Dergiler / Siirt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 14 Sayı: 1

Bulut Altyapısı ve Yapay Zekâ Yönetişiminde Platform Otoritesi: Altyapısal Yerleştirme, Epistemik Bağımlılık ve Tahayyüllerin Dengelenmesi

Platform Authority in Cloud Infrastructure and AI Governance: Infrastructural Embedding, Epistemic Capture, and Imaginative Stabilization

Güliz Dinç(ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY)0000-0003-0350-0556
Serpil Seda Şimşek(Jandarma ve Sahil Güvenlik Akademisi, Güvenlik Bilimleri Fakültesi, Sosyal Bilimler Bölüm Başkanlığı)0000-0001-8016-5566
Sayfa
273–291
Yayın Tarihi
2026-06-30
🏛️Bu makalenin bibliyografik verileri ve tam metin bağlantısı DergiPark üzerinden sağlanmıştır.
DergiPark Kaydı ↗
✨

Yapay Zeka Hızlı Bakış & Çıkarımlar

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(1 Cümlede Hızlı Çıkarım)

Analiz, bu mekanizmaların etkinliğinin kurumsal tasarım, düzenleyici gelenek ve yönetim tasarım seçimleri tarafından belirlendiğini göstermektedir.

📌 3 Maddede Bu Makale

🎯
Amaç & Hipotez:Az sayıda özel dijital platform şirketi, resmi olarak demokratik kurumlara ait olan yönetim yetkisini ele geçirmiştir.
📊
Temel Bulgular & Veri:Bu platform yetkisinin işleyiş biçimi ve kapsamı, uygulandığı bağlamların kurumsal yapılanması ve düzenleyici geleneklerinden etkilenmektedir.
💡
Sonuç & Katkı:Analiz, bu mekanizmaların etkinliğinin kurumsal tasarım, düzenleyici gelenek ve yönetim tasarım seçimleri tarafından belirlendiğini göstermektedir.
🔬Tür:Modelleme & Sayısal Simülasyon
📍Kapsam:Genişletilmiş Akademik Örneklem
⚙️Değişkenler:dijital yönetişim · platform otoritesi · post-demokrasi

Özet

Az sayıda özel dijital platform şirketi, resmi olarak demokratik kurumlara ait olan yönetim yetkisini ele geçirmiştir. Bu platform yetkisinin işleyiş biçimi ve kapsamı, uygulandığı bağlamların kurumsal yapılanması ve düzenleyici geleneklerinden etkilenmektedir. Bu çalışma, yoğunlaşmış platform yetkisinin Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Birleşik Krallık ve Avrupa Birliği’nde bulut altyapısı ve yapay zeka yönetimi olmak üzere iki dijital alanda nasıl işlediğini incelemektedir. Oligarşi teorisi, Bilim ve Teknoloji Çalışmaları ve Castelfranchi’nin vesayet ilişkileri teorisinden yararlanılarak, platform yetkisinin post-demokratik koşullar altında işlediği üç mekanizma belirlenmiştir: altyapısal yerleştirme, epistemik bağımlılık ve imgelemlerin yerleşmesi. Birincil politika belgeleri, düzenleyici çerçeveler ve yönetim metinlerinin nitel karşılaştırmalı vaka çalışması analizi yoluyla, çalışma bu mekanizmaların üç bağlamda da farklı yoğunluklarda ve sonuçlarla nasıl işlediğini izlemektedir. Analiz, bu mekanizmaların etkinliğinin kurumsal tasarım, düzenleyici gelenek ve yönetim tasarım seçimleri tarafından belirlendiğini göstermektedir. Bulgular, Avrupa Birliği’nin bağlayıcı yasal çerçevesinin platform otoritesini kısmen sınırlandırabildiğini, ABD’nin dijital platformlar tarafından üretilen bilgiye bağımlılığı nedeniyle epistemik ele geçirmeye en açık bağlam oluşturduğunu, Birleşik Krallık’ın ise gönüllü iş birliğine dayalı hibrit bir model sergilediğini göstermektedir. Çalışma, bu üç bağlamda kamu yönetişiminin platform şirketlerine yapısal bağımlılığının demokratik hesap verebilirliği zedeleyerek paternalist vesayet ilişkileri ürettiğini ve demokratik yönetişimin korunmasının kurumsal bağımsızlığa ve alternatif dijital yönetişim imgelerinin geliştirilmesine bağlı olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Abstract

