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Journals / Ilahiyat Studies / 2023 / Cilt: 14 Sayı: 2

A Reply to Morriston’s Objection to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense

Ferhat Taşkın(Indiana University Bloomington)0009-0007-3922-5193
Pages
419–437
Publication Date
2023-12-31
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

If I am right, Plantinga’s defense of free will can meet Morriston’s objection.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The logical problem of evil holds that the existence of the theistic God, who is considered omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, is logically incompatible with the existence of evil.
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Key Findings & Data:And the good reason that God has might be the great value of significant freedom – the freedom to choose between moral good and evil.
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Conclusion & Impact:If I am right, Plantinga’s defense of free will can meet Morriston’s objection.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Philosophy of religion · defense of free will · ontological argument

Abstract

The logical problem of evil holds that the existence of the theistic God, who is considered omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. Since there is evil in the world, the existence of the theistic God is then logically impossible. Alvin Plantinga has argued that if God has a good reason to allow evil to exist, the logical problem of evil fails. And the good reason that God has might be the great value of significant freedom – the freedom to choose between moral good and evil. Wesley Morriston objects that Plantinga’s free will defense is incompatible with one of the components of his ontological argument that God is omnibenevolent in every possible world. This paper aims to show that Morriston mistakenly assumes that the free will defense theorist holds the account of significant freedom for both human and divine freedom. If I am right, Plantinga’s defense of free will can meet Morriston’s objection.

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Cite This Article

Taşkın, F. (2023). A Reply to Morriston’s Objection to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. Ilahiyat Studies, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 2, 419–437. https://doi.org/10.12730/is.1277893

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References (10)

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