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Journals / Marmara Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 25

FROM HOMO ECONOMICUS to HOMO SOCIALIS: CRITIQUE of RATIONAL CHOICE

HOMO EKONOMİKUS’TAN HOMO SOCİALİS’E: RASYONEL SEÇİM KURAMINA ELEŞTİREL BİR BAKIŞ

Aras Yolusever(İSTANBUL KÜLTÜR ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-9810-2571
Pages
34–57
Publication Date
2026-06-29
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The analysis suggests that heterodox microeconomics offers a more empirically grounded and policy-relevant behavioral foundation than its orthodox counterpart, with implications for institutional design, welfare economics, and the theory of the firm.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The neoclassical model of Homo economicus—a perfectly rational, self-interested utility maximizer—has long served as microeconomics' foundational behavioral assumption.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Yet mounting evidence from evolutionary biology, behavioral economics, experimental game theory, and economic anthropology reveals this portrait to be an idealized abstraction with limited descriptive and predictive power in repeated, socially embedded environments.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The analysis suggests that heterodox microeconomics offers a more empirically grounded and policy-relevant behavioral foundation than its orthodox counterpart, with implications for institutional design, welfare economics, and the theory of the firm.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:İktisat Teorisi · Heterodoks Mikro İktisat · Sınırlı Rasyonellik

Abstract

The neoclassical model of Homo economicus—a perfectly rational, self-interested utility maximizer—has long served as microeconomics' foundational behavioral assumption. Yet mounting evidence from evolutionary biology, behavioral economics, experimental game theory, and economic anthropology reveals this portrait to be an idealized abstraction with limited descriptive and predictive power in repeated, socially embedded environments. This paper advances a heterodox microeconomic critique by examining how cooperation, reciprocity, norm-following, and other prosocial dispositions systematically outperform strict utility maximization across a range of repeated social interactions. Drawing on evolutionary game theory, and the behavioral literature on social preferences, the paper develops a conceptual model of Homo socialis—an agent whose fitness, broadly construed, is enhanced by internalizing social norms and cooperative heuristics. The analysis suggests that heterodox microeconomics offers a more empirically grounded and policy-relevant behavioral foundation than its orthodox counterpart, with implications for institutional design, welfare economics, and the theory of the firm.

Özet

Neoklasik iktisadın Homo ekonomikus modeli—tam rasyonel ve kendi çıkarını maksimize eden birey varsayımı—mikro iktisadın temel davranışsal çerçevesini oluşturmuştur. Ancak evrimsel biyoloji, davranışsal iktisat, deneysel oyun teorisi ve ekonomik antropoloji alanlarından elde edilen bulgular, bu modelin toplumsal olarak gömülü ve tekrarlanan etkileşimlerde sınırlı açıklayıcılığa sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, iş birliği, karşılıklılık ve normlara uyum gibi prososyal davranışların, birçok durumda katı fayda maksimizasyonundan daha başarılı sonuçlar doğurduğunu savunarak heterodoks bir mikro iktisadi eleştiri geliştirmektedir. Evrimsel oyun teorisine dayanan analiz, bireylerin uyum başarısının toplumsal normları içselleştirme ve işbirlikçi stratejiler geliştirme yoluyla arttığını öne süren Homo socialis kavramsallaştırmasını sunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, heterodoks mikro iktisat yaklaşımının, ortodoks modele kıyasla daha gerçekçi ve politika açısından daha işlevsel bir davranışsal temel sunduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

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Cite This Article

Yolusever, A. (2026). FROM HOMO ECONOMICUS to HOMO SOCIALIS: CRITIQUE of RATIONAL CHOICE. Marmara Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, Sayı: 25, 34–57. https://doi.org/10.58793/marusad.1917405

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