Journals / Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 21 Sayı: 1

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN BATI SAHRA SORUNUNDAKİ POZİSYONU: AKDENİZ’DE İŞBİRLİĞİ İÇİN BİR ENGEL

Pages
37–59
Publication Date
2013-06-27
🏛️Bibliographic metadata and full text access for this article are provided via DergiPark.
DergiPark Record ↗
✨

AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Therefore, the European Union has adopted an inactive position on the Western Sahara conflict that seriously hinders Mediterranean cooperation efforts under the Union for the Mediterranean.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:In 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean was established by the members of the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation to guarantee peace, stability and prosperity through the development of common projects.
📊
Key Findings & Data:This article aims to explain why the European Union, despite its significant leverage on Morocco through strong economic relations and the European Neighborhood Policy’s financial contributions, prefers to remain inactive in solving the Western Sahara conflict.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:Therefore, the European Union has adopted an inactive position on the Western Sahara conflict that seriously hinders Mediterranean cooperation efforts under the Union for the Mediterranean.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2008 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Batı Sahra Sorunu · Avrupa Birliği · Akdeniz İçin Birlik

Abstract

In 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean was established by the members of the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation to guarantee peace, stability and prosperity through the development of common projects. However, the Western Sahara conflict prevents the initiation of common projects between Morocco and Algeria and also puts at risk common projects in the entire Maghreb region. This article aims to explain why the European Union, despite its significant leverage on Morocco through strong economic relations and the European Neighborhood Policy’s financial contributions, prefers to remain inactive in solving the Western Sahara conflict. It is argued that the European Union’s inactivity is due to the policies of France, the United States and Spain on the Western Sahara conflict. France and the United States support the Moroccan autonomy plan on account of their strategic interests in Morocco and North Africa, and for the same reasons, Spain pursues a balanced policy that suits Moroccan interests. The European Union neither wants to upset these member states nor the United States by intervening in the conflict and putting diplomatic pressure on Morocco. Therefore, the European Union has adopted an inactive position on the Western Sahara conflict that seriously hinders Mediterranean cooperation efforts under the Union for the Mediterranean.

Özet

Akdeniz İçin Birlik, 2008 yılında, Avrupa Birliği ve Akdeniz’deki ortak ülkeler tarafından Akdeniz havzasını ortak projelerin geliştirilmesi yoluyla barışı, istikrarı ve refahı garanti altına alan bir diyalog, değişim ve işbirliği alanına çevirmek amacıyla kurulmuştur. Ancak, Batı Sahra sorunu Fas ve Cezayir arasında projelerin başlatılmasını engellediği gibi tüm Mağrip bölgesinde de ortak projeleri riske sokmaktadır. Bu makale, Fas ile olan güçlü ekonomik ilişkilerine ve Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası ile Fas’a sağladığı mali yardımlara rağmen Avrupa Birliği’nin Batı Sahra sorununun çözümünde neden pasif bir pozisyonda kalmayı tercih ettiğini açıklamaktadır. Avrupa Birliği’nin pasifliği Fransa, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve İspanya’nın Batı Sahra sorunundaki politikalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Fransa ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Fas ve Kuzey Afrika’daki stratejik çıkarlarından dolayı Fas’ın otonomi planına destek vermekte, aynı nedenlerden dolayı İspanya ise Fas’ın çıkarlarına uyan dengeli bir politika yürütmektedir. Avrupa Birliği bu üyelerini ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’ni rahatsız etmemek amacıyla soruna müdahil olmamakta ve Fas üzerinde diplomatik baskı kurmamaktadır. Bundan dolayı Avrupa Birliği, Batı Sahra sorununda pasif bir pozisyon benimsemiştir ve bu pasif pozisyon Akdeniz İçin Birlik’in kapsamındaki Akdeniz’deki işbirliği çabalarının önünde ciddi bir engeldir.

