Dergiler / Ekonomi-tek / 2014 / Cilt: 3 - Sayı: 2

Informal Payments to the Tax Collector in Transition Countries

Sayfa
1–26
Yayın Tarihi
2014-05-01
DOI
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⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Importantly, tax-compliance costs significantly affect informal payments.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

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Amaç & Hipotez:In this paper, I empirically examine survey data on the likelihood and frequency of firms’ having to make informal payments or gifts to government officials in transition countries.
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Temel Bulgular & Veri:The firm-level survey data are from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for enterprises in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, including Turkey.
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Sonuç & Katkı:Importantly, tax-compliance costs significantly affect informal payments.
🔬Tür:Uygulamalı Anket & Alan Araştırması
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:Tax collection · informal payments · gifts

Özet

In this paper, I empirically examine survey data on the likelihood and frequency of firms’ having to make informal payments or gifts to government officials in transition countries. The firm-level survey data are from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for enterprises in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, including Turkey. Characteristics of firms are used as explanatory variables along with country characteristics to control for the stage of economic development and current economic conditions at the time the survey data were collected. Probit and selection models of tax inspections, tax-compliance efforts, and firms' informal payments are estimated. The empirical evidence indicates that several specific corporate characteristics influence the likelihood of tax inspections, including employment and the location of the company. Both corporate and country characteristics determine the likelihood of tax officials' requests for informal payments. Importantly, tax-compliance costs significantly affect informal payments.

Abstract

In this paper, I empirically examine survey data on the likelihood and frequency of firms’ having to make informal payments or gifts to government officials in transition countries. The firm-level survey data are from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for enterprises in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, including Turkey. Characteristics of firms are used as explanatory variables along with country characteristics to control for the stage of economic development and current economic conditions at the time the survey data were collected. Probit and selection models of tax inspections, tax-compliance efforts, and firms' informal payments are estimated. The empirical evidence indicates that several specific corporate characteristics influence the likelihood of tax inspections, including employment and the location of the company. Both corporate and country characteristics determine the likelihood of tax officials' requests for informal payments. Importantly, tax-compliance costs significantly affect informal payments.

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Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

ANDERSON, J. E. (2014). Informal Payments to the Tax Collector in Transition Countries. Ekonomi-tek, Cilt: 3 - Sayı: 2, 1–26. https://ajindex.com/articles/753701

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Kaynakça (10)

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  3. Blanchard, Olivier, (1997), The Economics of Post-Communist Transition. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
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  8. Fortin, B., N. Marceau, and L. Savard, (1997), “Taxation, Wage Controls and the Informal Sector,” Journal of Public Economics, 66(2), pp. 293-312.
  9. Gaddy, Clifford, and Barry W. Ickes, (1998a), "Beyond a Bailout: Time to Face Reality About Russia's `Virtual Economy,'" Foreign Affairs, 77 (September/October), pp. 53-67.
  10. Gaddy, Clifford, and Barry W. Ickes, (1998b), "To Restructure or Not To Restructure: Informal Activities and Enterprise Behavior in Transition," Working Paper. Gaddy, Clifford, and Barry W. Ickes, (1998c), “A Simple Four-Sector Model of Russia's `Virtual' Economy,” The Brookings Institution, W