayı: 47, 47–64. https://ajindex.com/articles/546389

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