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Journals / Beykent Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 19 Sayı: 1

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE ASSAD REGIME

ESAD REJİMİNİN ÇÖKÜŞÜNDEN SONRA İSRAİL’İN SURİYE’YE YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKASI

Melih Dinçer0000-0003-3079-1512
Pages
18–33
Publication Date
2026-06-30
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

By conceptualising Israel as a regional power, it is possible to understand its foreign policy through offensive realism.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:This article aims to analyse Israeli foreign policy towards Syria after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad.
📊
Key Findings & Data:After the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Israel destroyed Syria’s military power and decided to expand the settlements it established in the Golan Heights.
💡
Conclusion & Impact:By conceptualising Israel as a regional power, it is possible to understand its foreign policy through offensive realism.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2024 Verileri
⚙️Variables:Suriye · İsrail Dış Politikası · Ofansif Realizm

Abstract

This article aims to analyse Israeli foreign policy towards Syria after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad. In order to do this, content and discourse analyses of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statements are conducted. In addition to Netanyahu’s statements, official statements made by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, Defence Minister Israel Katz and the Israel Defense Forces are analysed. After the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Israel destroyed Syria’s military power and decided to expand the settlements it established in the Golan Heights. This study argues that Israel implements a security-oriented foreign policy towards Syria. By conceptualising Israel as a regional power, it is possible to understand its foreign policy through offensive realism.

Özet

Bu makale Beşar Esad’ın devrilmesinden sonra, İsrail’in Suriye’ye yönelik dış politikasını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bunu yapmak için, Başbakan Netanyahu’nun ifadelerinin içerik ve söylem analizleri yapılmaktadır. Netanyahu’nun ifadelerine ek olarak, Dışişleri Bakanı Gideon Sa’ar, Savunma Bakanı Israel Katz ve İsrail Savunma Kuvvetleri tarafından yapılan resmî açıklamalar analiz edilmektedir. 8 Aralık 2024’te, Esad rejiminin çöküşünden sonra İsrail, Suriye’nin askerî gücünü yok etti ve Golan Tepeleri’nde kurduğu yerleşimleri genişletme kararı aldı. Bu çalışma, İsrail’in Suriye’ye yönelik olarak güvenlik odaklı bir dış politika uyguladığını iddia etmektedir. Bölgesel bir güç olarak İsrail’i kavramsallaştırarak ofansif realizm üzerinden dış politikasını anlamak mümkündür.

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Cite This Article

Dinçer, M. (2026). ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE ASSAD REGIME. Beykent Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 19 Sayı: 1, 18–33. https://doi.org/10.18221/bujss.1832305

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