A small number of private digital platform companies have acquired governance authority that formally belongs to democratic institutions. The mode of operation and the extent of this platform authority is influenced by the institutional configuration and regulatory traditions of the contexts in which it is exercised. This study examines how concentrated platform authority operates across two digital domains, namely cloud infrastructure and AI governance in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Drawing on oligarchy theory, Science and Technology Studies, and Castelfranchi’s theory of tutelary relationships, three mechanisms through which platform authority operates under post-democratic conditions are identified which are infrastructural embedding, epistemic capture, and imaginative stabilization. Through qualitative comparative case study analysis of primary policy documents, regulatory frameworks, and governance texts, the study traces how these mechanisms operate across all three contexts with different intensities and outcomes. The analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of these mechanisms is determined by institutional design, regulatory tradition, and governance design choices. The findings show that the EU’s binding legal framework partially constrains platform authority, the US constitutes the most vulnerable context due to its dependence on knowledge generated by digital platforms and the UK exhibits a hybrid model based on voluntary cooperation. The study argues that structural dependence of public governance on platform companies across all three contexts undermines democratic accountability and produces paternalistic tutelary relationships, and that preserving democratic governance in digital infrastructures depends on institutional independence and the cultivation of alternative digital governance imaginaries.

🔖

Bu Makaleye Atıf Yap

Dinç, G., Şimşek, S. S. (2026). Bulut Altyapısı ve Yapay Zekâ Yönetişiminde Platform Otoritesi: Altyapısal Yerleştirme, Epistemik Bağımlılık ve Tahayyüllerin Dengelenmesi. Siirt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 1, 273–291. https://doi.org/10.53586/susbid.1899090

📄 Tam Metin PDF Okuyucu

📄

PDF görüntüleyici hazırlanıyor...

Kaynakça (67)

