Dergiler / Ortadoğu Etütleri / 2026 / Cilt: 18 Sayı: 2

PARÇALANMIŞ BAĞLAR: HAREDİ MUAFİYETLERİ VE İSRAİL'DE ETNO-CUMHURİYETÇİ VATANDAŞLIĞIN ÇÖKÜŞÜ

SHATTERED BONDS: HAREDI EXEMPTIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF ETHNO-REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP IN ISRAEL

Sayfa
—
Yayın Tarihi
2026-11-16
🏛️Bu makalenin bibliyografik verileri ve tam metin bağlantısı DergiPark üzerinden sağlanmıştır.
DergiPark Kaydı ↗
✨

Yapay Zeka Hızlı Bakış & Çıkarımlar

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Üç teorik çerçeveyi (Cumhuriyetçi Denklem, Sözleşmesel Militarizm ve Teokratikleşme) bütünleştiren bu analiz, muafiyetin işgal için bir "demografik mazeret" olarak işlev gördüğünü, ordunun insan gücü krizini hızlandırırken sistemik eşitsizlikleri maskelediğini göstermektedir.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

🎯
Amaç & Hipotez:İsrail ordusunun 7 Ekim 2023'ten sonraki benzeri görülmemiş seferberliği, derin bir yapısal krizi ortaya çıkardı: Haredi (ultra-Ortodoks) topluluğunun zorunlu askerlik hizmetinden kategorik olarak muaf tutulması.
📊
Temel Bulgular & Veri:Haredi gençlerinin 2050 yılına kadar potansiyel askere alınanların %40'ını oluşturması öngörülürken; devlet bir yandan en hızlı büyüyen bu demografik grubun askerlikten uzak durmasını sübvanse etmekte, diğer yandan giderek küçülen laik ve ulusal-dini tabandan benzeri görülmemiş bir fedakârlık talep etmektedir.
💡
Sonuç & Katkı:Üç teorik çerçeveyi (Cumhuriyetçi Denklem, Sözleşmesel Militarizm ve Teokratikleşme) bütünleştiren bu analiz, muafiyetin işgal için bir "demografik mazeret" olarak işlev gördüğünü, ordunun insan gücü krizini hızlandırırken sistemik eşitsizlikleri maskelediğini göstermektedir.
🔬Tür:Deneysel Tarla Denemesi
📍Kapsam:2023 Verileri
⚙️Değişkenler:Haredi Zorunlu Askerliği · Etno-Cumhuriyetçilik · Askerlik Muafiyeti

Özet

İsrail ordusunun 7 Ekim 2023'ten sonraki benzeri görülmemiş seferberliği, derin bir yapısal krizi ortaya çıkardı: Haredi (ultra-Ortodoks) topluluğunun zorunlu askerlik hizmetinden kategorik olarak muaf tutulması. Bu makale, Haredi muafiyetinin bir politika başarısızlığı olmadığını, aksine askerlik hizmetinin tarihsel olarak vatandaşlık hakları ve toplumsal tahakküm sağladığı bir sistem olan İsrail'in etno-cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlık rejiminin nihai çelişkisi olduğunu savunmaktadır. Üç teorik çerçeveyi (Cumhuriyetçi Denklem, Sözleşmesel Militarizm ve Teokratikleşme) bütünleştiren bu analiz, muafiyetin işgal için bir "demografik mazeret" olarak işlev gördüğünü, ordunun insan gücü krizini hızlandırırken sistemik eşitsizlikleri maskelediğini göstermektedir. Haredi gençlerinin 2050 yılına kadar potansiyel askere alınanların %40'ını oluşturması öngörülürken; devlet bir yandan en hızlı büyüyen bu demografik grubun askerlikten uzak durmasını sübvanse etmekte, diğer yandan giderek küçülen laik ve ulusal-dini tabandan benzeri görülmemiş bir fedakârlık talep etmektedir. Bu dengesizlik, cumhuriyetçi toplumsal sözleşmeyi parçalayarak orduyu uyumlu bir "Halk Ordusu"ndan parçalanmış bir "Piyasa Ordusu"na dönüştürmüştür. Laik orta sınıf sözleşmesel militarizme (hizmeti kişisel kazanç için müzakere edilmiş bir sözleşme olarak ele almaya) çekilirken, ulusal-dini kesim askeri özerkliği kısıtlayan dini koşullar dayatarak muharebe boşluğunu doldurmaktadır. Makale, bu gidişatın izini Ben-Gurion'un 1948'deki taktiksel tavizinden, Yüksek Mahkeme ile Knesset arasındaki 2026 anayasa mücadelesine kadar sürmektedir. Krizin mevcut devlet yapısı içinde çözülemez olduğu sonucuna vararak ya kalıcı bir parçalanmaya ya da Siyonist projenin kendisinin temelden dönüşümüne işaret etmektedir. Bu analiz, farklılaştırılmış vatandaşlığa ve bölgesel genişlemeye dayanan etno-cumhuriyetçi rejimlerin sürdürülemezliğini anlamak için kritik içgörüler sunmaktadır.

