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Journals / Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi / 2025 / Cilt: 9 Sayı: 2

Massive Retaliation Strategy and European Security

Topyekün Mukabele Stratejisi ve Avrupa Güvenliği

Şafak Oğuz(KAPADOKYA ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-6758-175X
Pages
212–225
Publication Date
2025-12-29
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In contrast to Trump's approach of shifting the cost of nuclear weapons to European states, the US historically shouldered the financial burden.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The Trump administration's threat to its European allies that the US will not ensure Europe's security against Russia unless they increase their defense spending has highlighted the long-standing reliance of Europe on the US for security.
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Key Findings & Data:The strategy of massive response remained in place until Soviet missiles could reach US territory, involved covering the cost of conventional troops with nuclear weapons.
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Conclusion & Impact:In contrast to Trump's approach of shifting the cost of nuclear weapons to European states, the US historically shouldered the financial burden.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Topyekün Mukabele · Nükleer Silahlar · Nükleer Strateji

Abstract

The Trump administration's threat to its European allies that the US will not ensure Europe's security against Russia unless they increase their defense spending has highlighted the long-standing reliance of Europe on the US for security. Throughout the Cold War, US nuclear weapons were the foundation of the security guarantee provided to European allies against the Soviet Union. The strategy of massive response remained in place until Soviet missiles could reach US territory, involved covering the cost of conventional troops with nuclear weapons. This strategy formed the basis of the US's nuclear weapons policy and its commitment to its European allies through NATO. In contrast to Trump's approach of shifting the cost of nuclear weapons to European states, the US historically shouldered the financial burden.

Özet

Trump yönetiminin Avrupalı müttefiklerine savunma harcamalarını artırmazlarsa ABD’nin Rusya’ya karşı Avrupa’nın güvenliğini sağlamayacağı tehdidi, Avrupa’nın güvenliğinin uzun süredir ABD’ye bırakıldığı gerçeğini tekrar gündeme getirmiştir. Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD’nin nükleer silahları Sovyetler Birliği tehdidine karşı Avrupalı müttefiklerine sağladığı güvenlik taahhüdün temelini teşkil etmiştir. ABD topraklarının Sovyet füzelerinin menziline girmesine kadar geçen süre içerisinde yürürlükte kalan ve konvansiyonel birliklerin maliyetini nükleer silahlarla karşılayan topyekün mukabele stratejisi, ABD’nin nükleer silah politikasının ve NATO çerçevesinde Avrupalı müttefiklerine yönelik taahhüdünün temelini oluşturmuştur. Yani Trump gibi maliyeti Avrupalı devletlerin üstlenmesini istemek yerine maliyeti nükleer silahlara yüklemiştir.

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Cite This Article

Oğuz, Ş. (2025). Massive Retaliation Strategy and European Security. Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt: 9 Sayı: 2, 212–225. https://ajindex.com/articles/1569364

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