  1. AI Security Institute (AISI). (2025). Frontier AI trends report. https://www.aisi.gov.uk/frontier-ai-trends-report
  2. Baburajan, R. (2025). US cloud providers dominate 70% of €70 bn European market in 2024. https://infotechlead.com/cloud/us-cloud-providers-dominate-70-of-e70-bn-european-market-in-2024-90476
  3. Bradford, A. (2023). Digital empires: The global battle to regulate technology. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197649268.001.0001
  4. Brill, J. (2018, May 21). Microsoft's commitment to GDPR, privacy and putting customers in control of their own data. Microsoft On the Issues.
  5. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/05/21/microsofts-commitment-to-gdpr-privacy-and- putting-customers-in-control-of-their-own-data/
  6. Castelfranchi, C. (2022). A theory of tutelary relationships. Springer.
  7. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). (2025). Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). https://security.cms.gov/learn/fedramp
  8. CISPE. (2021). CISPE data protection code of conduct. Cloud Infrastructure Services Providers in Europe. https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2023- 03/2021_cispe_cloud_iaas_data_protection_code_of_conduct_-_gdpr_compliance_0.pdf
  9. CISPE. (2025a). About CISPE. Cloud Infrastructure Services Providers in Europe. https://cispe.cloud
  10. CISPE. (2025b). Sovereign cloud manifesto. Cloud Infrastructure Services Providers in Europe. https://www.cispe.cloud/website_cispe/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Sovereignty-Manifesto-FINAL.pdf
  11. Cohen, J. E. (2025). Oligarchy, state, and cryptopia. Fordham Law Review, 94(2), 563-625.
  12. Crouch, C. (2004). Post-democracy. Polity Press.
  13. Crown Commercial Service. (2025). G-Cloud 13 framework terms and conditions.
  14. https://www.crowncommercial.gov.uk
  15. Department of Defense. (2024, March 21). Defense industrial base cybersecurity strategy 2024. https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/DIB-CS-Strategy.pdf
  16. Diker Vanberg, A. (2023). Coordinating digital regulation in the UK: Is the digital regulation cooperation forum (DRCF) up to the task? International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 37(2), 128–146. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2023.2192566
  17. Donnelly, C. (2025, December 19). UK government's G-Cloud 15 framework: Everything you need to know. Computer Weekly. https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/UK-governments-G-Cloud-15-framework- Everything-you-need-to-know
  18. Drisko, J. W., & Maschi, T. (2015). Content analysis. Oxford University Press.
  19. Dudley, R. (2026, March 18). Federal cyber experts thought Microsoft's cloud was "a pile of shit." They approved it anyway. ProPublica. https://www.propublica.org/article/microsoft-cloud-fedramp-cybersecurity- government
  20. Eriksen, E. O. (2023). Three modes of administrative behaviour: Differentiated policy implementation and the problem of legal certainty. Journal of European Public Policy, 30(12), 2623–2642. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2125047
  21. European Commission. (2026). AI Office: Implementing the AI Act.
  22. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-office
  23. European Commission, Directorate-General for Digital Services. (2025, October). Cloud sovereignty framework (Version 1.2.1). https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/09579818-64a6-4dd5-9577- 446ab6219113_en
  24. European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2024). Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal of the European Union, L 2024/1689. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? uri=CELEX:32024R1689
  25. Executive Order No. 14110. (2023). Safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence, 88 Fed. Reg. 75191. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/11/01/2023-24283/safe-secure-and- trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence
  26. Executive Order No. 14179. (2025). Removing barriers to American leadership in artificial intelligence, 90 Fed. Reg. 8741. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/23/2025-01921/removing-barriers-to- american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence
  27. FedRAMP. (2025, March 24). FedRAMP in 2025. General Services Administration. https://www.fedramp.gov/2025-03-24-FedRAMP-in-2025/
  28. FedRAMP Authorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 1750 (2022).
  29. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7776
  30. Fischer, F. (1990). Technocracy and the politics of expertise. SAGE Publications.
  31. Gaffey, D. W. (2010). Outsourcing infrastructure: Expanding the use of public-private partnerships in the United States. Public Contract Law Journal, 39(2), 351–372.
  32. General Services Administration (GSA). (2025, August 7). GSA announces OneGov agreement with AWS. https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/gsa-announces-onegov-agreement-with-aws- 08072025
  33. George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press.
  34. Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35.
  35. Hale, C. (2025, August 8). AWS is giving the US government $1 billion credit to keep running its cloud services. TechRadar.
  36. https://www.techradar.com/pro/aws-is-giving-the-us-government-usd1billion-credit-to-keep-running-its- cloud-services
  37. Helmond, A. (2015). The platformization of the web: Making web data platform ready. Social Media + Society, 1(2), 1–11.
  38. Ho, C. W.-L., & Caals, K. (2024). How the EU AI Act seeks to establish an epistemic environment of trust. Asian Bioethics Review, 16(3), 345–372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41649-024-00304-6
  39. Hornstein, O. (2026, February 20). OpenAI and Microsoft pledge millions to fund UK's AI Security Institute. UKTN.https://www.uktech.news/ai/openai-and-microsoft-pledge-millions-to-fund-uks-ai-security- institute-20260220
