Journals / Journal of Political Administrative and Local Studies / 2026 / Cilt: 9 Sayı: 1

Social Fragmentation and Identity Instrumentalization: Analysis of the Political Dynamics in the Fulani-Dogon Crisis in Central Mali

Pages
1–18
Publication Date
2026-07-13
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

These atrocities normalized mass killings and entrenched mutual fear, further fragmenting society along identity lines.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Central Mali has seen persistent violence between Fulani herders and Dogon farmers, which observers warn that this situation constitutes “an existential threat to a united, peaceful Malian nation”.
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Key Findings & Data:The January 2019 Dan Na Ambassagou attack on the Fulani village of Koulogon-Peulh and the March 2019 Ogossagou massacre (around 160 civilians killed) exemplify how isolated clashes have escalated into collective ethnic violence.
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Conclusion & Impact:These atrocities normalized mass killings and entrenched mutual fear, further fragmenting society along identity lines.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2019 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Identity instrumentalization · Ethnic conflict · Fulani-dogon

Abstract

Central Mali has seen persistent violence between Fulani herders and Dogon farmers, which observers warn that this situation constitutes “an existential threat to a united, peaceful Malian nation”. This study examines how local elites and armed factions have politicized ethnic and religious identities in the Fulani–Dogon crisis to consolidate power. Using a qualitative interpretive analysis of NGO reports, academic studies, and media discourse, it shows that identity-based rhetoric has supplanted traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms and mobilized communities along sectarian lines. These developments have eroded the customary norms of coexistence that once governed herder–farmer relations. In this power vacuum, sectarian narratives have surged. Analysts document that all sides employ “sectarian narratives” aimed at “dehumanizing perceived enemies”. Islamist militants have further inflamed grievances by recruiting among Fulani herders and emphasizing communal identity; their actions inflamed tensions within the Bambara and Dogon, prompting ethnically aligned militias to form. Human Rights Watch finds that some Dogon and Bambara self-defense groups then invoke the fight against Islamists as a pretext to dislodge Fulani from fertile lands, intensifying cycles of reprisal. These identity-laden framings replace earlier local bargaining over resources with communal polarization. Local leaders and militia commanders openly instrumentalize identity to rally supporters. Dogon militias like Dan Na Ambassagou present themselves as ethnic protectors, while Fulani Islamist factions invoke Islamic and Fulani solidarity. ACLED analysts observe that these self-defense forces exacerbate violence by targeting civilians (often Fulani) and turning local disputes into “broader communal wars”. The January 2019 Dan Na Ambassagou attack on the Fulani village of Koulogon-Peulh and the March 2019 Ogossagou massacre (around 160 civilians killed) exemplify how isolated clashes have escalated into collective ethnic violence. These atrocities normalized mass killings and entrenched mutual fear, further fragmenting society along identity lines.

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Cite This Article

Bah, A. H. O. (2026). Social Fragmentation and Identity Instrumentalization: Analysis of the Political Dynamics in the Fulani-Dogon Crisis in Central Mali. Journal of Political Administrative and Local Studies, Cilt: 9 Sayı: 1, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.37460/jpaljournal.1886429

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