🔖

Cite This Article

Yıldız, U. (2013). AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN BATI SAHRA SORUNUNDAKİ POZİSYONU: AKDENİZ’DE İŞBİRLİĞİ İÇİN BİR ENGEL. Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt: 21 Sayı: 1, 37–59. https://doi.org/10.29228/mjes.110

📄 Full Text PDF Viewer

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

References (49)

  1. Benabdallah, K. (2009). ‘The Position of the European Union on the Western Sahara Conflict’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 17(3), 417- 435.
  2. Central Intelligence Agency. (2012, November 9). The World Factbook- Western Sahara. Retrieved: October 16, 2012, from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/wi.html
  3. Chirac Stirs Tension in Sahara. (2001, December 3). BBC News. Retrieved: November 3, 2012, from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1689945.stm
  4. Council of the European Union. (2003). ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World- European Security Strategy’, Brussels, December 12.
  5. Darbouche, H. & Colombo, S. (2010). ‘The EU, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Western Sahara: The Failure of Disengagement’, MICROCON Policy Work Paper 13.
  6. Darbouche, H. & Zoubir, Y. H. (2008). ‘Conflicting International Policies and the Western Sahara Stalemate’, The International Spectator, 43(1), 91-105. EU Parliament Approves Disputed Morocco Farm Trade Deal. (2012, February 16).
  7. EUbusiness. Retrieved: December 22, 2012, from http://www.eubusiness.com/newseu/morocco-farm-trade.f94
  8. European Commission, Development & Cooperation- Europeaid, Morocco. (2012, September 27). Retrieved: October 28, 2012, from ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/countrycooperation/morocco/morocco_en.htm
  9. European Commission.(2007). ‘European Neighborhood and Partnership InstrumentMorocco- Strategy Paper (2007- 2013)’, Brussels. Retrieved: October 18, 2012, from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_morocco_en.pdf
  10. European Commission. (2008). ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, Brussels, COM (2008) 319 (FINAL), Retrieved: January 17, 2012, http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com08_319_en.pdf>
  11. European Commission, Directorate General for Trade. (2012, October 24). Countries and Regions- Morocco. Retrieved: November 1, 2012, from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/
  12. European Union External Action Service. (2012). EU Special Representatives. Retrieved: December 11, 2012, from http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-specialrepresentatives/index_en.htm
  13. Gianniou, M. (2010, November 10). Israel and the Union for the Mediterranean: Bilateralism vs Multilateralism?. Retrieved: May 29, 2012, from http://www.ekemprogram.org/euromedo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& id=239:israel-and-the-union-for-the-mediterranean-bilateralism-vsmultilateralism&catid=37:2010-05-05-10-07-53&Itemid=59
  14. Gillespie, Richard. (2010). ‘European Union Responses to Conflict in the Western Mediterranean’, Journal of North African Studies, 15(1), 85-103.
  15. Institut MEDEA. (2012). EU- Morocco Relations. Retrieved: October 28, 2012, from http://www.medea.be/en/countries/morocco/eu-morocco-relations-2/
  16. International Court of Justice. (1975). ‘Western Sahara’, Advisory Opinion of October 16, 1975, No. 61, Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf (Accessed on: September 5, 2012)
  17. King of Morocco to be Biggest Benefactor of EU Trade Agreement. (2012, January 29). The Telegraph. Retrieved: December 22, 2012, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/morocco/9047659/Ki ng-of-Morocco-to-be-biggest-benefactor-of-EU-trade-agreement.html
  18. Med Water Conference Ends in Failure Due to Israel- Arab Row. (2010, April 13). EUbusiness. Retrieved: January 21, 2012, from http://www.eubusiness.com/newseu/mideast-environment.
  19. Moroccan Investment Development Agency. (2012). ‘Activity Report 2011’, Retrieved: December 3, 2012, from http://www.invest.gov.ma/upload/documents/en_Doc_108.pdf
  20. Morocco Satisfied with the Spanish Government’s Position on the Sahara. (2012, October 3).
  21. Morocco World News. Retrieved: 2012, November 29, from http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2012/10/59222/morocco-satisfied-with-the-spanishgovernments-position-on-the-sahara-2/
  22. Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is ‘Only Credible Offer for Talks’- French Minister. (2012, July 20), APA News. Retrieved: November 3, 2012, from www.apanewsnet.net/photo/en/photo.php?id=179578
  23. Mundy, J. A. (2004). ‘Seized of the Matter: The UN and the Western Sahara Dispute’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 15(3), 130-148. Nation Managed to Implement Reforms in Stability- EU Official. (2011, August 7). All Africa. Retrieved: December 11, 2012, from http://allafrica.com/stories/201108090248.html
  24. Omar, S. M. (2008). ‘The Right to Self-Determination and the Indigenous People of Western Sahara’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(1), 41-57.
