Journals / Rouya Türkiyyah / 2021 / Cilt: 10 Sayı: 4

Russia’s Policy towards Afghanistan

سياسة روسيا تجاه أفغانستان

Mehmet Çağatay Güler(İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-8604-0449
Pages
25–36
Publication Date
2021-10-01
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The study claims that Russia will face competition for influence in Afghanistan from various countries, namely China, India, Turkey and Iran, provided that this competition is far from creating security threats that would undermine the interests of all parties.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This study aims to analyze Russia’s policy toward Afghanistan in the post-US withdrawal period.
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Key Findings & Data:The study argues that Moscow’s policy toward Afghanistan is determined by two main factors; the first is to maintain the security and stability of the Central Asian countries, which occupy an important place in the Russian foreign policy and to prevent the infiltration of fundamentalist forces into this region.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The study claims that Russia will face competition for influence in Afghanistan from various countries, namely China, India, Turkey and Iran, provided that this competition is far from creating security threats that would undermine the interests of all parties.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Afghanistan · Russia · Central Asia

Abstract

This study aims to analyze Russia’s policy toward Afghanistan in the post-US withdrawal period. The study argues that Moscow’s policy toward Afghanistan is determined by two main factors; the first is to maintain the security and stability of the Central Asian countries, which occupy an important place in the Russian foreign policy and to prevent the infiltration of fundamentalist forces into this region. The second is to undermine the influence of international and regional actors in the region as possible or constraining it in the areas of joint cooperation. The study claims that Russia will face competition for influence in Afghanistan from various countries, namely China, India, Turkey and Iran, provided that this competition is far from creating security threats that would undermine the interests of all parties.

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Cite This Article

Güler, M. Ç. (2021). Russia’s Policy towards Afghanistan. Rouya Türkiyyah, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 4, 25–36. https://ajindex.com/articles/1599971

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