  40. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). (2025). Cloud computing environment. https://www.irs.gov/privacy- disclosure/cloud-computing-environment
  41. Jasanoff, S. (2015). Future imperfect: Science, technology, and the imaginations of modernity. In S. Jasanoff & S.-H. Kim (Eds.), Dreamscapes of modernity: Sociotechnical imaginaries and the fabrication of power (pp. 1– 33). University of Chicago Press.
  42. Jones, J., Milner-Smith, A., Ramsay, L., & Athwal, S. (2025, October 28). Global AI governance law and policy: United Kingdom. International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP). https://iapp.org/resources/article/global-ai-governance-uk
  43. Joosen, R., & Zhelyazkova, A. (2022). How do supranational regulators keep companies in line? An analysis of the enforcement styles of EU agencies. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(4), 983–1000. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13294
  44. Kalmenovitz, J., Lowry, M., & Volkova, E. V. (2025). Regulatory fragmentation. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13423
  45. Khutsishvili, K. (2025, September 10). A false confidence in the EU AI Act: Epistemic gaps and bureaucratic traps. TechPolicy.Press. https://www.techpolicy.press/a-false-confidence-in-the-eu-ai-act-epistemic- gaps-and-bureaucratic-traps/
  46. Larkin, B. (2013). The politics and poetics of infrastructure. Annual Review of Anthropology, 42(1), 327–343.
  47. Meinhardt, C., Zhang, D., King, J., Haupt, A., & Cryst, E. (2025, July 24). Inside Trump's ambitious AI action plan. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI. https://hai.stanford.edu/news/inside-trumps-ambitious-ai- action-plan
  48. Merriam, S. B., & Tisdell, E. J. (2015). Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation (4th ed.). Jossey-Bass.
  49. Ofcom. (2023, October 5). Cloud services market study: Final report. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/consultations/category-3-4-weeks/244808-cloud-services-market-study/associated-documents/cloud-services-market-study-final-report.pdf?v=330228#page=19.08
  50. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). (2024, July 25). M-24-15: Modernizing the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/M-24-15-Modernizing-the-Federal-Risk-and-Authorization-Management-Program.pdf
  51. Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251–267. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586011
  52. Plantin, J.-C., & Punathambekar, A. (2019). Digital media infrastructures: Pipes, platforms, and politics. Media, Culture & Society, 41(2), 163–174. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443718818376
  53. Prime Minister’s Office, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, & Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. (2023). The Bletchley Declaration by countries attending the AI Safety Summit. UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023
  54. Prior, L. (2003). Using documents in social research. SAGE Publications. Public Accounts Committee (PAC). (2025, June 6). Government's relationship with digital technology suppliers: Twenty-seventh report of session 2024–26 (HC 363). House of Commons. https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/48200/documents/252289/default/
  55. Rhodes, R. A. W. (2017). Network governance and the differentiated polity: Selected essays. Oxford University Press.
  56. Sadowski, J., & Bendor, R. (2019). Selling smartness: Corporate narratives and the smart city as a sociotechnical imaginary. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 44(3), 540–563. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243918806061
  57. Sadowski, J., & Guston, D. H. (2015). Technology assessment in the USA: Distributed institutional governance. Technikfolgenabschätzung – Theorie und Praxis, 24(1), 53–59.
  58. Schlesinger, P. (2022). The neo-regulation of internet platforms in the United Kingdom. Policy & Internet, 14(1), 47–62. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.288 Schreier, M. (2014). Qualitative content analysis. In U. Flick (Ed.), The Sage handbook of qualitative data analysis (pp. 170–183). Sage.
  59. Science, Innovation and Technology Committee. (2024). Governance of artificial intelligence (AI): Third report of session 2023–24 (HC 38). House of Commons. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmsctech/38/report.html
  60. Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity Press. Synergy Research Group. (2025, November 19). Cloud market share trends: Big three together hold 63% while Oracle and the neoclouds inch higher. https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/cloud-market-share-trends-big-three-together-hold-63-while-oracle-and-the-neoclouds-inch-higher
  61. UK Government. (2023a, June 19). Government cloud first policy. Cabinet Office. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/government-cloud-first-policy
  62. UK Government. (2023b). Introducing the AI Safety Institute. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-institute-overview/introducing-the-ai-safety-institute
  63. UK Government. (2024). A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation: Government response to consultation. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-regulation-a-pro-innovation-approach/
  64. U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute (AISI). (2024). Strategic vision for the U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute. National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://www.nist.gov/document/aisi-strategic-vision-document
  65. White House. (2025). America's AI action plan. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf
  66. Winner, L. (1980). Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus, 109(1), 121–136.
  67. Winters, J. A. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press.