Journals / Sosyoekonomi / 2020 / Cilt: 28 - Sayı: 44

Fiscal Decentralization with a Redistribution Rule vs. Fiscal Centralization

Mali Merkezîleşme ile Yeniden Dağıtım Kuralı altında Mali Yerelleşmenin Karşılaştırılması

Pages
107–136
Publication Date
2020-04-19
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In addition, when spillovers are not allowed, capital mobility determines which case is superior.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper compares the case of fiscal decentralization (FD) with an intergovernmental transfer rule to the case of fiscal centralization (FC) from a theoretical perspective while focusing on Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium by a continuum of citizens, local governments and a central government, which interact strategically.
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Key Findings & Data:On the other hand, the growth rate of FD is lower than FC case when there are spillovers.
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Conclusion & Impact:In addition, when spillovers are not allowed, capital mobility determines which case is superior.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:Mali Yerelleşme · Mali Merkezîleşme · Yönetimlerarası Transfer/ Yeniden Dağıtım Kuralı

Abstract

This paper compares the case of fiscal decentralization (FD) with an intergovernmental transfer rule to the case of fiscal centralization (FC) from a theoretical perspective while focusing on Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium by a continuum of citizens, local governments and a central government, which interact strategically. Simulation analysis shows both the degree of spillovers and capital mobility play a role in the comparison of these two cases. In the presence of spillovers, the welfare of FD case is higher than the one of FC which is an unexpected result but points out the positive effect of a redistribution rule in FD model in terms of welfare. On the other hand, the growth rate of FD is lower than FC case when there are spillovers. So, fiscal discipline, provided by the redistribution rule, prevents inefficiently low tax rates which pull down the growth rate. In addition, when spillovers are not allowed, capital mobility determines which case is superior.

Özet

Bu çalışma, yönetimlerarası transfer kuralına sahip mali yerelleşme ile mali merkezîleşmenin teorik perspektiften karşılaştırmasını yapmaktadır. Vatandaşların, yerel yönetimlerin ve merkezi hükümetin stratejik olarak etkileşimde olduğu bu modelde Markov-perfect Nash dengesi üzerinde çalışılmıştır. Simülasyon analizleri, yayılma (spillovers) derecesinin ve sermaye hareketliliğinin bu karşılaştırmada etkili olduğunu göstermiştir. Yayılmanın olduğu durumda, mali yerelleşmede görülen refah seviyesinin mali merkezîleşmeden yüksek olduğu görülmüştür. Bu durum beklenmeyen bir sonuç olmasına karşın, transfer kuralının mali yerelleşmeye refah açısından olumlu etkisine işaret etmektedir. Diğer yandan, yayılmanın olması halinde, mali yerelleşme durumunda büyümenin mali merkezîleşmeden düşük olduğu gözlenmiştir. Bu durum, transfer kuralı ile ortaya konan mali disiplinde hedeflenen vergi oranının, çok altına düşememesi sebebiyle büyümenin de yükselmesinin engellendiği sonucuna varılabilir. Yayılmanın olmaması durumunda ise, durumların birbiri üzerindeki üstünlüğünü belirleyenin sermaye hareketliliği olduğu bulunmuştur.

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Cite This Article

BULUT-CEVİK, Z. (2020). Fiscal Decentralization with a Redistribution Rule vs. Fiscal Centralization. Sosyoekonomi, Cilt: 28 - Sayı: 44, 107–136. https://ajindex.com/articles/139246

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