Abstract

The unprecedented mobilization of Israel's military following October 7, 2023, exposed a profound structural crisis: the categorical exemption of the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community from compulsory military service. This article argues that the Haredi exemption is not a policy failure but the terminal contradiction of Israel's ethno-republican citizenship regime, a system where military service historically conferred citizenship rights and social dominance. Integrating three theoretical frameworks (the Republican Equation, Contractual Militarism, and Theocratization), the analysis demonstrates that the exemption functions as a “demographic alibi” for the occupation, masking systemic inequalities while accelerating the military's manpower crisis. As Haredi youth are projected to comprise 40% of potential conscripts by 2050, the state demands unprecedented sacrifice from a shrinking secular and national-religious base while subsidizing the abstention of its fastest-growing demographic. This imbalance has fractured the republican social contract, transforming the military from a cohesive "People's Army" into a fragmented “Market Army”. The secular middle class retreats into contractual militarism (treating service as a negotiated contract for personal gain), while the national-religious sector fills the combat vacuum, imposing religious conditions that restrict military autonomy. The article traces this trajectory from Ben-Gurion's 1948 tactical concession to the 2026 constitutional warfare between the Supreme Court and the Knesset. It concludes that the crisis is insoluble within the existing state structure, pointing toward either permanent fragmentation or fundamental transformation of the Zionist project itself. This analysis offers critical insights for understanding the unsustainability of ethno-republican regimes predicated on differential citizenship and territorial expansion.

🔖

Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Şerif, M. (2026). PARÇALANMIŞ BAĞLAR: HAREDİ MUAFİYETLERİ VE İSRAİL'DE ETNO-CUMHURİYETÇİ VATANDAŞLIĞIN ÇÖKÜŞÜ. Ortadoğu Etütleri, Cilt: 18 Sayı: 2. https://doi.org/10.47932/ortetut.2025822

📄 Tam Metin PDF Okuyucu

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

Kaynakça (54)

