Journals / Rouya Türkiyyah / 2026 / Cilt: 13 Sayı: 2

Iran and Hezbollah in the Context of the Sponsor and Proxy Equation: Follower or Actor?

إيران وحزب الله في سياق معادلة الراعي والوكيل: هل الحزب تابع أو فاعل؟

Talha İsmail Duman(SAKARYA ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-7638-2082
Pages
79–96
Publication Date
2024-06-01
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The study’s results show that Hezbollahis largely independent in its decisions regarding internal Lebanon issues, but while it partially retains its authority in regional decisions, it generally acts in accordance with Iran’s strategic mind.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This article discusses the nature of Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran.
📊
Key Findings & Data:Hezbollah, has a special relationship with Iran through its commitment to the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist, and on the other hand, it is trying to prove that it is a local and national party through movement within the borders of Lebanon.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:The study’s results show that Hezbollahis largely independent in its decisions regarding internal Lebanon issues, but while it partially retains its authority in regional decisions, it generally acts in accordance with Iran’s strategic mind.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:إيران · حزب الله · الجهات الفاعلة غير الحكومية

Abstract

This article discusses the nature of Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran. Hezbollah, has a special relationship with Iran through its commitment to the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist, and on the other hand, it is trying to prove that it is a local and national party through movement within the borders of Lebanon. In this context, the study focuses on the question of whether Hezbollah is a simple affiliate of Iran or an independent actor in its decisions. The study’s results show that Hezbollahis largely independent in its decisions regarding internal Lebanon issues, but while it partially retains its authority in regional decisions, it generally acts in accordance with Iran’s strategic mind.

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Cite This Article

Duman, T. İ. (2024). Iran and Hezbollah in the Context of the Sponsor and Proxy Equation: Follower or Actor?. Rouya Türkiyyah, Cilt: 13 Sayı: 2, 79–96. https://doi.org/10.36360/1560-013-002-006

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