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Journals / Kutadgubilig: Felsefe Bilim Araştırmaları / 2016 / Sayı: 32

ACTIVE EXTERNALISM AND EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM

AKTİF DIŞSALCILIK VE EPİSTEMOLOJİK İÇSELCİLİK

FERHAT AĞIRMAN
Fatih S. M. ÖZTÜRK
Pages
213–223
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Our contention is that the truth of the hypothesis of extended cognition and the extended mind thesis entail the falsity of both accessibilism and mentalism

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Active externalism is the view that mind can partially extend to the world.
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Key Findings & Data:In this paper we argue that this view is incompatible with epistemic internalism, a view according to which epistemic justification is solely an internal affair.
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Conclusion & Impact:Our contention is that the truth of the hypothesis of extended cognition and the extended mind thesis entail the falsity of both accessibilism and mentalism
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Active externalism is the view that mind can partially extend to the world. In this paper we argue that this view is incompatible with epistemic internalism, a view according to which epistemic justification is solely an internal affair. Our contention is that the truth of the hypothesis of extended cognition and the extended mind thesis entail the falsity of both accessibilism and mentalism

Özet

Aktif dışsalcılık görüşü için dışsal objeler de kısmen zihnin asli kısımlarıdır. Buna göre zihin kendi sınırlarını dış dünyayı da içine alacak şekilde genişletir ve dolayısıyla zihinsel süreç ve durumlar dışsal objeleri de kapsayan bir mekânsal yayılıma sahip olur. Bu makalede, zihin felsefesindeki bu dışsalcı görüşün epistemolojideki içselcilik öğretisi ile tutarlı olmadığı gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Aktif dışsalcılığın doğruluğu, epistemolojik içselciliğin yanlış olduğunu ima eder

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Cite This Article

AĞIRMAN, F., ÖZTÜRK, F. S. M. (2016). ACTIVE EXTERNALISM AND EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM. Kutadgubilig: Felsefe Bilim Araştırmaları, Sayı: 32, 213–223. https://ajindex.com/articles/344655

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