  1. Adres, E., Vanhuysse, P., & Vashdi, D. R. (2012). The individual’s level of globalism and citizen commitment to the state: The tendency to evade military service in Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 38(1), 92–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X11398452
  2. Almasi, O. (2022). Yisum ha-chok dehiyat sheret li-talmidei yeshivot she-toratam omanutam (chok Tal) [Implementing the law on postponing service for yeshiva students whose profession is studying Torah (Tal law)] Knesset. https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/info/research/pages/incident.aspx?ver=2&docid=a74c6b58-e9f7-e411-80c8-00155d010977
  3. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. (2024, April 22). Haredim conscription and the future of Netanyahu’s coalition. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/haredim-conscription-crisis-and-future-of-netanyahu-coalition.pdf
  4. Arnaout, A. R. (2026, February 16). Ultra-Orthodox Jews protest mandatory military draft near West Jerusalem. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/ultra-orthodox-jews-protest-mandatory-military-draft-near-west-jerusalem/3831685
  5. Ashkenazi, E. (2024, June 26). How Ben-Gurion’s pragmatic decision led to haredim draft exemption—Analysis. The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-807773
  6. Bagno-Moldavsky, O. (2016). The IDF and the ultra-Orthodox: Economic aspects of conscription. In M. Elran & R. Gal (Eds.), Military service in Israel: Challenges and ramifications (Memorandum No. 159, pp. 93–105). Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/memo159.pdf
  7. Bank of Israel. (2025, March). Annual report 2024. https://www.boi.org.il/media/upvdwfe5/2024-full-r.pdf
  8. Bard, M. (2026, July 15). The Haredi challenge is becoming Israel’s national security crisis. Jewish News Syndicate. https://www.jns.org/opinion/column/mitchell-bard/the-haredi-challenge-is-becoming-israels-national-security-crisis
  9. Ben-Ari, E. (2023, December 26). Will the existing conscription model meet the needs of the IDF after the Gaza war? https://jiss.org.il/en/ben-ari-will-the-existing-conscription-model-meet-the-needs-of-the-idf/
  10. Ben-Ari, E., Rosman, E., & Shamir, E. (2023). Neither a conscript army nor an all-volunteer force: Emerging recruiting models. Armed Forces & Society, 49(1), 138–159. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211048216
  11. Ben-Porat, G., & Huss, B. (2025). Good citizens: Legitimization strategies of new religious movements in Israel. Politics and Religion, 18(1), 130–148. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175504832400035X
  12. Bob, Y. J. (2025, March 10). IDF plans to summon 14,000 haredim, expects shortfall in 2025 draft goals. The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-845512
  13. Bohbot, A. (2026, July 20). Mandatory service extension will not solve army manpower crisis, head of IDF personnel warns. The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-903027
  14. Cahaner, L., & Malach, G. (2025). Report on ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) society in Israel 2025: Executive summary. The Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/media/30207/final-final-haredi-shnaton-2025-pdf.pdf
  15. Cohen, R. S. (2024, January 13). Israel’s ‘people’s army’ at war. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/13/israel-hamas-war-gaza-idf-october-7-military/
  16. Cohen, S. A. (2007). Tensions between military service and Jewish orthodoxy in Israel: Implications imagined and real. Israel Studies, 12(1), 103–126. https://doi.org/10.2979/ISR.2007.12.1.103
  17. Cohen, S. A. (2008). Israel and its army: From cohesion to confusion. Routledge.
  18. Cohen, S. A. (Ed.). (2010). The new citizen armies: Israel’s armed forces in comparative perspective. Routledge.
  19. Çınkara, G. (2024, Şubat). İsrail’de rezerv askerlerin toplumsal mobilizasyonu ve Gazze Savaşı. Kriter Dergi, (87). https://kriterdergi.com/dis-politika/israilde-rezerv-askerlerin-toplumsal-mobilizasyonu-ve-gazze-savasi
  20. Dagan, N., Cohen, A., & Fuchs, A. (2026, January 21). Conscription of Haredi yeshiva students to the IDF and the emerging constitutional crisis. The Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/63168
  21. Elran, M., Gal, R., Sheffer, G., Eiland, G., Lifshitz, Y., Tiargan-Orr, R., & The Institute for National Security Studies (Eds.). (2016). Military service in Israel: Challenges and ramifications. The Institute for National Security Studies.
  22. Gross, J. A. (2025, April 30). Israel’s religious community has shouldered a disproportionate burden in the past 18 months of war: A rabbi weighs in on what that portends. eJewish Philanthropy. https://ejewishphilanthropy.com/israels-religious-community-has-shouldered-a-disproportionate-burden-in-the-past-18-months-of-war-a-rabbi-weighs-in-on-what-that-portends/
  23. Hadar, M., & Häkkinen, T. (2022). Conscription and willingness to defend as cornerstones of national defense in Israel and Finland. Journal of Political & Military Sociology, 47(2), 188–218. DOI:10.5744/jpms/2020/2004
  24. Herzog, B. (2023). Elevating the significance of military service: Knesset members and republican values. National Identities, 25(5), 501–515. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2023.2214094
  25. Israel Policy Forum. (2024). The Haredi exemption. https://israelpolicyforum.org/the-haredi-exemption/
  26. Jing, L. (2025). Faith, duty and the Haredi draft crisis in Israel (RSIS Commentary No. CO25236). S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/faith-duty-and-the-haredi-draft-crisis-in-israel/
