Journals / Felsefe Dünyası / 2024 / Sayı: 80

Berker’s Objection to the Anti-Luminosity Argument

Selim Berker’in Aydınlık-Karşıtı Argümana İtirazı

Pages
58–69
Publication Date
2024-12-15
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Berker’s objection to the anti-luminosity argument.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This article discusses Berker’ criticism of Williamson’s famous anti-luminosity argument.
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Key Findings & Data:According to the anti-luminosity argument, mental conditions are non-luminous and therefore are not open to direct epistemic access, contrary to what most internalists think.
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Conclusion & Impact:The purpose of this paper is to clarify Berker’s objection to the anti-luminosity argument.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Williamson · Berker · aydınlık-karşıtı argüman

Abstract

This article discusses Berker’ criticism of Williamson’s famous anti-luminosity argument. According to the anti-luminosity argument, mental conditions are non-luminous and therefore are not open to direct epistemic access, contrary to what most internalists think. Berker contends that the margins for error principle, namely MAR on which the argument based is groundless. This is because, on Berker’s view, MAR requires either a plausible soritical premise or it is based on a too strong safety requirement. So, the main premise of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument lacks a plausible support. The purpose of this paper is to clarify Berker’s objection to the anti-luminosity argument.

Özet

Bu makalede, Williamson’ın ünlü aydınlık-karşıtı argümanına karşı Berker’in yönelttiği eleştiri ele alınmaktadır. Aydınlık-karşıtı argümana göre, çoğu içselcinin düşündüğünün aksine, zihinsel haller hiç de aydınlık olmayıp doğrudan epistemik erişime kapalıdır. Berker, bu argümanın güvenilir olmadığını çünkü argümanın dayandığı hata payı ilkesinin yani MAR’ın temelsiz olduğunu savunur. Berker için MAR temelsizdir, çünkü MAR ya tartışmalı bir sorites öncülü gerektirir ya da hatalı bir güvenlik şartını esas alır. Dolayısıyla, Williamson’ın aydınlık-karşıtı argümanının temel öncülü iyi bir dayanaktan yoksundur. Bu makalenin amacı, Berker’in itirazını açıklığa kavuşturmaktır.

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Cite This Article

Öztürk, F. S. M. (2024). Berker’s Objection to the Anti-Luminosity Argument. Felsefe Dünyası, Sayı: 80, 58–69. https://doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1459531

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References (13)

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