Journals / Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 21 Sayı: 68 - Yeni Dünya Yeni Düzen: Küresel Sistemin Geleceğinde Türkiye

THE STRUCTURAL PARALYSIS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: GREAT POWER POLITICS AND THE GAZA CRISIS

BIRLEŞMIŞ MILLETLER GÜVENLIK KONSEYI’NIN YAPISAL FELCI: BÜYÜK GÜÇ POLITIKALARI VE GAZZE KRIZI

Talha İsmail Duman(SAKARYA ÜNİVERSİTESİ, SAKARYA YENİLİK MERKEZİ)
Mehmet Rakipoğlu(MARDİN ARTUKLU ÜNİVERSİTESİ)
Pages
44–71
Publication Date
2025-06-25
DOI
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Findings reveal that despite broad support from non-permanent members for immediate ceasefire resolutions, strategic alignments—especially the U.S. protection of Israeli interests—paralyzed the Council’s ability to act.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This paper examines the longstanding structural dysfunction of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through an in-depth analysis of its response to the Gaza War between October 2023 and January 2025.
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Key Findings & Data:Drawing on draft resolutions, voting records, and meeting transcripts, it explores how permanent members, particularly the United States, strategically utilized veto power to block or undermine ceasefire initiatives.
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Conclusion & Impact:Findings reveal that despite broad support from non-permanent members for immediate ceasefire resolutions, strategic alignments—especially the U.S. protection of Israeli interests—paralyzed the Council’s ability to act.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2023 Verileri
⚙️Variables:United Nations Security Council (UNSC) · Gaza War · Veto Power

Abstract

This paper examines the longstanding structural dysfunction of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through an in-depth analysis of its response to the Gaza War between October 2023 and January 2025. Drawing on draft resolutions, voting records, and meeting transcripts, it explores how permanent members, particularly the United States, strategically utilized veto power to block or undermine ceasefire initiatives. The paper argues that the veto has evolved from a tool of great-power consensus-building into an instrument of strategic impediment, undermining the Council’s effectiveness in addressing mass humanitarian crises. Findings reveal that despite broad support from non-permanent members for immediate ceasefire resolutions, strategic alignments—especially the U.S. protection of Israeli interests—paralyzed the Council’s ability to act. Even resolutions that passed were substantially weakened through political compromises and legal reinterpretations. The Gaza case thus reveals the substantial limitations of the UNSC’s current structure, reinforcing calls for urgent institutional reform. Without an end to veto abuse, the UNSC risks being irrelevant in future humanitarian catastrophes.

Özet

This paper examines the longstanding structural dysfunction of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through an in-depth analysis of its response to the Gaza War between October 2023 and January 2025. Drawing on draft resolutions, voting records, and meeting transcripts, it explores how permanent members, particularly the United States, strategically utilized veto power to block or undermine ceasefire initiatives. The paper argues that the veto has evolved from a tool of great-power consensus-building into an instrument of strategic impediment, undermining the Council’s effectiveness in addressing mass humanitarian crises. Findings reveal that despite broad support from non-permanent members for immediate ceasefire resolutions, strategic alignments—especially the U.S. protection of Israeli interests—paralyzed the Council’s ability to act. Even resolutions that passed were substantially weakened through political compromises and legal reinterpretations. The Gaza case thus reveals the substantial limitations of the UNSC’s current structure, reinforcing calls for urgent institutional reform. Without an end to veto abuse, the UNSC risks being irrelevant in future humanitarian catastrophes.

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Cite This Article

Duman, T. İ., Rakipoğlu, M. (2025). THE STRUCTURAL PARALYSIS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: GREAT POWER POLITICS AND THE GAZA CRISIS. Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi, Cilt: 21 Sayı: 68 - Yeni Dünya Yeni Düzen: Küresel Sistemin Geleceğinde Türkiye, 44–71. https://ajindex.com/articles/1127207

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