  27. Karmel, A. (2026, July 15). Coalition passes law gutting attorney general’s powers, removing key check on government. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/coalition-passes-law-gutting-attorney-generals-powers-removing-key-check-on-government/
  28. Levaton, S. (2025, November 18). Comptroller finds state fumbled pay, protections for overburdened reservists. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/comptroller-finds-state-fumbled-pay-protections-for-overburdened-reservists/
  29. Levy, Y. (2009). Is there a motivation crisis in military recruitment in Israel? Israel Affairs, 15(2), 135–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537120902734426
  30. Levy, Y. (2014). The theocratization of the Israeli military. Armed Forces & Society, 40(2), 269–294. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12466071
  31. Levy, Y. (2022). The legitimacy crisis of the conscription model. Strategic Assessment. https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/the-legitimacy-crisis-of-the-conscription-model/
  32. Levy, Y., Lomsky-Feder, E., & Harel, N. (2007). From ‘obligatory militarism’ to ‘contractual militarism’—Competing models of citizenship. Israel Studies, 12(1), 127–148. https://doi.org/10.1353/is.2007.0004
  33. Lifshitz, Y. (2016). Compulsory conscription or mobilization using market forces: Economic aspects. In M. Elran, R. Gal, G. Sheffer, G. Eiland, Y. Lifshitz, R. Tiargan-Orr, & The Institute for National Security Studies (Eds.), Military service in Israel: Challenges and ramifications. The Institute for National Security Studies.
  34. Linthicum, K. (2024, March 13). Israel’s religious right has a clear plan for Gaza: ‘We are occupying, deporting and settling’. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2024-03-13/israel-religious-nationalists-gaza
  35. Malach, G., Yakir, I., & Portal, R. K. (2026). Haredim in Israel 2050: Demographic projections and economic and security scenarios. Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/63385
  36. Malchi, A. (2018, October 16). The “people’s army”? The Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/24626
  37. Mekelberg, Y. (2025, December 13). Haredi draft dodging is tearing Israeli society apart. Arab News. https://arab.news/84mvd
  38. Moghadam, A. (1999, February 11). Army and society in Israel: An evolving relationship. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/army-and-society-israel-evolving-relationship
  39. Muhareb, M. (2024). The retreat of Israel’s reserve forces (Policy Analysis). Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/israeli-reserve-forces-structure-and-declining-role.aspx
  40. Neev, K. (2026, July 14). Knesset votes to freeze arrests of ultra-Orthodox draft evaders amid IDF manpower crisis. The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-902492
  41. Patir, Y. (2025, July 25). Israel’s conscription crisis—The debate over the ultra-Orthodox draft law. J Street. https://jstreet.org/israels-conscription-crisis-the-debate-over-the-ultra-orthodox-draft-law/
  42. Rosman-Stollman, E. (2005). Religion and the military as greedy frameworks: Religious Zionism and the Israel Defense Forces [Doctoral dissertation, Bar-Ilan University]. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/6320
  43. Schimmelpfennig, Y. (2026, June 24). The Haredi threshold. The Times of Israel. https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-haredi-threshold/
  44. Shafir, G., & Peled, Y. (2002). Being Israeli: The dynamics of multiple citizenship. Cambridge University Press.
  45. Shany, Y., & Lavi, M. (2024, March 7). Development of the Haredi exemption law. The Israel Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/53301
  46. Sharf, S. (2025, February). A conservative judge in the State of Israel. Hashiloach Frontlines. https://en.hashiloach.org.il/a-conservative-judge-in-the-state-of-israel/
  47. Sharon, A. (2024, January 1). Recent developments in Israeli law. Versa. https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/movement-quality-government-v-knesset
  48. Sharon, J. (2026, September 4). High Court annuls Haredi draft-dodger arrest ban as unconstitutional violation of equality. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-annuls-haredi-draft-dodger-arrest-ban-as-unconstitutional-violation-of-equality/
  49. Tercatin, R. (2026, February 10). By 2050, almost one in four Israelis will be ultra-Orthodox, study indicates. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/by-2050-almost-one-in-four-israelis-will-be-ultra-orthodox-study-indicates/
  50. The I Center. (2026). FAQ: Haredim. https://theicenter.org/icenter_resources/faq-haredim/
  51. Times of Israel. (2025, January 1). Survey: Public support for conscripting ultra-Orthodox has surged throughout war. https://www.timesofisrael.com/survey-public-support-for-conscripting-ultra-orthodox-has-surged-throughout-war/
  52. Wagner, M. (2024, November 1). As religious Zionist IDF casualties rise, so does resentment of Haredi exemption bill. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-religious-zionist-idf-casualties-rise-so-does-resentment-of-haredi-exemption-bill/
  53. Yoaz, Y. (2005, September 27). Justice minister: Implementation of Tal Law ‘unsatisfactory’. Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/2005-09-27/ty-article/justice-minister-implementation-of-tal-law-unsatisfactory/0000017f-f47e-d47e-a37f-fd7eeff60000
  54. Ziv, G. (2025). Military reservists and the resistance to Netanyahu’s legal overhaul. Middle East Policy, 32(2), 33–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12810