Journals / Praksis / 2010 / Sayı: 23

Economic theories of state or ‘Economics Imperialism’: Rent-seeking analysis as an exemplar

İktisadi devlet kuramları veya ‘İktisadın Emperyalizmi’: Bir örnek olarak rant-kollama analizi

Journal
Praksis
Pages
63–84
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

This, in turn, indicates the need for conceptual categories to come to terms with ‘collective action’ in ways in which theories premi- sed on individualistic foundations and/or limited by empiricist epistemologies could not provide.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:‘State’ and ‘market’ are concepts so grossly abused that they have almost lost their heuristic value as analytical categories.
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Key Findings & Data:They have also come to symbolise not only alternative strategies of capitalist development, but also rival premises upon which hegemonic strategies were to be developed.
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Conclusion & Impact:This, in turn, indicates the need for conceptual categories to come to terms with ‘collective action’ in ways in which theories premi- sed on individualistic foundations and/or limited by empiricist epistemologies could not provide.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

‘State’ and ‘market’ are concepts so grossly abused that they have almost lost their heuristic value as analytical categories. They have also come to symbolise not only alternative strategies of capitalist development, but also rival premises upon which hegemonic strategies were to be developed. In the era of neoliberal hegemony, it has been contended that a ‘theory of state’ is required so as to make up for the deficiencies of the mainstream economics. This study focuses on the antinomies of an influential attempt to develop an economic theory of politics, namely, the rent-seeking analysis. It highlights the fact that the concept of the state as a neutral guarantor of contractual relations is no more than a ‘mental construct’, hardly relevant to account for the phenomena in question, but one which would be instrumental in providing the circumstances conducive for the ‘rational economic man’ to operate according to the assumptions of a particular model. This, in turn, indicates the need for conceptual categories to come to terms with ‘collective action’ in ways in which theories premi- sed on individualistic foundations and/or limited by empiricist epistemologies could not provide.

Özet

‘Devlet’ ve ‘piyasa’ o kadar suistimal edilen kavramlardır ki neredeyse analitik kategoriler olarak açıklayıcı değerlerini yitirmişlerdir. Ayrıca sadece alternatif kapitalist gelişme stratejilerini değil, üzerinde hegemonya stratejilerinin geliştirildiği rakip öncülleri de sembolize etmeye başlamışlardır. Neoliberal hegemonya döneminde, ana akım iktisadın kusurlarını telafi etmek için bir ‘devlet kuramı’na gereksi- nim duyulduğu belirtilmiştir. Bu çalışma, iktisat temelli bir siyaset kuramı geliştirme çabalarının etkin bir örneği olan rant kollama analizinin içerdiği kuramsal açmazları ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, sözleşme ilişkilerinin tarafsız garantörü olarak devlet kavramının, bir ‘zihinsel kurgu’dan öte bir şey olmadığı gerçeği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu ‘zihinsel kurgu’nun ele alınan olguların açıklanmasında pek de yardımcı olmadığı halde, tikel bir modelin varsayımlarına göre işleyen ‘rasyonel iktisadi insan’a uygun koşulları sağlamada araçsal olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, ampirisist epistemolojiler ve/ veya bireyselci temellere dayanan kuramlar temelinde açıklanması mümkün olmayan ‘kollektif eylem’i irdelemek için kavramsal kategorilere ihtiyaç olduğu belirtilmektedir.

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Cite This Article

YALMAN, L. (2010). Economic theories of state or ‘Economics Imperialism’: Rent-seeking analysis as an exemplar. Praksis, Sayı: 23, 63–84. https://ajindex.com/articles/303056

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