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Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2012 / Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 2

Öğrenci Yerleştirme Problemi: ERASMUS Değişim Programına Uygulanması

Student Placement Problems: An Application to the ERASMUS Exchange Program

Ekrem AKKAYA
Ayşe MUMCU
Pages
63–82
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The paper ultimately aims to introduce a methodology that can be profitably used in designing mechanisms applicable to all exchange programs.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The purpose of this paper is to offer guidelines for student placement mechanisms used in exchange programs which belong to the class of problems that deals with matching students with seats in schools.
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Key Findings & Data:The study also proposes policy recommendations, and shows how the current system can be improved by simulating actual data of the 2009-2010 exchange market for outgoing Boğaziçi University students.
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Conclusion & Impact:The paper ultimately aims to introduce a methodology that can be profitably used in designing mechanisms applicable to all exchange programs.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2009-2010 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to offer guidelines for student placement mechanisms used in exchange programs which belong to the class of problems that deals with matching students with seats in schools. By considering the case of the mechanism applied at Boğaziçi University in placing outgoing students as a part of the ERASMUS program, the paper discusses a set of characteristics that a placement mechanism is intended to satisfy. The study also proposes policy recommendations, and shows how the current system can be improved by simulating actual data of the 2009-2010 exchange market for outgoing Boğaziçi University students. The paper ultimately aims to introduce a methodology that can be profitably used in designing mechanisms applicable to all exchange programs.

Özet

Bu çalışmanın amacı, bir öğrenci-okul eşleştirme problemi kapsamında incelenen değişim programlarında kullanılan öğrenci yerleştirme mekanizmalarına ilişkin ilkeler önermektir. Çalışmada, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi’nde ERASMUS programı ile yurt dışına giden öğrencilerin yurtdışı kurumlara yerleştirilmesinde kullanılan mekanizma bir örnek olarak kullanılarak, yerleştirme mekanizmalarının sağlamaları istenen bir dizi özellik tartışılmaktadır. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi’ndeki 2009-2010 değişim piyasasına dair veri kullanılarak, mevcut mekanizmayı iyileştirecek tavsiyeler önerilmektedir. Çalışma, son kertede, bir değişim programı kapsamında öğrenci yerleştirmelerinde kullanılacak mekanizma tasarımına ilişkin metodolojiyi sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

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Cite This Article

AKKAYA, E., MUMCU, A. (2012). Öğrenci Yerleştirme Problemi: ERASMUS Değişim Programına Uygulanması. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 2, 63–82. https://ajindex.com/articles/144332

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