  25. Open that Border: Will the Long Stalemate Between the Maghreb’s Two Big Rivals Ever End?. (2010, May 27), The Economist. RRetrieved: June 18, 2012, from http://www.economist.com/node/16219845/print
  26. Pham, J. P. (2010). ‘Not Another Failed State: Toward a Realistic Solution in the Western Sahara’, Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 1(1), 1-24.
  27. Ross Calls for a Settlement that is Honorable to All. (2012, November 12). Morocco World News. Retrieved: December 2, 2012, from http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2012/11/64793/sahara-ross-calls-for-a-settlementthat-is-honorable-to-all-7/
  28. Roussellier, J. E. (2005). ‘Quicksand in the Western Sahara? From Referendum Stalemate to Negotiated Solution’, International Negotiation, 10(2), 311-336.
  29. Saidy, B. (2011). ‘American Interests in the Western Sahara Conflict’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 33(2), 86-92.
  30. Sarkozy juge sérieux le plan d'autonomie marocain sur le Sahara. (2007, October 23). Reuters.
  31. Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union on Hold. (2009, March 16). Europafrica. Retrieved: January 21, 2012, from http://europafrica.net/2009/03/16/sarkozys-mediterranean-union-on-hold/
  32. Secretariat of the UfM.(2008a). ‘Final Statement’, Marseille, November 13- 14. Retrieved: June 20, 2012, from http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/decfinal-Marseille-UfM.pdf
  33. Secretariat of the UfM. (2008b). ‘Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean’, Paris, July 13. Retrieved: January 19, 2012, from http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/ufm_paris_declaration1.pdf
  34. Secretariat of the UfM. (2012). Projects. Retrieved: July 20, 2012, from http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/projects/
  35. Slimi, A. A. (2009). ‘The United States, Morocco and the Western Sahara Conflict’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Retrieved: November 22, 2012, from https://www.carnegieendowment.org/2009/06/17/united-states-morocco-and-western-saharadispute/ak1
  36. Smith, K. E. (2006). European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.
  37. Sola-Martin, A. (2009). ‘Conflict Resolution in Western Sahara’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9(3), 117-140.
  38. Spain Affirms Support to the Right of the Saharawi People to Self-Determination. (2012, September 26). Sahara Press Service. Retrieved: November 29, 2012, from http://allafrica.com/stories/201209270508.html
  39. Spain’s Aznar in Morocco Before the Start of Negotiation on Fishing Agreement. (2000, May 23). All Africa. Retrieved: November 14, 2012, from http://allafrica.com/stories/200005230155.html (Accessed on: November 14, 2012)
  40. Theofilopoulou, A. (2006). ‘The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair’, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report: 166. Retrieved: August 14, 2012, from http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr166.pdf
  41. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ekonomi Bakanlığı. Komşuluk Politikasının Temel Unsurları ve Amaçları, Ankara, Retrieved: January 24, 2012, from http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/avrupabirligi/index.cfm?sayfa=DB164801-D8D3-8566- 452049DA66F84F00
  42. United Nations. (1965). ‘Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Fourth Committee’, Resolution No: A/RES/2072(XX), Retrieved: September 5, 2012, from http://daccess-dds ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/35/IMG/NR021835.pdf?OpenElement
  43. United Nations. (1966). ‘General Assembly- Twenty-first Session’, Resolution No: A/RES/2229(XXI), Retrieved: September 5, 2012, from http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/005/32/IMG/NR000532.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed on: September 5, 2012)
  44. U.S. Department of State. (2012, September 11). Fact Sheet- U.S. Relations with Morocco. Retrieved: November 20, 2012, from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm
  45. U.S. Department of State. (2009, November 3). Interview with Fouad Arif of Al-Aoula Television. Marrakech, Retrieved: November 27, 2012, from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/11/131354.htm (Accessed on: November 27, 2012)
  46. Zapatero’s Government Brought Great Harm to Western Sahara People, Saharawi Official Says. (2011, December 8). Sahara Press Service. Retrieved: November 14, 2012, from http://www.spsrasd.info/en/content/zapatero%E2%80%99s-government-brought-greatharm-western-sahara-people-saharawi-official-says
  47. Zoubir, Y. H. (2007). ‘Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality’, Middle East Policy, 14(4), 158-177.
  48. Zoubir, Y. H. (2010). ‘The Unresolved Western Sahara Conflict and Its Repercussions’, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 4(2), 85-99.
  49. Central Intelligence Agency. (2012, November 9). The World Factbook- Western Sahara. Retrieved: October 16, 2012, from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/wi.html