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Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2008 / Cilt: 22 - Sayı: 1

Asimetrinin açık artırmalardaki ex ante rüşvete etkileri

Effects of asymetry on ex ante corruption at auctions

Şevket Alper KOÇ
Pages
17–33
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Ex ante bribery might be more profitable for the auctioneer than ex post bribery, in which a bribe is solicited from the winner after bids are submitted.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:I study an auction in which bidders can bribe the auctioneer before they bid and before they know the identity of the winner, with the auctioneer lowering the winner's bid if the winner was the one who paid the bribe.
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Key Findings & Data:In equilibrium, only bidders with valuations higher than some critical value pay the bribe.
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Conclusion & Impact:Ex ante bribery might be more profitable for the auctioneer than ex post bribery, in which a bribe is solicited from the winner after bids are submitted.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

I study an auction in which bidders can bribe the auctioneer before they bid and before they know the identity of the winner, with the auctioneer lowering the winner's bid if the winner was the one who paid the bribe. In equilibrium, only bidders with valuations higher than some critical value pay the bribe. Corruption has no effect on either efficiency or the bidders' expected payoffs when the bidders are symmetric, but may improve efficiency when bidders are symmetric and the required bribe is sufficiently high. Ex ante bribery might be more profitable for the auctioneer than ex post bribery, in which a bribe is solicited from the winner after bids are submitted.

Özet

Bu çalışma mal sahibinin aracısı olan müzayedecinin tüm teklif verenlere yaklaşıp onlara, eğer bir miktar rüşvet verirlerse ve en yüksek teklifi verirlerse tekliflerini değiştirip sadece ikinci en yüksek teklifi ödemelerini söz verdiği bir açık artırma üzerinedir. Dengede, belirli bir miktarın üzerindeki değere sahip teklif verenler rüşveti verecektir ve kendi değerlerini teklif vereceklerdir. Rüşvet ve ahlaki bozulma açık artırmanın verimliliği ve teklif verenlerin biçtikleri değerin dağılımı simetrik iken beklenen kazançları üzerine bir etki yaratmamıştır. Ancak biçilen değerlerin dağılımı asimetrik iken ex ante rüşvet ex post rüşvete göre müzayedeci için daha karlı olabilmektedir.

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Cite This Article

KOÇ, Ş. A. (2008). Asimetrinin açık artırmalardaki ex ante rüşvete etkileri. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 22 - Sayı: 1, 17–33. https://ajindex.com/articles/147305

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