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Journals / Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies / 2012 / Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 2

Eşitsizlik Karşıtı Tercihlerin Stratejik Avantajı

The Strategic Advantage of Inequality Averse Preferences

Özgür YILMAZ
Pages
83–91
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

We analyze a different type of inter- dependency in games; in particular, we analyze games where players with inequality averse preferences have a strategic advantage over the independent players.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:Abstract It is usually assumed that the sole purpose of agents is to maximize their own material payoff independently from what other agents receive, and that this yields a strategic advantage in terms of receiving a higher payoff compared to other types of players, if any.
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Key Findings & Data:On the contrary, it is shown that in certain subclasses of games, players with negatively interdependent preferences have an unambiguous strategic advantage over the independent players (Koçkesen et al., 2000).
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Conclusion & Impact:We analyze a different type of inter- dependency in games; in particular, we analyze games where players with inequality averse preferences have a strategic advantage over the independent players.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2000 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Domain Parameters

Abstract

Abstract It is usually assumed that the sole purpose of agents is to maximize their own material payoff independently from what other agents receive, and that this yields a strategic advantage in terms of receiving a higher payoff compared to other types of players, if any. On the contrary, it is shown that in certain subclasses of games, players with negatively interdependent preferences have an unambiguous strategic advantage over the independent players (Koçkesen et al., 2000). We analyze a different type of inter- dependency in games; in particular, we analyze games where players with inequality averse preferences have a strategic advantage over the independent players.

Özet

Genel olarak, bireylerin iktisadi kararlar alırken, kendi çıkarlarının azami olmasını sağlamaktan başka bir hedeflerinin olmadığı, herhangi bir paylaşımdan aldıkları faydanın da diğer bireylerin elde ettiklerinden bağımsız olduğu ve bu motivasyonun stratejik bir avantaj sağladığı varsayılır. Fakat gösterilmiştir ki, bazı oyun kümelerinde, diğer bireylerin elde ettikleri ile negatif bir bağımlılık içeren tercihler stratejik bir avantaj sağlamaktadır (Koçkesen v.d., 2000). Bu çalışmada, başka türlü bir bağımlılık içeren tercihleri, eşitsizlik karşıtı tercihleri, stratejik avantaj açısından inceliyoruz.

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Cite This Article

YILMAZ, Ö. (2012). Eşitsizlik Karşıtı Tercihlerin Stratejik Avantajı. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Cilt: 26 - Sayı: 2, 83–91. https://ajindex.com/articles/143787

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